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Abstract
The EU provides a new context for minority nationalist parties, not only to conceive 
their long-term political project, but also to organise their mobilisation. New institutional 
and representational opportunities have emerged from multi-level European politics, 
through the European Parliament, the Committee of the Regions, the EU Regional Policy, 
etc. This thesis looks at the impact of European integration on minority nationalist 
mobilisation in France. The French position on internal diversity-still largely influenced by 
Jacobinism - is emblematic of the tensions existing between minority nationalism and the 
concept of nation-state. This makes it a valuable “hard” case to assess the significance of 
the EU for minority nationalist contestation in member states. Evidence gathered from 
three parties in Brittany (UDB), Corsica (UPC) and the Northern Basque Country (AB) 
shows that minority nationalists have found it hard to participate in European politics and 
to access the European political space. As a result of a lack of institutional recognition and 
parliamentary representation, minority nationalists in France are constrained to operate 
exclusively at the local level. Consequently, and unlike many minority nationalists in 
Europe, none of these parties have conceived the EU as an alternative to their relations 
with the French state and/or fully reformulated their demands in accordance with the 
European level. European integration has nevertheless entered the strategic 
considerations of minority nationalists in France, albeit to different degrees. Unlike what 
could be expected from their trans-border identity, Northern Basque nationalists have 
perceived the least opportunity in Europe for their mobilisation. It is argued that this is 
because AB does not mobilise in an institutionalised region. The regional status of Brittany 
and Corsica has involved both regions in the European policy-making process and this is 
why European resources have proved valuable to the UDB and the UPC. In the end, 
though, the comparison of the Breton and Corsican cases shows that the value of Europe 
as a strategy is contingent on the level of exclusivity that minority nationalists can claim on 
the European issue within their local political spheres.
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Chapter 1 -  Introduction
Academic commentators have portrayed minority nationalists as fervent supporters 
of European integration. The pro-Europeanism of these parties has been noted in almost 
all datasets on party attitudes towards the EU (Ray, 1999; Marks, Hooghe, Nelson & 
Edwards, 2006), granting them to be referred to as the “Europhile fringe” of European 
party systems (Jolly, 2007). Europe has, since the 1980s, become a key feature in the 
programmes and campaigns of these political actors demanding self-government on 
behalf of regional minorities. Minority nationalists have been vocal advocates of the 
Europe of the Regions, a future European polity where political power would be shared 
between the European and regional levels (Elias, 2008). The kind of multi-level politics 
emerging in Europe has been seen as providing new ways of accommodating minority 
nationalist demands. The transfer of competences to the EU has been interpreted by 
minority nationalists as the sign of a weakening of the state, i.e. their traditional adversary. 
By challenging the state as the sole basis of political authority, European integration has 
seemingly opened up unprecedented avenues for the resolution of the minority nationalist 
predicament. Accordingly, several minority nationalists have reformulated their long-term 
political project to demand self-government within some kind of European framework 
(Lynch, 1996). For instance, Plaid Cymru has called for a “full national status” for Wales 
within a Europe of the Regions, while Convergencia i Unio outlined a vision of Catalonia 
within a plurinational Spain and a regional Europe, within which subnational actors would 
participate equally in European decision-making alongside member states. This shared 
desire among minority nationalist parties to create a different kind of Europe also led to the 
consolidation of a new Euro-party, namely the European Free Alliance-Democratic Party 
of the Peoples of Europe (De Winter & Gomez-Reino, 2002; Lynch, 2007).
Yet, the dynamics underlying the relationship between European integration and 
minority nationalist mobilisation remain a largely unexplored area of research. The alleged 
unequivocal support of minority nationalists for the EU is remarkable considering that in 
many other respects -  long-term political project, ideology, organisation, etc. - they form a 
rather heterogeneous party family. First, while these parties share a claim to self- 
determination on behalf of their minority nation, their main demands for self-government 
have taken different forms such as regionalisation, cultural autonomy, federalism, 
independence, etc. Minority nationalist parties are also spread widely across the 
ideological spectrum, from the Italian Lega Nord on the extreme right to the Belgian 
Volksunie on the extreme left. Even more importantly in relation to their interactions with 
higher levels of government such as the EU, the electoral and political fortunes of minority 
nationalist parties vary considerably. These diverse fortunes reflect the different stages of 
mobilisation in which the parties find themselves. From group awareness to self­
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determination, minority nationalist mobilisation is a process along which some minority 
nationalists are more advanced than others. Some of these parties have already achieved 
self-government and have flourished to become the main political forces within powerful 
autonomous regions. The Partido Nacionalista Vasco has led the Basque regional 
government ever since the creation of the Comunidad Autonoma del Pais Vasco in 19781. 
After being the main opposition party in Scotland since British devolution, the Scottish 
National Party has become the largest party in the Scottish Parliament following the 2007 
elections. Other minority nationalists have a long record of regional government 
involvement but their minority nationalist aspirations are not dominant within their territory. 
The Partito d’Azione Sardo has had its electoral breakthrough at the end of the 1980s - 
party leader Mario Melis was President of Sardinia between 1984 and 1989 and the party 
was also represented in the Italian Parliament from 1989 to 1994 -  but has since seen its 
electoral support diminish and stabilise around 5 percent. The electoral performance of the 
Bloque Nacionalista Galego has made a slow but steady progression since its creation in 
1982. Galician nationalists have achieved representation in the Spanish Parliament since 
1996 and have for the first time succeeded in forming a coalition government with the 
Socialist Party of Galicia between 2005 and 2009. Yet another kind of minority nationalists 
are still in the process of establishing, and mobilising support around, the specificity of 
their regional minority. These parties are minor political players even within their own 
regions, which have not achieved institutional recognition. The Union Democratique 
Bretonne has mobilised for an autonomous and reunified Brittany since 1964 but only 
gained representation in the Breton Council in 2004, through an electoral alliance with the 
Green Party. Mebyon Kernowwas created in 1951 to campaign for the self-government of 
Cornwall and maintained a small representation in district, parish and town councils. As of 
1st April 2009, the county of Cornwall has been turned into a unitary authority and the party 
obtained three seats in the newly created Cornish Council.
As these examples demonstrate, minority nationalist mobilisation is far from a 
uniform concept and the question that constitutes the starting point of this research is: how 
could European integration have the same significance for political parties with such a 
range of different demands and disparate levels of electoral performance, political 
influence and institutional recognition? This thesis will probe this assumption through a 
qualitative in-depth study of a universe of cases often omitted in the literature: minority 
nationalist parties in France. Existing scholarship has overwhelmingly been based upon 
an analysis of minority nationalist parties in those regions with the strongest sub-national 
structures (e.g. Scotland, Catalonia, Flanders). By contrast, France is arguably among the 
least conducive settings for sub-national mobilisation in Europe owing to the centralist bias
1 Following the last elections, the PNV is still the largest party in the Basque Parliament but 
Socialist leader Patxi Lopez was elected Lehendakari (President) on 5th May 2009 after the 
Socialist Party of the Basque Country formed an alliance with the People’s Party.
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of the French politico-administrative system. In the French Republican tradition, regional 
identities are considered a threat to a neutral public sphere that alone is meant to 
guarantee political and civil rights. The limited political and discursive opportunity 
structures in France significantly constrain explicit minority nationalist claims. The Unione 
di U Populu Corsu (UPC) in Corsica, Abertzaleen Batasuna (AB) in the Basque Country 
and the Union Democratique Bretonne (UDB) in Brittany -  i.e. the three cases included in 
this thesis - provide a valuable insight into the early stages of minority nationalist 
mobilisation. The UPC, AB and the UDB have yet to achieve significant political 
representation and institutional recognition2, and this research will establish whether the 
EU has provided any resources for their mobilisation in the French domestic context. 
Comparing three minority nationalist parties within the same member state will enable us 
to hold the domestic context constant and establish whether and how local factors shape 
the impact of European integration. Variations across three factors -  regional 
institutionalisation, trans-border identity and the dynamics of party competition -  among 
the cases will enable us to assess the relevance of these factors for minority nationalists’ 
response to European integration.
1.1. Studying the impact of European integration
As an attempt to understand how European integration affects minority nationalist 
mobilisation in France, this research clearly fits within the field of “Europeanisation” 
research. Until recently, European studies had been mainly interested in the process of 
institution-building and political integration at the European level. Most studies have 
adopted a perspective in which the main dependent variables are the dynamics and 
outcomes of European integration. Less attention has been paid to the reverse 
relationship: how European integration might impact on the domestic politics of EU 
member states. With the interpenetration between European and domestic levels 
becoming evident, it has become necessary to bring domestic politics back into the 
analysis of European studies. The Europeanisation literature represents a response to this 
challenge. This thesis will also contribute to a better comprehension of how EU 
developments might affect the perceptions and choices of political actors and the 
dynamics in local politics. Yet, without overlooking the wider field within which it inserts 
itself, this research will only engage with the Europeanisation literature from a distance, 
not least due to the vague nature of the concept. Europeanisation has been used in 
different ways by scholars to explain a variety of processes such as cultural change, new
2 Although Corsica could be said to have a form of institutional recognition, it will become clear in 
the following chapters that its Special Status only goes as far as administrative devolution and 
does not give any political autonomy to the Corsican Assembly.
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identity formation, policy change, administrative innovation, etc. It is most often associated 
with “domestic adaptation to the pressures emanating directly or indirectly from EU 
membership" (Featherstone, 2003:7), but definitions of Europeanisation differ in terms of 
their broadness and in relation to what it is applied to3, giving rise to a disparate and at 
times confusing body of literature. Furthermore, empirical studies are inconclusive about 
the causal effects of Europeanisation4, leading to arguments that academics have been 
too quick to operationalise it as a process capable of producing certain effects. The fact 
that Europeanisation has no single precise or stable meaning clearly complicates its use 
as a working concept, as does the absence of alternative scenarios that could test the 
absence of Europeanisation against a similar background of structural conditions.
In the research presented here, Europeanisation is understood in its widest 
possible sense. European integration is conceived of as a multi-faceted process which can 
have an impact on minority nationalist parties in different and contradictory ways. The 
objective is not to artificially isolate one EU policy area and observe its effects on minority 
nationalist mobilisation in France, but to remain as inclusive as possible about the 
potential impact of European integration. Similarly, the EU is not perceived as transmitting 
a coherent set of decisions and norms to all its member states. Rather, it is seen as a 
platform where a range of state and non-state actors compete in order to influence the 
trajectory of European integration. A definition of Europeanisation tailored for this research 
would have to be broad enough to incorporate any EU-related development used by 
minority nationalist parties and to reflect a dynamic understanding of the EU. However, 
insofar as Europeanisation can help us understand European governance, its definition 
must be closely tied to a specific aspect of European politics in order to shed light on 
specific actors, their perceptions and interactions. This is the only way of making the 
concept manageable in the absence of a clear definition.
3 Europeanisation has been seen as a process affecting not only member states but also the 
wider world, and is not always used in the sense of EU-isation. As shown by Featherstone 
(2003:3), for instance, it can include the transfer of policy from one European country to several 
other countries, and it has been used by historians to describe the export of West European 
cultural norms. When understood as a concept centred exclusively on the EU, it has been seen 
as a process that involves "the penetration of national and sub-national systems of governance 
by a European political centre and European-wide norms" (Olsen, 2002:924). In relation to its 
effect on domestic policies, Europeanisation has been defined as a “process by which domestic 
policy areas become increasingly subject to European policy making” (Borzel, 1999:574).
4 It has been pointed out that macro-level and policy-level studies demonstrate a persistence of 
deep structural divergences across national and policy contexts (Hughes, Sasse & Gordon, 
2004:28). It was also suggested that variations of outcome were part of the process of 
Europeanisation. For some, "the impact of Europeanisation is typically incremental, irregular, and 
uneven over time and between locations, national and subnational" (Featherstone, 2003:4). For 
others, the variation in impacts is more deeply structural and indeterminate because “the 
domestic impact of Europe varies with the level of European adaptation pressure on domestic 
institutions, and the extent to which the domestic context [...] facilitates or prohibits actual 
adjustments” (Knill & Lehmkuhl, 1999:1-2). However, many scholars view these inconsistencies 
as a major flaw in the concept, and question its usefulness as a tool for the study of European 
governance.
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The Europeanisation literature has raised, and partially responded to, important 
methodological issues associated with studying the domestic impact of European 
integration. The discussion about the “bottom-up" approach to Europeanisation has 
inspired the party-centred perspective adopted here. As mentioned, a common criticism of 
the Europeanisation literature is that it assumes that it is a variable or process capable of 
producing clear causal effects. In order to avoid presupposing the effects of 
Europeanisation, scholars have opted for a “bottom-up” approach instead of trying to find 
out the domestic effects of independent variables defined at the EU level (Schmidt & 
Radaelli, 2002:13). The assumption behind the “bottom-up” approach is that the best way 
to see whether EU developments have had an effect on domestic policy and politics is not 
to trace down developments from Brussels to the domestic level, but to analyse what 
occurs at the level of domestic actors -  most importantly, what opportunities are available 
to them and whether their beliefs and expectations have changed (Knill & Lehmkuhl, 
1999:15). This “bottom-up” approach to Europeanisation starts from a more explicitly 
actor-centred premise and takes into account the context from which actors consider 
European integration and which colours their positions and subsequent actions.
Similarly, a concern of this research is not to overstate the importance of European 
integration for minority nationalist parties in France. Minority nationalist actors are 
assumed to actively reflect upon, respond to, and seek to influence, the changing political 
and institutional settings in which they are situated (Maiz and Losada, 2000:62). There is a 
variety of factors affecting minority nationalist mobilisation (electoral system, party system, 
government policies, constitutional structure of the state, etc). European integration is just 
one of many political and institutional elements which these parties consider in their 
strategic evaluation of the resources available in France for their mobilisation and the 
realisation of their political agenda. As such, it is difficult to isolate from other factors. 
Accordingly, in this thesis the impact of European integration on the mobilisation of 
minority nationalist parties will be observed from a party-centred perspective, in which 
minority nationalist parties are assumed to evaluate European integration in relation to 
their political self-interest. The objective will not be to trace down the effects of European 
integration but rather to get an idea of its significance for minority nationalist parties within 
the French context. In this way, this research will incorporate all the dimensions of 
European integration without any assumption as to what aspects of European politics are 
most likely to affect minority nationalists. This will not only avoid presuming that European 
integration has an impact on minority nationalist parties, but also help us understand what 
material and ideational resources (if any) it may offer to these parties within their domestic 
context. This party-centred perspective will shift the angle of analysis and therefore 
reframe the question around not just how minority nationalist parties have sought to take
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advantage of resources emerging from European integration, but also what resources they 
perceive in the first place.
1.2. Shortcomings of the literature on minority nationalist parties
The literature on minority nationalist parties has been dominated by definitional 
considerations. In reaction to the general disregard for these parties in the party politics 
literature (Gallagher, Laver & Mair, 2001; Mair & Mudde, 1998), several scholars have 
sought to emphasise the main characteristics of the minority nationalist party family (De 
Winter & Tursan, 1998; De Winter & Gomez-Reino, 2002; Delwit, 2005; De Winter, 
Gomez-Reino & Lynch, 2006). They have proposed a classification of minority nationalist 
parties based on the nature of their demands, thereby distinguishing different types of 
minority nationalist goals (Seiler, 1994; De Winter & Tursan, 1998; Catt& Murphy, 2002). 
By highlighting the multiplicity of demands for self-government, these studies have 
significantly increased the understanding of minority nationalism. However, an issue with 
this line of research is that minority nationalist parties almost always change their goals 
over time, in an attempt to maximise opportunities available to them. For instance, a rather 
moderate political project (e.g. the creation of an administrative region) may in fact be a 
first tactical step towards a claim for regional autonomy. Not enough consideration has 
been given to the way these parties form, mobilise and operate in the democratic arena. In 
response to this lacuna, the research presented here will not only be interested in minority 
nationalist demands but also in the mobilisation of these parties, i.e. all the actions 
undertaken by the party to achieve self-government. The party-centred perspective will 
shed light onto the perceptions shaping the positions and strategies of minority nationalist 
parties. Minority nationalists are rational actors trying to maximise the resources available 
for the realisation of their political project. Particular attention will be given to the context 
within which minority nationalist actors organise their mobilisation, in order to see how 
European integration fits into it.
In general, the minority nationalist party family has been perceived as being 
overwhelmingly supportive of Europe. Even though many minority nationalists were 
initially critical of the European Community (Nagel, 2004), since the 1980s opposition to 
European integration has been replaced by growing levels of support for this process (De 
Winter & Gomez-Reino, 2002). Beyond this observation, however, scholars have yet to 
clarify the reasons motivating the convergence of minority nationalist parties around a pro- 
European position and to explain why some of these parties have been more responsive 
to European integration than others. The party politics literature and its analysis of party 
attitudes towards Europe have proved particularly unhelpful in the case of minority
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nationalist parties. For instance, it is often argued in this literature that small parties on the 
periphery of party systems are prone to Euroscepticism as a way of differentiating 
themselves from more established parties (Taggart, 1998). Regional parties, on the other 
hand, have been identified as being mostly pro-European because the EU can facilitate 
the decentralisation of authority from the central state to their regions, while nationalist 
parties are assumed to oppose European integration on the ground that it diminishes 
sovereignty (Marks and Wilson, 2000:438-439). These predictions provide little 
understanding of the interest found in the EU by these small parties not only mobilising on 
the centre-periphery cleavage, but also claiming a right to national self-determination. 
Furthermore, the evolution of their positions on the EU since the 1980s points towards the 
need for a dynamic conceptualisation of the relationship between European integration 
and minority nationalist parties. These parties constantly reassess the ever-changing 
realities of domestic and supranational politics for the conduct of their mobilisation, and 
their European responses are bound to evolve accordingly (Elias, 2009).
Only a few scholars have sought to analyse the links between European 
integration and minority nationalist mobilisation. These observations have commonly 
perceived this relationship in terms of the opportunity structures that the EU offers minority 
nationalist parties to pursue their goal of self-government. The literature suggests that 
minority nationalist parties have exploited the new institutional and representational 
opportunities of this potentially more accommodating political space. Lynch (1996) 
examines how European integration has increasingly shaped the constitutional 
preferences of minority nationalist parties. Through the concept of political linkage, he has 
argued that European integration provides these parties with new political resources, in 
the sense that developments within the framework of the European Union can be grafted 
onto the political discourse of minority nationalism and serve to strengthen their demand 
for autonomy (Lynch, 1996:16-17). In the same vein, it has been argued that minority 
nationalists have sought to maximise on the EU’s broad political commitment to the 
principle of subsidiarity and its increasing sympathy for minority rights (McGarry & Keating, 
2001:3). The perception of the EU as a new political space for minority nationalist 
mobilisation has fostered a reorientation in the goals and strategies of these parties 
towards the European level. De Winter and Gomez-Reino (2002) also show that European 
integration has been a strong impetus for trans-national party activity, particularly through 
the evolution of the European Free Alliance. Minority nationalist parties have been able to 
link up with other like-minded actors: “an emerging European polity has thus facilitated the 
development of contacts and has transformed party cooperation into standard practice”, 
leading to the constitution of a new party family (De Winter and Gomez-Reino, 2002:494).
While they underline the opportunities that minority nationalist parties derive from 
European integration, the perspective adopted by these authors has remained very much
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“top down”. The focus has been much more on opportunities created at the European 
level than on the form taken by minority nationalist mobilisation in the context of European 
integration. This approach has neglected the capacity for adaptation among minority 
nationalist actors, in particular those operating in a forbidding nation-state system, albeit 
one that is undergoing a gradual evolution. It is not just the type of opportunities created 
through European integration that is of interest here but also -  or even more so - the way 
in which minority nationalist parties have used these opportunities for their own 
mobilisation. Since these parties operate primarily at the sub-national level, there is scope 
for analysing not only how they have mobilised in the European arena, but also how they 
have taken advantage of EU-related changes within their local political platform. This is 
precisely the question this thesis proposes to answer by contextualising minority 
nationalists’ responses to Europe within the broader economic and political environment of 
these parties. The objective is to identify the resources emerging from the European 
integration process that minority nationalists have used, for what purpose and to what 
effect, thereby illustrating the concrete value of European integration for the dynamics of 
minority nationalist mobilisation.
On a case study basis, academic research has started to provide more detailed 
accounts of the domestic context shaping minority nationalist parties’ responses to 
European integration (for the most recent collection of individual case studies, see 
McGarry & Keating, 2006). However, there is a lack of comparative perspectives, such as 
the one presented here, providing a more systematic analysis of how external 
developments such as European integration shape minority nationalist mobilisation. 
Furthermore, restraining the empirical study to one member state -  France - will shed light 
on the different ways in which minority nationalists operate within a given national 
opportunity structure. Each member state offers a different institutional, political and 
ideological context for minority nationalist mobilisation and this poses a problem for cross­
national comparison: how can one analytically dissociate a minority nationalist party 
strategy from the opportunity structure within which it has been elaborated? Looking at 
several parties in the same member state will place the emphasis on differences in party 
positions and strategies, as opposed to differences in national opportunity structures 
resulting in different positions and strategies. This research will compare three minority 
nationalist parties within France in order to see whether these parties have reacted to, and 
sought to exploit, the process of European integration in similar ways, and if not what 
factors can explain these differences.
Focusing on France will also enable to explore a hitherto under-investigated side of 
minority nationalist mobilisation in Western Europe. A concern with the literature is that 
empirical studies have concentrated almost exclusively on a handful of cases where 
minority nationalist mobilisation is the strongest, e.g. Scotland, Wales, Catalonia, Southern
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Basque Country, Flanders, Northern Italy, South Tyrol. The common justification for this 
case selection is that these are “places where the process of stateless nation-building has 
been taken furthest and the debate on the possibilities provided by the new state order 
has been fullest” (Keating, 2001:15). These cases correspond to the regions in Europe 
with the most advanced institutional arrangements, meaning that the constitutional project 
of minority nationalists is fully elaborated and often at a stage of being realised. Political 
parties such as the Scottish National Party, the Partido Nacionalista Vasco or the Lega 
Nord have the electoral support necessary to exert a considerable level of influence within 
their regional parliaments and to send a delegation to their national parliaments. Other 
parties, and consequently regions and groups, that do not reach that benchmark, remain 
largely below the radar, most notably in the almost complete exclusion of French minority 
nationalist parties from academic study. Using electoral strength as a selection criterion 
has led the literature to exclude a whole set of cases in states, such as France, where 
national political institutions disadvantage small and regional parties.
This biased case selection bears a risk of presenting a distorted vision of the 
politics of minority nationalism in Europe. The literature has essentially based its 
observation on advanced forms of minority nationalist mobilisation, overlooking as a result 
the process undergone to get to that point. It is not the existence of a nation that 
generates minority nationalism, but the minority nationalist mobilisation that - in certain 
social and institutional settings - produces and extends a collective national identity (Mais 
& Losada, 1999:1). Minority nationalism remains a social construction, of which minority 
nationalists are the entrepreneurs elaborating a nation-building strategy. The variety of 
profiles of minority nationalist parties corresponds to the mobilisation phase in which each 
movement finds itself. Minority nationalist mobilisation can be seen as a series of 
progressive stages going from group awareness among elites, to recognition of the 
specificity of the minority nation, to wide popular support around a political project for self- 
government and finally to the realisation of self-determination. Depending on their 
institutional, political and cultural environment, minority nationalists will find it more or less 
difficult to mobilise for the self-government of their minority nation. The varying fortunes of 
minority nationalists in Europe do not only reflect the relative strength or weakness of 
regional identities, they also rely on the extent to which national opportunity structures are 
conducive to the accommodation of regional diversity. Accordingly, some minority 
nationalist parties in Europe - such as the three parties included in this thesis - are still 
translating cultural, historical and linguistic specificity into political assertiveness. Their 
positions and perceptions should not be discarded, as these actors in the making might be 
even more sensitive and reactive to changes in the institutional and political settings 
where they seek to establish their mobilisation.
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The limited universe of cases found in the literature also raises questions regarding 
the conclusions drawn on the significance of European integration for minority nationalism. 
Although scholars have been careful to define minority nationalist parties as a 
heterogeneous party family (De Winter & Gomez-Reino, 2002:485), they have seemingly 
conceived them as a group of political parties all possessing the same set of resources 
and opportunities in the context of European integration. In effect, evidence has been 
gathered almost exclusively from cases of minority nationalist parties with parliamentary 
representation at the national level and whose regions have achieved self-government. 
The level of political autonomy achieved by these regions also translates into autonomy in 
European matters, thereby facilitating the involvement of minority nationalists in European 
politics. But what about minority nationalists who do not have political representation and 
institutional recognition in their domestic context? What is the value of European 
integration for their mobilisation? It might be that, for minority nationalist parties, access to 
the European political space requires “victory” at the state level (McGarry & Keating, 
2006:16). The impact of European integration on minority nationalist mobilisation is likely 
to be uneven, depending on the level of the recognition already achieved by minority 
nationalists. The fact that European integration might impact on different minority 
nationalist parties in different ways is something that scholars have so far failed to 
address. Minority nationalists in France are still a long way from their goal of self- 
government and this research will tell us what kind of resources, if any, the EU provides to 
minority nationalists at an early stage in their nation-building process.
1.3. Factors influencing party responses to Europe
The main question of this research is: what is the impact of European integration 
on minority nationalist mobilisation in France? To answer it, a party-perspective will be 
adopted turning our attention to the resources that these parties perceive in European 
integration for the purposes of their mobilisation. An enriched vision of local politics -  
revealing the strategies employed by these parties locally -  will draw out the contours of 
minority nationalist mobilisation in the new context created by the EU. Secondly, this 
research will also identify conditions for the impact of European integration, i.e. factors 
affecting minority nationalist parties in their perceptions and use of Europe. The 
comparison of three parties in Brittany, Corsica and the Northern Basque Country will 
permit the examination of three such factors: trans-border identity, regional 
institutionalisation and the dynamics of party competition5.
5 This does not intend to be an exhaustive list of factors potentially affecting minority nationalist 
parties in their use and perception of Europe.
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1.3.1. Trans-border identity
The first hypothesis refers to the meaning of European integration as a process 
reducing the significance of state borders for minority nationalists with trans-border 
identity. Indeed, "hard external borders between member states have been transformed 
into softer, more administrative boundaries” (Danspeckgruber, 2002:176). The most 
obvious way in which borders have changed is related to the Single Market, which has 
removed restrictions on flows of capital, goods, services and people. Borders are losing 
their functional significance in a way which even dispenses with passport controls. But 
borders are also symbols of identity, as barriers drawing a line between “us” and “them”, 
and their erosion facilitates cross-border interactions (O’Dowd, 2003:27). European 
integration has brought about concrete opportunities for cross-border cooperation on 
economic, environmental and cultural matters. The first legal framework for the creation of 
cross-border regions, also known as Euro-regions, was provided by the Council of Europe 
in 1980. The EU has since emerged as the dominant supranational arena for the 
promotion of cross-border cooperation6 and the INTERREG programme of cross-border 
partnerships has been active across every border in Europe since the end of the 1990s. A 
new mechanism for the establishment of legal cross-border regions, the European 
Grouping for Territorial Co-operation (EGTC), was also adopted by the EU in 2006. Cross- 
border regions, broadly defined as “groupings of contiguous public authorities across one 
or more nation-state borders" (Perkmann, 2005:3), can offer ways for sub-national actors 
to emancipate themselves vis-a-vis central governments (Kramsch & Hooper, 2004). 
These emerging functional spaces can also provide a new institutional form for historical 
territories divided between two states, as illustrated with the Euro-region Tyrol-South 
Tyrol-Trentino7.
These changes have direct implications for minority nationalists with a trans-border 
identity, as they can affect the way in which they conceive the realisation of their goal of 
self-government. The growing permeability of borders within the EU can facilitate the 
accommodation of minorities cut off from their co-nationals by state barriers (McGarry & 
Keating, 2006:9). While the resolution of their predicament seemed highly compromised in 
the nation-state system, European integration has now made states less sensitive about 
cross-border interactions and irredentism is, arguably, less of a concern. In addition, the 
European context has opened up unprecedented possibilities for these minorities, which 
now share the same currency and can participate in the same elections. Cross-border and
6 Although Euro-regions are Council of Europe’s instruments, most of them essentially function as 
implementation frameworks for the EU Regional Policy.
7 The Euro-region Tyrol-South Tyrol-Trentino is formed by the Austrian State of Tyrol and the 
Italian provinces of South Tyrol and Trentino. The boundaries of the association correspond to 
the former Austrian County of Tyrol.
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inter-state cooperation within the EU has provided new opportunities to explore 
constituting political communities across national borders. The most far-reaching example 
of cross-border cooperation of the sort that benefits minorities is that between the UK and 
the Irish Republic with respect to Northern Ireland8 (McGarry, 2006). For these reasons, it 
is argued that minority nationalists with a trans-border identity will be fully engaged with 
the European question and redefine their long-term goals in relation to European 
integration. Framing their demands in a European perspective will appear as a natural and 
valid option to overcome the inflammatory nature of a political project challenging state 
borders.
7.3.2. Regional institutionalisation
The second proposition is that regional institutionalisation will increase the 
strategic value of Europe for minority nationalist mobilisation. The reform of the European 
regional policy, through the inclusion of notions of “partnership” and “participation”, has 
drawn sub-national actors more closely into the EU policy process. Sub-national entities, 
especially regions, have become players in the European political system (Hooghe, 
1996:175). Empirically, it is clear that national governments have maintained a 
“gatekeeping” role in controlling the access of regional actors to European institutions 
(Jeffery, 2000; Nay, 2002). The influence of the regional level within the EU should not be 
overestimated and the regional policy field remains intergovernmental in practice. Yet, the 
changes that have occurred within regions are undeniable. With regions becoming a locus 
of EU politics, regional actors have increasingly come to incorporate European policies 
into their political agenda. Structural funds, in particular, have transformed political 
dynamics within regions (Smith, 1997) and resulted in the creation of networks and new 
forums of public action (Jones & Keating, 1995). In its local manifestations, the European 
regional policy is best understood as an arena for symbolic politics in which regional 
actors can claim to have established a funding link with Brussels (Keating, 2006:31). 
Some might say that regional politics have been Europeanised (Paraskevopoulos, 2001) 
in the sense that the EU has not only penetrated the regional political debate, but also 
changed the rules of the regional political game.
Bearing this in mind, it is proposed that references to Europe will be more useful to 
minority nationalists mobilising in institutionalised regions than for those whose territory 
has not been institutionalised. This hypothesis is not about political decentralisation -  
which remains remarkably different from one member state to another - but is rather a
8 In 1985, through the Anglo-Irish Agreement, the British government formally allowed the Irish 
government a role in the governance of Northern Ireland, in order to address the aspirations of its 
large Irish nationalist minority. As part of the agreement, the Irish Republic removed its 
constitutionally entrenched irredentist claim to Northern Ireland. In 1998, cross-border political 
institutions were established, including a North-South Ministerial Council.
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case of the simplest form of institutionalisation possible. The regional tier of the EU in fact 
corresponds to administrative units defined by central governments, meaning that 
European regional policy still takes place within the territorial divisions established by each 
member state. As a result, only regions that have achieved institutional recognition have 
seen their politics change via contact with European policy-making. Institutionalised 
regions do not always coincide with the historical territories represented by minority 
nationalist parties. These parties often make demands for boundary adjustment, precisely 
because of a mismatch between their putative territory and administrative regions 
(Miodownik & Cartrite, 2006). Furthermore, certain regions represented by minority 
nationalists have not been institutionalised at all and are instead incorporated into a larger 
administrative unit. Lack of regional institutionalisation, through the absence of an elected 
political assembly and institutional channels of representation, undoubtedly complicates 
minority nationalist mobilisation. But, as argued here, the lack of regional 
institutionalisation also diminishes the strategic resources emerging from the EU for 
minority nationalist parties. Any type of evocation of Europe will carry some weight in 
regional politics directly concerned with EU policies, and minority nationalists will find an 
advantage in bringing forward their Europeanism in order to reinforce their status and 
influence within such a context. By contrast, the EU is likely to be perceived as distant and 
irrelevant to local actors in territories which have not been recognised institutionally,
thereby reducing the benefits that minority nationalists could derive from 
associating themselves with European integration.
1.3.3. Dynamics o f party competition
This last hypothesis deals with how minority nationalists translate questions related 
to European integration into a strategy for party competition at the local level. “Pro- vs. 
anti-European” has emerged as a new dimension of party competition, inasmuch as 
Europe is now a core issue which national political parties have to address (Hix & Lord, 
1997). Provided that the local political sphere within which minority nationalists operate 
has been penetrated by the EU - if the second hypothesis proves right, this will be 
dependent on the institutionalisation of their territory - the same logics applies to sub­
national party systems. For some political parties, positions on European integration are 
intertwined with the way in which they interact with other parties in electoral arenas. For 
instance, Taggart has demonstrated that, for extreme-right or -left parties outside the 
mainstreams of party systems, opposition to Europe has been a means to set themselves 
apart from the centre of politics (Taggart, 1998:384). Because minority nationalists 
essentially challenge the organisation of political authority, they are often outcasts 
compared to the main political parties embodying the current organisation. In a similar vein
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to the argument made above, supporting the EU is for minority nationalist parties a means 
of getting closer to mainstream political circles. Electoral competition usually requires 
small political parties to change their programmes in two ways: to broaden its content 
beyond their “core business” in order to be able to compete with mainstream political 
parties on a range of socio-economic and political issues; and to moderate their political 
message in order to broaden their political appeal beyond their support base (Muller- 
Rommel and Pridham, 1991). European integration is one high-profile issue that minority 
nationalist parties can use to broaden and moderate their programmes in order to interact 
with non-nationalist parties.
Yet, the extent to which minority nationalist parties play the European card as a 
strategy in local politics is affected by the dynamics of party competition. It has been 
argued that the effectiveness of this strategy was dependent on whether other political 
parties have crowded out the European space at the local level (Elias, 2008:565). If all the 
parties of a political system have adapted to European integration, having a European 
profile ceases being a comparative advantage and this diminishes the political credentials 
that minority nationalists can derive from it. Building on this, this thesis will look more 
specifically at the dynamics of party competition within minority nationalist movements. 
The latter can be divided on the European issue, with each party reacting differently to 
European developments. As we will see in the empirical chapters, the referenda on the 
Maastricht Treaty and the proposed European Constitution have sparked off diverging 
responses from parties within the Basque, Breton and Corsican movements respectively. 
By positioning itself on European integration, a minority nationalist party might constrain 
other minority nationalists’ ability to use Europe in order to overcome their political 
marginalisation. A party that is alone in promoting a European dimension will have more 
freedom to explore different formulations and different linkages between its mobilisation 
and the EU. It is proposed that the effectiveness of this strategy will also rely on the 
degree of exclusivity that a minority nationalist party can claim with regards to Europe 
within its own political movement.
1.4. Comparative case study approach
This framework of analysis will be applied to an empirical study of three minority 
nationalist parties in France: Abertzaleen Batasuna (AB) in the Northern Basque Country, 
Unione di U Populu Corsu (UPC) in Corsica and Union Democratique Bretonne (UDB) in 
Britanny. This research will explain how and why these three parties have responded to 
European integration in order to draw conclusions on minority nationalist parties in France. 
Case studies are particularly appropriate to address “how” and “why” questions such as
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the ones posed here (Hancke, 2009:64), as they give an insight into the interaction of 
multiple factors within a single context over time. The case study method is also 
appropriate to the contextualised party-centred perspective set out previously. This 
research intends to understand how Europe is viewed through the minority nationalist 
lense. A case-study approach provides the mechanism for entering each party context in 
order to capture the opportunities that these minority nationalist parties derive from 
European integration and the use they make of it.
The case selection was limited to France, which possesses a large number of 
peripheral regions with strong historical and cultural identities: Corsica, Brittany, Northern 
Basque Country, Alsace, Savoy, Occitania and Northern Catalonia. Although a form of 
collective action defending the culture and language of these regions has existed for 
decades, minority nationalist mobilisation in France has received little scholarly attention. 
In comparison to the usual cases of Scotland, Catalonia or Flanders, the political 
expression of regional minorities in French regions is less developed at this point in time. 
The influence of the Jacobin tradition on the concept of the French nation, as well as the 
use of coercive policies to achieve cultural and linguistic homogeneity, have undoubtedly 
had a detrimental effect on regional identities. Consequently, minority nationalist 
mobilisation in France draws on a weak tradition of autonomy or independence and the 
legitimacy of demands for self-government is contested. Corsica stands as an exception 
within this universe of cases, inasmuch as it is the only French region whose specificity 
has been recognised by the French government. Since 1980s, a series of reforms have 
provided Corsica with a Special Status and a directly elected Corsican Assembly. 
Institutional recognition has been favourable to the Corsican nationalist movement, which 
has emerged as one of the island’s main political forces. Cultural and linguistic 
particularities are also present in other French regions, but a clear sense of collective 
identity is often weak and in competition with other kinds of identification. Minority 
nationalist parties have maintained a small but stable electoral presence in French regions 
since the 1970s, but they find it difficult to mobilise a wide audience around their political 
programme. Their nation-building strategy may not be fully developed or very clear in its 
aims. And yet, these parties have many things in common with their more advanced 
counterparts in Europe. Ideologically, they are motivated by their cultural and historical 
attachment to their minority nation, and make the same demands for political and 
institutional rights that reflect this specificity. Even more importantly, in a rapidly changing 
political environment, they are confronted with many of the same challenges: What 
domestic arrangements would best protect their political and cultural rights as a minority? 
How can they defend their regional interests and advance their political project within both 
the unitary French state and the EU? How best to organise their mobilisation within the
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context of European integration, where the French government does not have the 
monopoly of political power anymore?
Within minority nationalist parties in France, the selection of cases is driven by the 
aim to identify conditions for the impact of European integration on minority nationalist 
mobilisation. Variations across the three sets of factors proposed to affect minority 
nationalists’ response to European integration -  regional institutionalisation, trans-border 
identity and dynamics of party competition -  among three relatively comparable cases will 
enable us to assess the relevance of these factors. Although some differences exist, AB, 
UDB and UPC present many similarities as key political parties of the Basque, Breton and 
Corsican nationalist movements respectively. The Unione di u Populu Corsu (UPC) has 
been the main representative of the autonomist branch of Corsican nationalism since the 
1970s9. The basis for its claim is the notion that Corsicans constitute a distinct people, and 
that this specificity should be recognised through the increase of Corsica’s autonomy, and 
in particular the extension of the legislative and fiscal powers of the Corsican Assembly. 
The UPC also makes demands for an official status of the Corsican language and its 
mandatory teaching in the island’s schools (Olivesi, 1998:177-179). Created in 1964, the 
Union Democratique Bretonne (UDB) promotes Brittany’s regional autonomy. The 
“national vocation” of the Breton people constitutes the basis for the UDB’s demand for 
self-government, a necessary means to ensure the cultural and economic development of 
Brittany (Pasquier, 2006:90). As well as linguistic demands for the protection of the Breton 
language, one of the UDB’s main goals in the administrative reunification of Brittany, that 
is the return of the department Loire Atlantique, currently part of the region Pays de la 
Loire, in order to reform the historical Breton region. Lastly, Abertzaleen Batasuna (AB) 
emerged at the beginning of the 1990s, as a coalition of political parties advocating the 
self-government of the Basque people in France (Crettiez & Sommier, 2002:45), and 
quickly became the focal point of a local mobilisation for the institutionalisation of the 
Northern Basque Country (Gurrutxaga, 2005). In 2001, AB ceased being a party coalition 
to become its own political party, promoting the creation of a Basque department as well 
as the official recognition of the Basque language, Euskara.
Bearing in mind the specificities of each mobilisation context, one could place AB, 
UDB and UPC towards the moderate end of the minority nationalist spectrum in terms of 
demands. Accordingly, these three parties share a common position on the use of political 
violence as a strategy to achieve their goals of self-government. The UPC resorted to 
symbolic violence in the early 1970s10 but soon after declared itself opposed to violence of
9 Other political parties have emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s, such as U Rinnovu 
Naziunale, A Ghjama pa I’lndipendenza and A Manca Naziunale, and can be grouped within the 
autonomist tendency, having either emerged from the UPC or abandoned independentist goals in 
favour of a more moderate interpretation of the nationalist struggle.
10 In 1975, some members of the UPC, led by the Simeoni brothers, staged an armed occupation 
of the wine cellar of a “pied noir" winegrower at AI6ria, who had been accused of trafficking low-
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any kind, as a way to distance itself from the independentist branch of Corsican 
nationalism organised around the Front de Liberation Nationale de la Corse (FLNC). 
Similarly, the UDB has made clear that it condemned the violent actions of the Armee 
Revolutionnaire Bretonne11 and wished to differentiate between its mobilisation and such 
clandestine organisations (Crettiez & Sommier, 2002:64). Finally, AB has perhaps the 
most ambiguous position on political violence. The party neither condemns (like most 
Basque nationalist parties), nor justifies (like Batasuna) the armed struggle of ETA, calling 
instead for a truce. In sum, these minority nationalist parties have all rejected violence as 
a valid instrument of struggle in favour of democratic means. Consequently, they 
concentrate their mobilisation efforts on the democratic arena and local elections.
Finally, while the overall electoral impact of the Corsican nationalist movement12 
cannot be compared to other minority nationalist movements in France, the electoral 
performance of AB, UDB and UPC is relatively similar when taken individually. Electoral 
alliances and coalitions are a necessity for these small parties to survive in a largely 
disadvantageous electoral system, making it difficult to isolate the electoral results of each 
minority nationalist party. As the Northern Basque Country is not institutionalised, the 
results of AB in sub-national elections do not reflect the popular support found in the 
historic Basque territory for Basque nationalism. Nevertheless, it has been estimated that 
the electoral support for each of the three cases averages around 4 percent of the 
population in their historic territories13. In terms of political representation, AB, UDB and 
UPC have all secured seats in the local assemblies most relevant to their political project. 
The UPC, whose name changed in 2002 to Partitu di a Nazione Corsa (PNC), currently 
has three representatives in the Corsican Assembly14. A coalition with the Greens granted 
the UDB three seats in the Breton regional council, of which UDB’s leader Christian 
Guyonvarc’h is Vice-President in charge of European Affairs. Finally, AB has managed to 
secure a seat in the Pyrenees Atlantiques departmental council15 as well as the position of 
Deputy Mayor of Biarritz16. Hence, with moderate nationalist agendas, an opposition to 
political violence and similar levels of electoral performance, AB, UDB and UPC are
quality wine. This incident ended with the death of two gendarmes and serious rioting in Bastia. 
This form of symbolic violence, in the sense of making a symbolic statement as opposed to the 
FLNC’s prolonged armed campaign, was soon after abandoned by the UPC.
11 Created in 1971, the Armee Revolutionnaire Bretonne recently claimed a series of terrorist 
attacks between 1998 and 2000. Emgann’s former spokesperson, Gael Roblin, was arrested 
following a terrorist attack in the Mac Donald of Quevert on 9th April 2000, which led to the death 
of one of the restaurant's employee, but was eventually released. The Armee Revolutionnaire 
Bretonne is also suspected to have participated in the theft of 8.5 tonnes of dynamite by ETA in 
Plevin (Brittany) on 19th September 1999.
12 As an indication, the totality of votes for minority nationalist parties, autonomist and 
independentist included, in Corsican regional elections was 9,07% in 1987, 24,8% in 1992, 
16,77% in 1999 and 17,34% in 2004.
13 See Appendix 1: Election Tables.
14 Jean-Christophe Angelini, Christine Colonna and Nadine Nivagionni
15 Jean-Michel Galant, until 2008.
16 Jakes Abeberry, until 2008.
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mostly similar cases. The three parties are clearly comparable: they conceive their long­
term political projects in the same way, mobilise through the same democratic channels 
and have achieved similar levels of electoral support. However, some key differences exist 
between the cases, enabling us to explore the relevance of certain factors for minority 
nationalists’ experience of Europe.
1.4.1. Trans-border identity
Although AB operates exclusively in the Northern Basque Country17, the party’s 
long-term goal remains the reunification of Euskadi, the historic Basque Country. The 
party mobilises to defend the historical, cultural and linguistic specificities of the whole 
Basque nation, divided by the French-Spanish border. As such, its mobilisation and 
political project are closely linked to developments in the Southern Basque Country. On 
the other hand, although the party refers broadly to the Celtic cultural identity, the UDB 
does not claim any historical attachment to a region in another member state. Similarly, 
the UPC has claimed historical links with Sardinia but the Corsican identity and territory 
are clearly limited to the island. Neither the mobilisation, nor the long-term aspirations of 
Breton and Corsican nationalists can be said to have a trans-border character.
Comparing the European response of AB to the other two cases will provide the 
basis to test the first hypothesis, i.e. minority nationalists with trans-border identity 
perceive European integration as a process enabling the resolution of their predicament. If 
this applies, AB will see more incentives in reframing its long-term political project in 
accordance with the new European context than the UDB and the UPC, which will 
continue to conceive the realisation of their demands for self-government within the 
framework of the French state.
1.4.2. Regional institutionalisation
A significant difference between the three cases lies in the fact that Corsica and 
Brittany have been institutionalised, while the Basque Country has never been recognised 
institutionally in France. Since the 1980s, a series of reforms have granted Corsica its own 
regional institutions, i.e. a Statut Particulier or Special Status and an elected Corsican 
Assembly18. These provisions cannot amount to regional autonomy - on the basis that the
17 AB was purposefully chosen as a case study for its lack of affiliation with another larger political 
organisation in the Autonomous Basque Community. Given the political weight of parties such the 
Partido Nacionalista Vasco or even Batasuna in Spain, using their Northern branches as case 
studies would have undermined the results of a study aiming to look at how minority nationalist 
parties take advantage of the resources available to them in the French context.
8 These reforms, which have provided Corsica with a unique institutional status among French 
regions, will be detailed in chapter three with the overall presentation of the French politico- 
administrative system.
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Corsican Assembly still only has consultative powers -  but Corsica does have extended 
competences in line with its cultural and geographical specificity. Brittany is one of the few 
historic French regions which has been institutionalised through French decentralisation, 
albeit as an ordinary administrative region. Although it only has functional competences, 
the locally elected Breton Council provides a democratic platform for the formulation of 
Breton interests. In contrast, the Basque Country has yet to achieve institutional 
recognition despite demands for the creation of a Basque department dating back to the 
French Revolution. The Basque Country has no existence in the French politico- 
administrative system: it is neither an administrative region nor a department. Instead, it 
forms with Bearn the department Pyrenees-Atlantique, part of the region Aquitaine.
The clear gap in terms of institutional status between the Northern Basque Country 
on the one hand, and Brittany and Corsica on the other hand, will enable us to test the 
second hypothesis, i.e. regional institutionalisation increases the strategic value of Europe 
for minority nationalist parties. If this proves true, Breton and Corsican nationalists will see 
more advantages in using their European dimension to raise their status in local politics 
than Northern Basque nationalists, whose local political profile would not necessarily 
benefit from evocations of Europe.
1.4.3. Dynamics o f party competition
The Basque, Breton and Corsican nationalist movements differ in terms of 
organisation and internal cohesion. There is an internal struggle among the different 
organisations of the Corsican nationalist movement, which is split in two competing 
tendencies: the autonomists of the UPC and the independentists of Corsica Nazione (CN). 
Similarly, the Basque nationalist offer in Spain is divided between a moderate branch, led 
by the Partido Nacionalista Vasco, and a radical branch centred around Batasuna, the 
public front of ETA. These divisions have been transposed to the Northern Basque 
nationalist movement and left AB standing somewhere in the middle. In contrast with the 
fragmentation of the Basque and Corsican movements, the UDB has established itself as 
the main voice of Breton nationalism. While there are a couple of other nationalist parties 
in Brittany, the leadership of the UDB over the Breton movement has never been 
significantly contested.
The different organisation of Basque, Breton and Corsican movements, as well as 
the position of the three parties within them, will give some insight to test the last 
hypothesis, i.e. the strategic advantages that minority nationalists can draw from 
European integration depend largely on dynamics of party competition. If this is right, a 
European strategy will be more fruitful to the UDB than the UPC and AB, whose position
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on European integration is likely to be challenged by other parties within their political 
movements.
1.5. Time period and sources
The case studies focus mainly on the years from 1982 to 2006, although a broader 
historical perspective is provided when necessary. This twenty-four year period captures 
many important developments in France and in the EU. Prior to 1982, minority nationalist 
parties in France had no access to a democratic platform where to mobilise public support 
and bring forward their demands. But from the beginning of the 1980s onwards, important 
changes took place in French regions. The law of 2 March 1982 marked the start of 
decentralisation reforms creating a regional level in the French politico-administrative 
system and providing all levels of sub-national government with directly elected 
assemblies. While these reforms were not intended as a response to regionalist and 
minority nationalist pressures, they nevertheless changed the politics of minority 
nationalism in France. From then onwards, minority nationalist parties have had a chance 
to gain political representation in a political assembly. Hence, the time period of this study 
will enable us to observe the successive attempts made by minority nationalist parties to 
operate in the democratic arena and their progressive realisation of the resources 
available to minority nationalist mobilisation in France. On the other hand, developments 
at the European level during these years have also seen the nature of the European polity 
change dramatically. The EU policy competences have expanded from economic 
integration to fields of political and social integration, and its institutional set-up has 
become more complex. Direct elections to the European Parliament were introduced in 
1979, and following the “eurosclerosis" of the 1970s, the 1980s are often referred to as the 
period of the “relaunching of Europe” (Dinan and Cowles, 2004). This was in large part 
due to the 1986 Single European Act and the creation of the internal market project. A 
number of Treaties followed in quick succession (Treaty of the European Union in 1992, 
Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and Treaty of Nice in 2001), which increased EU 
membership to fifteen, put into practice the commitment to a single European currency 
and prepared the ground for more political integration. The European Convention on the 
Future of Europe was launched in 2001 and represented a further attempt to move the 
political agenda forward ahead of enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe. These 
countries eventually joined the EU in December 2004, taking the number of member 
states to 25. However, the rejection of the proposed Constitutional Treaty by French and 
Dutch electorates in May and June 2005 has halted the integration process in its tracks, 
and the future direction of Europe is unclear, at least for the time being.
27
The findings will be derived from the qualitative content analysis of party 
documentation and interviews. The objective of the case studies is to understand how AB, 
UDB and UPC assess the value of European integration within the broad economic and 
political context of their mobilisation. As such, this study is not only interested in the 
parties’ official European discourse, but also in the strategies and tactics that have led to 
the adoption of such discourse. However, fieldwork has been complicated by the almost 
complete absence of formal party documentation beyond very basic leaflets and posters, 
and the opaqueness of minority nationalist party organisations. Minority nationalist parties 
in France rarely produce party manifestoes or even election programmes. For this reason, 
the empirical study relies mainly on the archive of nationalist newspapers available for 
consultation at the Bibliotheque Nationale de France in Paris. These magazines are called 
Aritti for Corsican nationalists, Enbata for Basque nationalists and Le Peuple Breton for 
Breton nationalists. The case studies will seek to trace the deliberative and framing 
processes by which these parties make up their minds about Europe. Wherever possible, 
therefore, data from any fora where such a debate may take place will be gathered and 
analysed. For this purpose, documents will be included in the analysis when they address 
European issues in any way. This may refer to electoral or campaigning issues, strategy 
and tactics relating to Europe, and the discussion of the party’s European policies. Finally, 
in the interest of gathering data from a large number of sources, a series of semi- 
structured interviews complement the documentary analysis by questioning certain 
themes and arguments further. Interviewees were identified as being party leaders, senior 
party members and individuals particularly related to the European dimension of each 
party’s activities. Most of this fieldwork research, including archives consultation at the 
Bibliotheque Nationale de France and research trips to Corsica, Brittany and the Basque 
Country, was carried out between July and December 2007.
1.6. Thesis organisation
This introductory chapter has laid out the analytical framework chosen to study the 
impact of European integration on minority nationalist mobilisation. This thesis will adopt a 
party-centred perspective and propose a comparative analysis of three minority nationalist 
parties in Brittany, Corsica and the Northern Basque Country. This comparative set-up 
within the single context of France will place the emphasis on the different strategies that 
these parties deploy for the achievement of their political project. By contextualising 
minority nationalist parties’ responses to European integration - herein broadly understood 
as both ideological rhetoric and institutional reality - the objective is to identify what 
resources Europe provides for their domestic mobilisation. The rest of the thesis is 
organised as follows: chapter two defines minority nationalist mobilisation and specifies
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how minority nationalist parties operate in the democratic arena. It also introduces the 
multiple ways in which European integration can frame and change the politics of minority 
nationalism. While the EU has brought about a new context for demands of self- 
government, it does not provide a framework for the accommodation of these demands. In 
sum, minority nationalist mobilisation is still directed at national governments. Accordingly, 
chapter three then presents the ideological, political and institutional context provided by 
France for minority nationalist parties and their interactions with the EU. Chapter four, five 
and six contain the individual case studies of the Unione di U Populu Corsu, Abertzaleen 
Batasuna and the Union Democratique Bretonne respectively. These empirical chapters 
provide a contextualised account of the way in which each party has responded to and 
sought to use European integration for its mobilisation. Chapter seven then proceeds to 
the comparative analysis of the three parties’ responses to the EU, listing the resources 
provided to minority nationalists in France and explaining the differences in their 
perceptions and uses of Europe. The conclusion of this chapter will briefly review the main 
contributions made by this research to the literatures on minority nationalism, on minority 
nationalist response to European integration and on sub-state mobilisation in the EU.
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Chapter 2 - Minority nationalist parties and European integration
Despite being a widespread feature of European party systems, minority nationalist 
parties remain poorly understood in the literature. This chapter will start by defining these 
political actors demanding self-government for their minority nation and by explaining how 
these parties form, operate and mobilise in the democratic arena. It will also respond to 
the shortcomings of the party politics literature in assessing the significance of minority 
nationalist parties whose internal logic differs from conventional political parties. The 
second part of the chapter will prepare the ground for the core topic of this research, the 
factors shaping the impact of European integration on minority nationalist mobilisation. It 
will mention the fundamental connections existing between European integration and 
minority nationalism as processes supporting alternative ways of organising political 
authority. More concretely, however, it will show that-far from the Europe of the Regions 
scenario - the EU remains dominated by state interests and cannot provide a direct 
solution to the minority nationalist predicament. By penetrating and transforming the state, 
European integration has nevertheless changed the settings where minority nationalists 
mobilise and provided new opportunities to advance their demands within member states.
2.1. Defining the object of this research: minority nationalist parties
2.1.1. What is minority nationalism?
Minority nationalism in European states is sometimes viewed as an anachronism -  
many authors still talk about the “survival” of minority nationalist parties. There is a long 
tradition in political science of equating the concepts of the nation and the state, the 
association is so strong in the French language that the terms are often used 
interchangeably. This conflation is rooted in a traditional view that sees nation-states as 
the product of historical evolution, while minority nationalist conflict is seen as the product 
of an incomplete evolution which is bound to disappear in due course (McGarry & Keating, 
2001:2-3). This model of the European nation-state has been backed up by political 
scientists from the nineteenth century onwards. John Stuart Mill famously said: “Nobody 
can suppose that it is not more beneficial for a Breton or a Basque of French Navarre to 
be a member of the French nationality than to sulk on his own rocks, the half-savage relic 
of past times. The same remark applies to the Welshman or the Scottish highlander” (Mill, 
1972:395). It was not only argued that regional minorities would disappear, but also that it 
was normatively desirable for them to do so. This was the basis for the Jacobin theory of 
assimilation, which received its fullest expression in France. The coercive policies to
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achieve linguistic and cultural homogeneity and create a single French nation attested to 
the fear that regional diversity would threaten the territorial integrity of the state. For more 
than two centuries, modernist social science approaches have been predicting that 
economic and social forces would secure the political triumph of the nation-state and the 
end of minority nationalism (McGarry & Keating, 2006:2-5).
The limits of this political tradition have been sharply exposed in Western Europe 
by the re-appearance of ethno-territorial politics and the transformation of the state since 
the 1970s. While they had long existed, many minority nationalist parties have 
experienced a revival in their electoral fortunes in the last decades. New minority 
nationalist movements have been created in some places (Northern Italy and Savoy, for 
instance). With these parties gaining political and electoral salience, state authorities have 
had to respond to their demands for the re-distribution of political authority between the 
centre and the periphery. The rise of minority nationalism cannot solely account for the 
decentralisation and devolution reforms undertaken throughout Western Europe, but it is 
clear that these actors have had a major impact on the territorial organisation of European 
states. For instance, minority nationalists in Belgium were key actors in the transformation 
of the country into a federation of three languages and three regions in 1992 (De Winter, 
Gomez-Reino & Lynch, 2006:31-32). In Spain, the creation of a “state of autonomies” at 
the end of the 1970s, which granted substantial policy responsibilities to autonomous 
communities, was a concession to the demands of Catalan and Basque nationalists. In 
subsequent years, the Catalan Convergencia i Uno and the Basque Partido Nacionalista 
Vasco were able to extract further policy concessions for their communities in return for 
parliamentary support for Spanish government coalitions (Calvet Crespo, 2003; Guerrero 
Salom, 2003). In the UK, the electoral growth of Scottish nationalism during the 1980s was 
one factor behind the British Labour Party’s commitment to devolution (Mitchell, 1998; 
Hepburn, 2006). Since the establishment of parliaments in Scotland and Wales in 1999, 
the Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru have used their positions as the main parties 
of opposition, and then as parties of regional government since 2007, to push for a further 
redistribution of power from Westminster (Elias, 2009:45). The Lega Nord electoral 
breakthrough in the 1990s enabled the party to negotiate new institutional reforms to 
strengthen regional government in Italy (Ruzza, 2006:243-244). Even in France, arguably 
the European state most reluctant to recognise the existence of cultural and linguistic 
diversity within its borders, a limited degree of administrative devolution has been granted 
to Corsica to assuage the political demands of the island’s nationalist movement (Olivesi, 
1998).
This research is mostly indicative of trends and political processes in Western 
Europe, but minority nationalist parties have also come to the fore in Central and Eastern 
Europe since the beginning of the 1990s. Arguably, the configuration is somewhat
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different: groups which constitute a minority in a “host" state often have an ethnic kin 
which is dominant in another state, the “kin" state. Examples include the Hungarians of 
Slovakia, Romania and Serbia; the Serbs and Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina; and the 
Turks of Bulgaria (Brubacker, 1996). The Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) - the 
party of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria - or the Democratic Union of Hungarians in 
Romania (UDMR), for instance, have toned down the territorial nature of their demands 
and are more oriented towards segmental autonomy in the long term. Given the recent 
history of the region, which saw three ex-communist plurinational federations break apart, 
it is not surprising that the ideal of the centralised unitary state remains dominant. These 
ethnopolitical parties have nevertheless been key actors in governing coalitions and been 
able to advance the civil and political rights of their minorities as a result, partly aided by 
the conditionality on minority protection for EU accession (Sasse, 2008; Toggenburg 2004; 
Vachudova 2005). As a coalition partner to the various cabinets led by prime ministers 
from the liberal conservative Democratic Convention of Romania (CDR), the UDMR was 
able to achieve major amendments to the education and self-government laws. In 
Romanian municipalities with more than 20 per cent of the residents belonging to a 
national minority, the use of the minority language in public administration was made legal, 
bilingual signs were introduced and the minority language became a language of 
instruction (Brusis, 2003:9). Similarly, the MRF became an official coalition partner in the 
Bulgarian government after the 2001 parliamentary elections and used its position to 
ensure funding for Turkish-language classes in public school as well as Turkish 
broadcasting on state television (Warhola & Boteva, 2003:270).
In brief, the minority question is not likely to disappear any time soon, but could 
potentially continue to grow. More than historical realities based around objective factors 
(linguistic, cultural, geographical, economic, etc.), minority nations are social constructs 
resulting from “a complex process of political, organisational, discursive and institutional 
genesis” (Maiz & Losada, 2000:1). Maiz and Losada (2000) have established a list of 
factors concurring to the emergence of minority nationalism. These include certain cultural 
and historical preconditions, socio-economic activators of the defence of common 
interests, a political opportunity structure - especially the availability of a certain level of 
self-government and politics of institutional recognition - along with an efficient discursive 
and organisational mobilisation of all this potential by minority nationalist actors. In this 
conceptualisation, the institutional context provided by federalism, territorial autonomy or 
consociationalism is not only a democratic way of accommodating internal diversity. It also 
reinforces collective identities and encourages demands for self-government by opening 
up the political opportunity structure within which minority nationalists mobilise (Maiz & 
Losada, 1999:2). Hence, minority nationalism has flourished in Europe since the 1970s in 
part because some European states have proved more inclined to decentralise power and
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sovereignty. Minority nationalist movements had already existed for decades19, struggling 
to defend a constitutional project seemingly incompatible with the nation-state system. 
Ceding some form of autonomy to regional minorities seems to be more thinkable today, 
now that member states have pooled their sovereignty in Brussels (McGarry & Keating, 
2001:9). National opportunity structures, when they have been opened up through 
decentralisation, will not only enable the realisation of demands for self-government, but 
also feed back into minority nationalist mobilisation by strengthening sub-national 
consciousness.
The existence of a minority nation is not the starting point of a mobilisation for self- 
government, rather minority nationalists will produce and extend a minority nation in 
certain political and institutional settings. As such, minority nationalists can be conceived 
as “ethnic entrepreneurs”, as agents of nationalist mobilisation who translate cultural and 
historical specificity into political assertiveness (Tursan, 1998). Although the focus of this 
study is on political parties, minority nationalist mobilisation can use many vehicles, 
varying from armed organisations to social movements and interest groups, and adopt a 
variety of strategies including the collection of votes, protest or political violence. Each of 
these organisations will have devised the nation-building strategy best tailored (in its view) 
to its own context. Minority nationalist mobilisation will then go through progressive stages. 
Taking group awareness among a part of the regional elites as a starting point, some 
parties -  like the ones included in this study - are still in the first phase of Hroch’s (1985) 
nationalist mobilisation, i.e. they are elaborating a nation-building strategy and mobilising 
support around the specificity of their minority nation. Others -  such as the Bloque 
Nacionalista Galego or the Partito Sardo d'Azione - are in the second phase, having 
achieved some form of institutional arrangement but still demanding further concessions 
from the centre towards self-government. A few parties are even in the third phase, they 
have seen most of their demands met by the former unitary state and are the main political 
force in their historical region, as illustrated in the case of Volksunie or the Scottish 
National Party. Conceptualising minority nationalist mobilisation as a process does not 
however imply that every minority nationalist movement will strictly follow all these steps. 
A considerable amount of variation is provided by the diverse forms taken by self- 
government: while some minority nationalists essentially seek the cultural autonomy of 
their minority nation, others will not be satisfied until the achievement of full fledged 
independence.
19 For instance, the Partido Nacionalista Vasco was founded in 1895, the Scottish National Party 
in 1934 and Volksunie in 1954.
33
Table 1: Stages o f minority nationalist mobilisation 
Stage 1 Group awareness among elites
Stage 2 Widespread recognition of the specificity of the minority nation
Stage 3 Popular support around a project for self-government
Stage 4 Self-determination of the minority nation through the realisation 
of self-government
Perhaps because of an initial bias of political science in favour of the nation-state, 
scholars are still coming to terms with political actors demanding a right to self- 
government on behalf of minorities. A great variety of terminologies have been used to 
qualify the phenomenon: sub-state nationalism (Catt & Murphy, 2002), ethnoregionalism 
(De Winter & Tursan, 1998; Miodownik & Cartrite, 2006), regional nationalism 
(Christiansen, 1998; Van Atta, 2003), ethnonationalism (Connor, 1972; Cronin, 2002), 
stateless nations (Keating, 2001), nations without states (Guibernau, 1996) or minority 
nations (Lynch, 1996; Keating & McGarry, 2001). If some scholars remain unsure about 
defining these actors as “nationalists”, this is partly due to the traditional association of 
nationalism with the concept of sovereign state. Statehood has for a long time been 
considered as the only possible outcome of nationalist success (Hobsbawm, 1990; Smith,
1995). But if the age of the almighty sovereign state has represented a particular form of 
nationalism, it is not the only one. For minority nationalism, as it has manifested itself 
throughout Europe, does not always aim at secession or is framed as the establishment of 
a separate state. The Scottish National Party has for instance adopted a “post- 
sovereigntist" stance since the 1980s, committing itself to independence in Europe. 
Scottish nationalists have perceived an opportunity to resume full statehood in the context 
of an intergovernmental European Union (Keating, 2001), at least for the time being. Many 
minority nationalists, such as the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, Plaid Cymru and 
the Bloque Nacionalista Galego, have embraced a post-statist policy in their rhetoric, 
looking to a future Europe of the Peoples in which states have disappeared altogether. 
This is also the position of Abertzale Batasuna, the Union Democratique Bretonne and the 
Unione di U Populu Corsu, the three minority nationalist parties included in this 
comparative study. It would be wrong to assume that minority nationalist aspirations 
systematically equate to the creation of new states. Rather, minority nationalist actors 
place the emphasis on nationhood, on the existence of a minority nation possessing a 
right to self-determination. Minority nationalism refers to a broader definition of 
nationalism, focusing on self-determination and self-government irrespective of the 
constitutional form which these take (McGarry & Keating, 2001:20).
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Claims for nationhood at the sub-national or regional level are often disputed 
because of the threat they represent for the national unity and territorial integrity of states. 
Explicit claims for nationhood are so contentious in some places that minority nationalists 
will prefer using the language of regionalism, thereby adding to the terminological 
confusion. One can talk of nationalism in Scotland or Wales, since these places are 
commonly recognised as nations and the population sees itself as such. In Spain, the 
Constitution makes a distinction between the Spanish nation and the “nacionalidades” or 
nationalities that compose it, such as Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia20. In Italy, 
the Lega Nord has sought to conjure up a “Nazione Padania" but this imagined nation is 
not taken seriously outside the party’s rank. By contrast, Sicily has its own distinct history, 
a language, a strong sense of identity and an autonomous government, but it is rarely 
referred to as a nation. Brittany is usually seen as a region and Breton political groups 
describe themselves as autonomists, but their claims and political agenda are essentially 
nationalist in content. On the other hand, Corsican groups are widely referred to as 
nationalist (including by the French government), a term implying the existence of a 
Corsican national identity. The same French authorities have however fiercely opposed 
references to “the Corsican people” in official documents. In sum, while there can be a 
general agreement on the existence of nations in some regions, nationhood is most often 
claimed on one side and denied on the other. It is however generally accepted among 
scholars and practitioners that the existence of a minority nation is not a matter of official 
recognition by a state, but relies instead on the presence of a collective sense of 
community. Capotorti’s definition stands as a standard reference in the field and mentions 
that minorities “show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving 
their culture, traditions, religion and language” (Capotorti, 1979). This self-awareness or 
self-identification, while being essential to the idea of minority nation, cannot be objectively 
demonstrated and is therefore bound to be the subject of continuing controversy.
Empirically, minority nationalist parties can be difficult to distinguish from 
regionalist organisations. According to Meny (1991:61), the “defence of the territory” is the 
justification for the creation of regionalist parties. Minority nationalist actors certainly fit 
within this category, as they concentrate their efforts, both in terms of demands and 
strategies, exclusively on one sub-national territory. The central features of minority 
nationalism in Western Europe are a coinciding group identity and territory, making it a 
territorially integrated nationalism. Territory is defined on the basis of the historical, 
linguistic and cultural properties of minority nations, ratherthan the administrative divisions
20 “La Constitucion se fundaments en la indisoluble unidad de la Nacibn espanola, patria comun 
e indivisible de todos los espaftoles, y reconoce y garantiza el derecho a la autonomla de las 
nacionalidades y regiones que la integran y la solidaridad entre todas ellas.” Constitucibn 
espanola de 1978 (accessed online at
http://www.maD.es/documentacion/leqislacion/constitucion.html on 6 July 2009).
35
of states. Minority nationalists identify with, and make claims upon central governments on 
behalf of, territories and groups that do not coincide with state boundaries and national 
populations (Rokkan & Urwin, 1983:8). Like regionalist parties, these actors therefore 
present a challenge to the territorial structure of the state, asking for its reconfiguration in 
favour of the regional territory. Both regionalist and minority nationalist organisations 
advocate an alternative organisation of political authority to the unitary nation-state and 
seek to establish the region as the most relevant political space. But while minority 
nationalism has much in common with regionalism, there is an important normative 
difference. Unlike other kinds of regionalist organisations, minority nationalist parties base 
their demands on the right to self-determination of their minority nation. In their view, a 
minority nation, just like any nation, has a right to decide the nature and form of its political 
identity. The exercise of this right to internal self-determination results in the elaboration of 
a project of self-government. Such project reflects the domestic arrangements which, in 
each case, are deemed necessary for the protection and continued existence of the 
minority nation. Hence, the crucial distinction between nationalist and regionalist claims 
lies in the area of legitimacy: “asserting nationhood implies that the nation, however 
defined, is the primary social grouping to which allegiance is due, the basis for social 
organisation” (McGarry & Keating, 2001:24). For minority nationalists, this normative 
dimension confers legitimacy to their mobilisation inasmuch as it is grounded on a 
fundamental right of peoples, a right being denied to them by state authorities. Other 
regionalist organisations do not make claims of this nature, they refer instead to functional, 
economic and/or identity-related arguments for demanding greater control over the affairs 
of the regional territory. This is not to say that minority nationalists are necessarily the 
chosen representatives of the regional minority they associate themselves with. According 
to Rokkan and Urwin, “while not all people in a territory may identify with or support such a 
movement, the latter may demand control of, or adjustments in the control of, the territory, 
and hence over all who live there, irrespective of their political opinions" (1983:8). 
Nevertheless, normatively, it is this grounding in the right to self-determination which 
differentiates minority nationalists from other type of regionalist actors also making claims 
on behalf of regional populations and territories.
2.1.2. Minority nationalists as political parties
As political parties, minority nationalists have adopted a great variety of ideological 
positions to defend their claims to self-determination - so much so that they have often 
been disregarded as an ideologically heterogeneous category in the party politics literature 
(Gallagher, Laver & Mair, 2001). Mair and Mudde argue that problems associated with the 
ideological dimension of party families are “particularly acute in the case of regional and
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sub-national parties, which are sometimes grouped together as a separate family on the 
basis of their limited territorial appeal but which include within their ranks a remarkable 
diversity of ideological identities” (Mair & Mudde, 1998:222). Minority nationalist parties 
are spread widely across the conventional right/left spectrum, ranging from the Belgian 
Vlaams Blok on the far right to the Irish Sinn Fein on the far left. Some of the parties are 
even voluntarily excluding themselves from that traditional framework, such as the Unione 
di U Populu Corsu which asserts a strict “neither right, nor left” stance on Corsican politics. 
In some cases, minority nationalists have also displayed significant ideological volatility. 
The Flemish Volksunie, for instance, tended towards the right until the mid-1960s, when it 
moved to the centre-left and defined itself as a “socially progressive justice party". The 
party then adopted a “liberal-left” profile in the 1980s, but its programme was radicalised 
towards the extreme left by its leader, Bert Anciaux, in the 1990s (De Winter, 1998:35). 
The ideological variability of minority nationalist parties has meant that they have rarely 
been studied as a party family in the literature, as illustrated by Mair and Mudde who 
conclude that “the group might be more usefully disaggregated and dispersed among 
other competing families” (1998:222). Such disaggregation of minority nationalist parties 
would shift the research focus away from the specific nature of their demands and political 
mobilisation.
By contrast, the assumption made in this thesis is that, far from being a residual 
category, minority nationalist parties represent a coherent subset of political parties with 
distinct characteristics. For a start, the fact that the right/left divide is not predominant for 
minority nationalists, and that ideological positions vary from one party to another, is not 
as surprising as it may sound. This observation is consistent with the work of Lipset and 
Rokkan (1967) on the emergence of party systems and simply indicates that these parties 
do not mobilise on the class cleavage, unlike the traditional trajectory of the vast majority 
of Europe’s mainstream political parties. Political parties sustain an identity that is 
anchored in the issues that gave rise to their birth (Tursan, 1998:5) and minority nationalist 
parties essentially seek to redefine centre-periphery relations with regards to a specific 
regional minority. As such, these parties - like regionalist parties - are grounded in the 
centre-periphery cleavage, i.e. the empowerment and disempowerment of levels of 
decision-making in the regional periphery and at the centre respectively. The centre- 
periphery cleavage is the “bounded rationality” shaping the way in which these parties 
come to terms with new challenges and uncertainties (Marks and Wilson, 2000:434). As 
the research presented in this thesis demonstrates - European integration striking at the 
very heart of this cleavage - it is particularly relevant to these parties who claim 
“ownership” to issues related to the territorial organisation of political power (De Winter & 
Gomez-Reino, 2002:484). At the same time, the way in which political power is shared 
among different socio-economic groups, i.e. the issue at the origin of the right-left
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spectrum, is not a shared core concern of minority nationalists and each party will respond 
to this issue in its own way.
Instead of right/left ideology, it is the demand for self-government that primarily 
defines the minority nationalist party family. This demand will vary considerably from one 
case to another, reflecting the domestic arrangements best suited to the recognition and 
protection of the minority nation. The historical experience of the minority nation, the 
factors that induce nationalist mobilisation and define its goals, as well as the opportunity 
structures available for pursuing such claims, will be different in each case (Rokkan & 
Urwin, 1983; Keating, 1998:117). Depending on the latter, minority nationalist demands for 
self-government will take different forms such as independence, autonomy, federalism, 
devolution, cultural rights and/or even European integration. De Winter (1998: 204-208) 
distinguishes five types of minority nationalist parties: protectionist parties (which demand 
measures to protect and develop their cultural identity within the framework of the existing 
state), autonomist parties (which ask for specific power-sharing arrangement for their 
region only), national-federalist parties (which want to acquire self-government through the 
reorganisation of the unitary state into a federal state), independentist parties (which aim 
at the full political independence of their region) and irredentist parties (which aim to break 
away from the state to which they belong and/or favour the annexation of their region to 
another nation-state). This classification should not be seen in terms of strict categories, 
as minority nationalist parties almost always change their rhetoric and goals overtime. As 
will transpire in the following account of Basque, Breton and Corsican nationalist 
mobilisation since the 1980s, these different demands for self-government are not 
mutually exclusive and often overlap. Each minority nationalist party will determine the 
domestic arrangements best adapted not only to the needs but also to the current 
prospects of its minority nation, so that its demand for self-government will be adjusted 
along the way. Another useful distinction could nevertheless be made between 
“fundamentalist” and "gradualist” parties. The latter see self-government as arriving in 
stages, seeking to use autonomy as a stepping stone to independence for instance, while 
the former see constitutional provisions falling short of independence as undermining the 
momentum for self-government (Hepburn, 2006). Independently of how it is conceived, the 
pursuit of self-government, based on a political right to self-determination, is what primarily 
distinguishes minority nationalist parties from other party families.
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Table 2: Different forms o f self-government advocated by  
minority nationalist parties
Territorial institutionalisation, regionalisation
Cultural autonomy, cultural & linguistic rights
Regional autonomy, power-sharing arrangement for one region
Federalism, devolution
Independence, creation of a new state
An area of research relatively untouched in the literature - to which this study will 
make a contribution - are the dynamics underlying the mobilisation of minority nationalist 
parties. Evidence suggests that the internal logic of these parties is distinct from traditional 
political parties. The prime objective of minority nationalist parties is to mobilise support 
around a regional minority, to generate a group consciousness giving way to the 
realisation of self-determination. Rather than only seeking to improve their electoral 
performance and gain office at all cost, minority nationalists work towards having their 
demands heard and discussed in the relevant political platforms. While sitting in sub­
national elected assemblies can be an effective way of influencing regional political 
debates, substantial representation is not always readily accessible for these small 
parties. In that event, minority nationalist parties will seek other ways of bringing exposure 
to their predicament, sometimes at the cost of electoral success. For instance, 
Abertzaleen Batasuna has repeatedly resorted to strategies of civil disobedience to draw 
public attention to its demand for the institutionalisation of the Northern Basque Country. 
Minority nationalist parties display more flexibility and adaptability than most political 
parties, revising their positions in order to make the most out of opportunities arising for 
their mobilisation. This will often lead to significant changes in their programmes and 
strategies over time.
The way in which minority nationalists identify and operate within their territory also 
stands out as a crucial characteristic of their mobilisation as political parties. Miodownik 
and Cartrite (2006) distinguish between a de ju re  demarcation of the territory whose 
boundaries and/or institutional organisation they seek to adjust through their demands, 
and a de facto demarcation of the territory through contesting elections across their 
historic region irrespective of administrative boundaries imposed by the state. For small 
parties with limited resources, such a strategy will come at the expense of electoral 
success, as they do not concentrate their resources in potentially winnable electoral 
districts. The Union Democratique Bretonne provides a clear illustration of this point: the 
party favoured maximising the number of seats contested in Brittany (including in the
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department Loire-Atlantique, which is not part of the Breton administrative region) in lieu of 
achieving elected office. As a result of these efforts to define the historic Brittany, the UDB 
waited 40 years before gaining representation at the regional level in 2004. This 
conception of territoriality has direct implications for the way in which minority nationalists 
function as political parties. By using electoral activity as a tool to define their territory, they 
differ from most political parties whose prime objective is to achieve political 
representation.
The mobilisation of minority nationalist parties is also characterised by (1) a greater 
frequency of contestation of non-national elections instead of national elections, (2) a 
particularly high level of flexibility in election-coalition formation and (3) organisational 
survival, in the absence of significant electoral success, as a baseline of success 
(Miodownik & Cartrite, 2006:76). First, minority nationalist parties do not intend to capture 
votes across the entire electorate of a state but try to maximise electoral support from the 
regional minority they focus on. Since they are bounded to a pre-defined segment of the 
national population, these parties will place more importance on regional and sub-national 
elections than on state-wide elections. As the case studies will illustrate, minority 
nationalists whose resources are limited will commonly prefer competing for a municipal 
seat than taking part in parliamentary elections. Secondly, precisely because of their lack 
of ideological affinity, minority nationalist parties are like free electrons in politics. These 
parties often form electoral alliances or join political coalitions on an ad hoc basis, 
depending on which political partner will better serve their interests in the short-term. 
Finally, the electoral performance of these small parties is greatly influenced by national 
political institutions - we will come back to that in the next sections. If electoral success is 
hindered by national political institutions, as it is in the case of France, the continued 
existence of minority nationalist parties over time will constitute a baseline of success. In 
disadvantageous circumstances, these parties will concentrate on organisational survival, 
for their mere presence in elections is already a way of claiming minority nationhood. The 
points mentioned above single out minority nationalist parties among the vast majority of 
political parties, usually understood as maximising their electoral performance in the view 
of gaining office at the highest level of government possible.
2.1.3. The impact o f minority nationalist parties
The distinctiveness of minority nationalists as political parties can make it difficult 
to assess their relevance in democratic arenas. In general, the significance of political 
parties is gauged in relation to levels of support in national elections. Minority nationalist 
parties are sometimes seen as politically unimportant because of their size and the low 
electoral turnout they command at the national level (Muller-Rommel, 1998:18). Most
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minority nationalist parties are “small parties”, i.e. polling more than one but less than 15 
per cent of the national vote (Mair, 1991). In Western Europe, only two of these parties 
currently participate in national government - Lega Nord in Italy and Volksunie in Belgium - 
and few have done so in the past, at least for any significant amount of time. In Spain, 
Catalan and Basque nationalist parties have periodically been key actors in securing 
governing majorities at the state level (Calvet Crespo, 2003; Guerrero Salom, 2003). In 
Italy, the electoral breakthrough of the Lega Nord in the 1990s, and its participation in 
Berlusconi’s coalition government since 2001, has had a major effect on national politics 
(Giordano, 2003). Beyond these few exceptions, the role played by minority nationalist 
parties in state-wide political arenas is marginal.
This thesis contends that one must penetrate the internal logic of these parties to 
appreciate their impact on politics. The electoral performance of a minority nationalist 
party cannot be measured in terms of the proportion of the national vote. What matters 
instead is the proportion of the targeted electorate and votes in the territory that minority 
nationalists claim to represent. Similarly, these parties make a conscious decision to 
operate exclusively at the sub-national level, there is little point assessing their political 
significance within national politics. Rather, Sartori’s (1976) conceptualisation of “relevant 
political parties”21 must be adapted to the regional political space, where most minority 
nationalists have established a stable presence. Many minority nationalist parties are 
mainstream parties in regional politics; when they are not parties of regional government, 
they act as the main opposition parties within their respective territories, as illustrated by 
the Scottish National Party or Plaid Cymru until 2007 (Hepburn, 2006; Elias, 2006). Even 
minority nationalist parties that are less successful electorally often find themselves to be 
key partners for electoral alliances, because of their flexibility in coalition formation, and 
can therefore exert influence on regional politics. For instance, the 1998 election of the 
Ligue Savoisienne, which gathered only 5.16 percent of the votes, considerably altered 
party competition within the Regional Assembly of Rhone Alpes22. Regional political 
arenas are where minority nationalists primarily seek to increase their political weight and
21 Sartori proposes two rules to determine the relevance of a political party: “Rule 1. A minor party 
can be discounted as irrelevant whenever it remains over time superfluous, in the sense that it is 
never needed or put to use for any feasible coalition majority . . .  Rule 2. A party qualifies for 
relevance whenever its experience, or appearance, affects the tactics of party competition and 
particularly when it alters the direction of the competition—by determining a switch from 
centripetal to centrifugal competition either leftward, rightward, or in both directions—of the 
governing-oriented parties . . .  In summary, we can discount the parties that have neither (i) 
coalition potential nor (ii) blackmail potential” (1976: 122-123).
22 In 1998, after the first round of elections, the Socialist list led by Jean-Jacques Queyranne and 
the right-wing list led by Charles Millon had the same number of seats, with no absolute majority. 
The only Savoisian representative and leader of the LS, Patrice Abeille, gave its vote to the 
Socialists, which led Millon to break the implicit pact of non-alliance with the extreme-right by 
accepting the votes of the FN, represented by Bruno Gollnisch, in order to gain control of the 
Regional Assembly.
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electoral support. Behaving as regional actors per se, they stand out from conventional 
political parties often seeing sub-national elections as second-order politics.
Going even further with this line of argument, electability does not appear to be the 
most appropriate concept to assess the audience and support received by minority 
nationalist parties. As mentioned above, the electoral behaviour of these parties differs 
from the traditional vote-maximising approach of most political parties and electoral results 
cannot fully account for their level of influence within regional politics. In addition, the 
political representation of minority nationalists is largely conditioned by the nature of 
election systems. It is generally stated that majoritarian systems restrain multipartism 
whereas proportional systems promote it (Duverger, 1959; Rae, 1967; Taagepera & 
Shugart, 1989; Lijphart, 1994). There are two sets of arguments: firstly, under majoritarian 
systems only larger parties have the possibility to gain representation and smaller parties 
are therefore penalised (Duverger, 1959); secondly, voters become aware that voting for a 
small party implies wasting votes and tend to refrain from voting for it (Cox, 1997). An 
electoral system with proportional representation will boost minority nationalist parties, as 
it boosts other small parties. In Spain, proportional representation is likely to have 
facilitated the breakthrough and rapid expansion of parliamentary representation of 
Catalan and Basque nationalists. In majoritarian systems, only one candidate can win in 
each district and any third party suffers from extreme under-representation as a result. 
Voters with sympathies for a minority nationalist party may not vote for such a party if it 
does not stand a chance of winning any seat. Electoral thresholds for representation can 
also be deadly for small parties and prevent minority nationalists from gaining the seats 
that their electorate would usually dictate. In sum, different electoral rules translate into 
different levels of representation for these parties and the percentage of votes that 
minority nationalist parties receive is not a perfect indicator of the total public support for 
their main issue.
Last but not least, minority nationalist parties can play a significant role within their 
respective political arenas, in spite of their limited electorate and political representation 
(Villalba, 1997; Tursan, 1998). The impact of these parties can be found in the nature of 
political debates rather than in terms of direct political outputs or outcomes. In pushing 
autonomy questions onto the political agenda, there is a sense in which minority 
nationalists force their opponents onto “regional” territory. This is what Rokkan and Urwin 
(1983:118) referred to as “the politicisation of peripheral predicaments”. Instead of 
concentrating only on traditional issues - taxation, spending, health, education, defence, 
etc -  state wide parties are forced to discuss regional issues, produce regional solutions 
and establish regional institutions (Lynch, 2003:5). From a minority nationalist point of 
view, these are the first steps towards the emergence of political assertiveness at the 
regional level and ultimately towards self-government. Furthermore, before the emergence
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of widespread group consciousness, minority nationalism will manifest itself more 
effectively at the level of elite accommodation (Cole, 2006:49). These parties will work 
towards bringing exposure to their demands in regional politics, so that these demands 
end up being supported by the political, economic and cultural elites within their historic 
territory. Hence, one must also look into the content of regional political debates to 
appreciate the impact of minority nationalist mobilisation.
The points above have introduced minority nationalist parties as actors maximising 
institutional and political opportunities available to them in order to achieve the self- 
determination of their minority nation. In its second part, this chapter will survey the ways 
in which European integration has changed the institutional and political settings where 
these actors mobilise. The EU has opened up a debate about new ways of organising 
political authority and this has engendered possibilities for minority nationalism that were 
inconceivable within the traditional state system. In practice, however, it is still within the 
nation-state framework that minority nationalists must achieve self-government. Through 
its institutional, legal, political and economic manifestations within member states, 
European integration can nevertheless provide opportunities for minority nationalist 
mobilisation.
2.2. European integration and minority nationalist parties
2.2.1. The EU: A new framework for minority demands?
Fundamentally, European integration and minority nationalism can be seen as 
mutually reinforcing processes aiming for a new kind of politics. They both challenge the 
concept of “nation-state” as the sole basis for identity and sovereignty, and offer 
alternative ways of organising political authority. European integration has led to a 
rethinking of the relationship between territory, identity and political authority. With states 
transferring competences to Brussels, the notion of indivisible sovereignty has become 
obsolete. Rather, sovereignty is increasingly being perceived as a commodity shared 
between several authorities (MacCormick, 1999; Walker, 2001). Apart from the idea of 
sovereignty-sharing, the EU has concretely undermined the functional purpose of the 
nation-state. The internationalisation of economic and political relationships, and the 
emergence of new dimensions to traditional policy issues that the state is ill-equipped to 
deal with in isolation, have forced the reallocation of decision-making capacities upwards 
to European institutions and downwards through decentralisation and devolution (Hooghe 
& Marks, 2001). The state has been emptied of some of its substantive content and can 
no longer claim a monopoly on the exercise of legitimate political authority within a 
territorially bounded political system. In this way, European integration has altered the
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centre-periphery cleavage that pitted the centralising state against political, economic and 
cultural forces -  such as minority nationalists - in the peripheries (Rokkan & Urwin, 1983). 
Instead of the nation-state model, a new and unique European polity is being created in 
which European, state and sub-state actors share political powers (Marks, 1993; Marks, 
Hooghe & Blank, 1996; Hooghe & Marks, 2001).
The alternative organisation of political authority embodied by the EU constitutes a 
promising rhetoric for the self-determination of minority nations. These doctrines are 
appealing to minority nationalists because "if we recognise that neither nationalism nor 
sovereignty are absolutes and that both can change and evolve over time, and that the 
nation-state as it has existed since the nineteenth century is merely one way of doing this, 
then we open up a large array of possibilities for managing nationality issues” (Keating, 
2001:42). By devising new sources of legitimate authority, the EU has opened up 
unprecedented perspectives for the resolution of the minority nationalist predicament. 
Many minority nationalists have embraced post-sovereigntist arguments according to 
which the traditional understanding of sovereignty and statehood are no longer 
appropriate in contemporary society (McGarry & Keating, 2006:23-34). Furthermore, the 
EU can be seen as implementing a new model of deliberative democracy, within which 
minority nations have an opportunity to become the “co-architects” of European 
governance (Malloy, 2005:250-288). Instead of asking for their rights to be respected, 
minority nations could be empowered with self-protection through European integration. 
The building of an internal market, the 1988 reform of the European Structural Funds and 
several innovations contained in the Maastricht Treaty - the creation of a Committee of the 
Regions, access for regional representatives to the Council of Ministers and the principle 
of subsidiarity -  have been European developments hailed by minority nationalists as 
evidence that a Europe of the Regions has been in the making. The logical conclusion 
would be a future European polity in which sovereign states are being replaced by 
regional and supranational entities jointly exercising political power (Nagel, 2004:59). 
From a minority nationalist perspective, this is clearly an attractive prospect since minority 
nations would enjoy a level of decision-making responsibility unimaginable within the state 
system.
Yet, these philosophical and theoretical arguments belie a reality where member 
states remain in control of key policy areas tied to the notion of sovereignty and continue 
to play a privileged role in defining the direction of European integration. The lack of 
progress towards creating a Europe of the Regions was highlighted in debates held during 
the Convention on the Future of Europe. Many of the demands put forward by EFA on 
behalf of its members were not included in the final constitutional text (Elias, 2008:559). 
The resulting document represented a "robustly statist" vision of the EU whose powers 
were given to it by sovereign member states (MacCormick, 2004:342). Member states
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have proved resilient in the face of pressure to transfer political authority to the 
supranational and sub-state levels. Furthermore, even though the EU has assumed many 
of their functional responsibilities, there is little evidence that sub-state actors have gained 
from this redistribution of policy competences. Empirically, we are still very far from the 
multi-level governance model where sub-state actors bypass the state to participate 
directly in the European policy-making process. Limitations are present constraining the 
mobilisation of sub-state actors in the EU and their influence on European decision­
making has remained limited. The Committee of the Regions (CoR), the European 
assembly of elected regional and local representatives, stands as an allegory for the 
weakness of the regional level in the EU. While its creation in 1994 was presented as a 
recognition of the role granted to regions in the emerging EU polity, the CoR was only 
given a consultative role. The effectiveness of the CoR for the representation of sub-state 
interests in the EU has almost immediately suffered from the high disparities in terms of 
action capacity and competences among European regions (Jeffery, 1997; Loughlin,
1996). The Committee’s competences have been extended by the new Lisbon Treaty: 
most significantly, it now has a right to approach the Court of Justice and to request the 
annulment of EU legislation if it is in breach of the principle of subsidiarity. Its influence 
remains negligible, especially since powerful regional actors, such as the Presidents of the 
German Lander, have long deserted the assembly.
National governments have maintained a strong “gatekeeping" role in controlling 
the access of sub-state actors to European institutions (Bache & Jones, 2000; Jeffery, 
2000; Nay, 2002). Only the most entrepreneurial and well resourced regional governments 
have succeeded in mobilising directly at the European level. This is perhaps best 
illustrated with the right for regional representation in the Council of Ministers introduced 
by the Maastricht Treaty. Symbolically an important breakthrough for regional participation 
in the EU, this provision has for a long time only been used by Germany, Belgium and 
Austria (Keating, 1998:167-169). The UK (1999) and Spain (2004) have conceded the 
right for ministers from regional parliaments to participate in delegations to the Council of 
Ministers, although in all cases the latter act as representatives of their member states, 
and not of their respective regions (Elias, 2005). In practice, this provision remains the 
privilege of the strongest regions in Europe and there is no indication that it might be 
applied by other member states in the near future. In this context, it seems more accurate 
to speak of a Europe with some regions than a Europe of the Regions (Nagel, 2004; 
Jeffery, 2000). Despite claims of hosting a variety of state, non-state and sub-state 
interests, the EU remains largely intergovernmental in nature.
Admittedly, the state is being transformed through the increasing penetration of 
supranational and sub-national influences. But there is little sign of it disappearing any 
time soon and minority nationalist aspirations continue to be inextricably linked to
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developments within member states. While the EU can give new hopes to minority 
nationalists in the future, their contestation is still directed at national governments. For 
now, the promise of a new kind of European politics remains an abstract ideal and the EU 
as it stands does not constitute an alternative framework in which to accommodate 
minority nationalist demands. European integration can however impact on the politics of 
minority nationalism by providing resources for the pursuit of nationalist aspirations within 
member states, as we shall see in the following section.
2.2.2. European developments affecting minority nationalist mobilisation
While the EU does not yet provide an alternative for resolving long-term minority 
nationalist goals, it has offered a number of opportunities for developing new strategies to 
achieve these goals within member states. EU policy-making procedures however 
continue to underline the power of central governments and most contacts between 
Europe and sub-national actors go through member states. The French case will serve to 
show how member states can constrain the degree to which minority nationalists are able 
to participate in the governance of Europe.
Since the 1970s, institutional opportunities have allowed minority nationalist parties 
to enter the European arena. The introduction of elections to the European Parliament in 
1979 provided direct access to EU institutions for the first time. European elections have 
been an additional electoral arena where to defend minority nationalist projects and 
visions of the future European polity. As this research will demonstrate, these elections 
have a unique significance for minority nationalist parties. In centralised states such as 
France, these parties essentially participate in elections as anti-system actors because of 
the challenge that they pose to the territorial organisation. By contrast, European elections 
have been an opportunity to gain visibility in a positive light and to campaign behind a 
programme for self-government compatible with the norms and values of the EU. 
Furthermore, these elections have proved to be advantageous in terms of electoral results 
for small parties such as minority nationalist parties. Voters generally perceive them as 
“second order elections" because they play no role in deciding who governs the country 
(Reif & Schmitt, 1980). They may be less inclined to turn out to the polls as a result, but 
those who do vote have tended not to vote in the same way as in general elections. 
People will continue to vote according to national preferences despite the European 
character of the election (Hix, 2002) but they are likely to give their support to opposition 
parties or single-issue parties, in reaction to the policies of their national governments. The 
“wasted vote" argument that usually applies to small parties who have no chance of 
forming government becomes irrelevant in European elections - all votes are wasted in the 
sense that they do not lead to the election of a government. Voting will be more
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expressive than instrumental, so that people will feel free to “vote with the heart” (Reif, 
1985) or to support issues they wish governing parties would take into account (Eijk, 
Franklin and Marsh, 1996).
Still, only a select group of minority nationalist parties in Europe have managed to 
secure MEPs in every election23. While not all minority nationalist parties have the 
electoral support necessary to win a seat in the European Parliament, the electoral rules 
applied by some member states have also prevented small regional parties from gaining 
representation. For instance, until recently, European elections were organised in France 
within one single constituency and with a 5 percent electoral threshold to get 
parliamentary representation. In 2004, a more proportional system was adopted through 
the division of the French territory into 8 electoral constituencies and results were quick to 
follow: Corsican nationalist Francois Alfonsi (UPC) won a European seat for the South 
East constituency in the last elections24. Nevertheless, even minority nationalist parties 
without an MEP can find a form of European representation through the European Free 
Alliance (EFA). The EFA was formally established in 1981 with the objective of forming a 
“stateless nations” party group within the European Parliament. Originally composed of 6 
signatory parties, the EFA now has over 30 members, most recently boosted by new 
members from Central and Eastern Europe (Lynch, 2005). France is currently the member 
state with the largest number of minority nationalist parties within the EFA, seven in total25. 
Since its creation, the EFA has grown in stature to provide a forum for minority nationalist 
parties (both with and without MEPs) to structure and articulate their interests at the
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European level. However, the EFA remains electorally heterogeneous, which inevitably 
undermines its cohesion, and has not yet managed to constitute its own party group, 
having to co-operate with the coalition of Green parties (Lynch, 2005). Furthermore, while 
other European party families, due to their participation in national governments, have 
extra-parliamentary privileged access to the EU decision-making bodies (Council and 
Commission), such channels of influence are not usually available to EFA members. The 
EFA for instance does not hold Europarty summits before the European Council and 
therefore lacks an opportunity for voicing its vision on the EU and claiming visibility as a 
party family (De Winter & Gomez-Reino, 2002:485).
Second on the list of European developments directly affecting minority nationalist 
parties is the European regime of minority rights. In 1993, “respect for and protection of 
minorities” was integrated in the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership. Although the
23 These correspond to the most visible minority nationalist parties in Western Europe, such as 
Plaid Cymru (Wales), the SNP (Scotland), the PNV (Basque Country), CiU (Catalonia), Volksunie 
(Flanders), Lega Nord (Northern Italy).
4 A coalition with the Greens had already yielded a MEP seat for Corsican nationalist Max 
Simeoni (UPC) from 1989 to 1994.
25 Mouvement Region Savoie, Partit Occitan, Union Democratique Bretonne, Union du Peuple 
Alsacien, Unione di u Populu Corsu, Unitat Catalana and Ligue Savoisienne.
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“minority criterion” was primarily motivated by security concerns, it did establish minority 
protection among the political norms associated with democracy within the EU 
(Toggenburg, 2004). Except for the basic anti-discrimination acquis, there is however no 
provision for minority rights in European law, so that the EU has relied entirely on norms 
developed by the OSCE and the Council of Europe to promote minority protection in 
Central and Eastern Europe (Sasse, 2005). EU accession has shaped minority nationalist 
mobilisation in new member states but the effects of EU conditionality -  its scope and 
limitations - are a vast area of research which goes beyond the scope of this study (see for 
instance Sasse, 2008). In any case, minority rights remain controversial in old member 
states which have jealously guarded their rights to deal with their minorities in their own 
way. France is the most striking example in that respect, as it denies the existence of 
minorities on its territory and has not ratified any international document of minority 
protection. Despite the discrepancies in member states’ approach to minority rights, the 
EU has nonetheless emerged as a sphere where minorities can voice their demands and 
concerns. The European Parliament, in particular, has pushed the agenda of minority 
languages and cultural diversity by commissioning reports and passing resolutions on 
these issues26. The Arfe Resolution27 notably led to the adoption of the European Charter 
on Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML) by the Council of Europe. Yet, the 
unwillingness of some member states to ratify the ECRML28, whose provisions are far 
from ground-breaking in terms of linguistic rights, does not fare well for the adoption of an 
EU minority policy in the near future. Still, these European initiatives have resonated with 
minority nationalist concerns for the protection of their cultural and linguistic specificities. 
The body of rights emerging through European integration has provided a standard of 
norms strengthening their demands to national governments. Even more importantly, it 
demonstrates for minority nationalist parties a fundamental commitment by the EU to 
defend the right of minority groups. Recently, an explicit reference to minorities was 
included for the first time in the Lisbon Treaty and the Charter of Fundamental Rights29, 
further indicating a growing awareness of minority issues within the EU.
26 For instance, the report commissioned by the European Parliament in 1996, Euromosaic: The 
Production and Reproduction of the Minority Language Groups of the EU, the creation of the 
European Bureau for Lesser used Languages in 1982 and the Art. 128 of the Maastricht Treaty of 
the European Union mentioning respect for the regional diversity of member states.
27 Resolution on a Community Charter of Regional Languages and Cultures and on a Charter of 
Rights of Ethnic Minorities, adopted by the European Parliament on 16 October 1981 (A1- 
965/80), 16-10-81 OJC 287, p.57
28 France and the UK delayed signing the European Charter on Regional or Minority Languages, 
with France doing so in May 1999 and the UK in March 2000. The UK and Spain eventually 
ratified the Charter in March and April 2001 respectively, but France has yet to do so since its 
Constitutional Court declared the document to be incompatible with the French Constitution.
29 The Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/01) states that 
“Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic 
features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national
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Finally, European integration has transformed the level of government where 
minority nationalists operate, i.e. the region. The influence of regional actors in the 
European polity should not be overestimated and there is still a long way to go before 
subsidiarity will be fully applied to the sub-national level. Yet, as players in a wide system 
of European governance, regions have been recognised as a key level of political action. 
Regions have become functional spaces in which actors from all levels (supranational, 
national, regional, local) interact (Keating, 1997:17). The EU has developed several policy 
measures targeted at regions, such as the EU Cohesion policy, the Common Agricultural 
policy and the Structural Funds. As a result, new political linkages and channels of 
influence have emerged between the EU, member states and regions (Hooghe & Marks,
2001). EU policies have provided new channels for regional actors to put forward their 
demands and new resources to overcome the economic difficulties of peripherical regions 
neglected by their central governments. If only in this way, the EU has altered the balance 
of power between the state and the regions. Beyond institutionalised top-down processes, 
EU policy-making has also had a reverberating effect in regions, bringing into being new 
social and political movements. Structural fund interventions, in particular, have stimulated 
political mobilisation around programmes and spending projects and have encouraged 
people and organisations to articulate their demands in regional terms (Cole & Loughlin, 
2003). Regions have adopted an active role in European politics (interregional 
organisations, information offices, lobby, public-private partnerships, etc) (Jeffery, 1997:4). 
The EU has provided an arena where regional actors can pursue their interests alongside 
state actors, in a non-zero sum game (Downs, 2002:173). European integration gives 
regions the opportunity to get involved in supranational and cross-border agreements and 
regional networks of influence are being created around European institutions, exchanging 
information, planting ideas, and gradually developing policy and increasing their technical 
capacity (Balme, 1995:183).
That being said, it can be extremely difficult for regional interests in some member 
states to articulate their demands at the European level and the most effective avenue for 
influencing European politics continues to be via domestic state channels (Hooghe & 
Marks, 1996; Bache, 1999). Only some sub-state actors participate in the implementation 
of the European regional policy and member states have maintained a firm grip on the 
management of European funds (Jones & Keating, 1995). Here again, France provides a 
telling example. French regions have been excluded from most parts of the European 
policy-making process and structural funds are dealt with at the national level (Balme, 
1995:182). The government has also imposed its territorial administrations, the 
prefectures, as essential actors in the implementation of European policies. The
minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited” [italics are the 
author’s] (Article 21).
49
development of the European regional policy has in fact triggered a territorial 
redeployment of the French state, which has adopted the role of intermediary between 
Europe and the local level (Nay, 2002). More detail will be provided on this in the next 
chapter, but the French case is revealing of a trend within member states. The weakening 
of the state in relation to the EU has prompted the internal strengthening of the capacity of 
state actors to pursue their goals in the face of opposition from regional actors (Evans,
2002). Still, regardless of the limitations imposed by member states, regions have 
irrevocably become an integrated part of the system of European governance, and this 
has contributed to raising the relevance and salience of regional politics, i.e. the political 
level where minority nationalists operate.
2.3. Conclusion
This second chapter has defined the key term and scope of this research, namely 
the concept of minority nationalist parties. Several terminologies have been used to refer 
to these actors and these definitional considerations were a necessary starting point to 
ensure a constructive engagement with the literature. The position taken in this study is 
that minority nationalists constitute a distinct party family identifiable by the demand for 
self-government but also an internal logic which differs from that of traditional political 
parties. The unique dynamics driving the mobilisation of minority nationalist parties is an 
important point to bear in mind when assessing their significance in multi-level democratic 
arenas. The second part of the chapter has examined the new context that the EU 
provides for minority nationalist mobilisation. European integration has opened up new 
perspectives for the self-determination of minority nations, by offering the vision of a future 
European polity where states would be replaced by supranational and sub-national actors. 
Empirically, however, it is clear that states are not disappearing just yet, although they are 
being transformed through economic and political integration. Direct elections to the 
European Parliament, the European regime of minority rights, the Europeanisation of 
regional politics -  these are EU developments that minority nationalists can exploit to 
advance their demands. But the national framework within which a mobilisation is 
conducted will constrain minority nationalists’ participation in European politics and 
determine the degree to which they can take advantage of European integration. The next 
chapter will provide an overview of the ideological, political and institutional constraints 
and opportunity structures that France offers for minority nationalist mobilisation.
50
Chapter 3 - France as a context for minority nationalist mobilisation
Minority nationalist parties mobilise support within a framework of national political 
opportunity structures, which not only conditions their demands and strategies, but also 
shapes their response to European integration. This chapter provides an overview of the 
ideological, political and institutional context that the French state offers for minority 
nationalist mobilisation. France can be seen as a "hard case” to assess the significance of 
European integration for minority nationalist contestation in member states. In many 
respects, it embodies the tensions existing between minority nationalism and the concept 
of the nation-state. Jacobinism is still a pervasive component of French politics that is 
perceptively hostile to the minority nationalist predicament. Most EU member states have 
adopted measures to accommodate their internal diversity, but the French government 
has remained reluctant to make concessions towards its regional minorities. The latter 
remain deprived of legal recognition and of the collective means to preserve their distinct 
cultures and languages. This aversion for regional identities is also reflected in the French 
politico-administrative system and the successive decentralisation reforms have done little 
to empower sub-national actors30. Corsica stands as a noticeable exception among 
French regions, but the institutional status granted to the island amounts to little more than 
administrative devolution. All in all, talking of a regional level of government still feels like 
an overstatement. The French government has also been keen to monitor the involvement 
of sub-national authorities in the European policy-making process and has retained control 
of the management of structural funds. The growing importance of the EU regional policy 
has entailed a reinforcement of state administrative structures at the regional level, so that 
regional authorities have no autonomy with regards to EU matters. It is in this context of 
centre-periphery relations, which offers few opportunity structures to escape the 
interference of the French state, that Basque, Breton and Corsican nationalists pursue 
their claims for self-government.
3.1. Jacobinism and French nation
To fully understand the French official positions today, it is necessary to appreciate 
how deeply they are rooted in the Republican movements of the past. France is where the 
Jacobin theory of assimilation originated and has had its fullest expression, and the 
resulting conception of the French nation, one and indivisible, still proves difficult to 
reconcile with the accommodation of cultural diversity.
30 Please note that the term “sub-national" will subsequently be used to refer to all levels of
government below the state (municipal, departmental, regional).
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3.1.1. The legacy o f the French Revolution
During the French Revolution, France was conceived as a “nation-state”, whose 
national and political identities were congruent (Gellner, 1983:1). This congruence became 
the basis for the Jacobin ideology. From then on, “Frenchness" derived from a voluntary 
commitment to common political values and a common fate (Safran, 1991:220). In the 
words of Ernest Renan (1947:903-904), “a nation is a sentiment, a spiritual principle [...] 
which is based on two things. One is in the present, one is in the past; one is the common 
possession of a rich inheritance of memories, and the other, a common consent, a desire 
to live together, and the will to help the heritage that each individual has received 
prevail"31. The French nation was not a matter of heredity but of political and cultural 
identities, rights and duties. Furthermore, in contrast to Germany or Italy for instance, it 
was believed that the French state preceded the existence of the nation and (re)created it.
While there was an historical and cultural heritage common to all French people, 
the organic basis of French nationhood was presented as less important than its political 
basis. The emphasis was placed on the individual will of the citizen. The existence of the 
French nation was a “daily plebiscite" (Renan, 1947), a continually expressed desire to live 
together. One became French through the embracement of civic values, through the wish 
to participate in an economic and political life and through the practice of a shared 
language. Such a conception had no place for either culture or ethnicity as defining 
characteristics for membership of the political community and meant that minority nations 
and regional identities were deprived of political legitimacy. These identities were 
presented as a relic of the past, the result of an incomplete evolution. Jacobins argued 
that it was normatively desirable for regional minorities to be integrated into the nation­
state, thereby justifying the use of coercive policies to achieve linguistic and cultural 
homogeneity and create a single French nation.
The French state transcended the ethnic and linguistic divisions among the 
population of France. The nation, thus redefined, became composed of undifferentiated 
individuals, not of communities (De Herte, 1988). The assumption was that one entered 
the French political community simply as an individual, deprived of any group affiliation 
(Jennings, 2000:577). This translated into three founding principles, which have been 
integrated into the French Constitution: the indivisibility of the French Republic, equality of 
all French citizens before the law and the unity of the French people. It is still a matter of 
debate whether this conception of nationhood was a genuine ideal type around which the 
French nation was fashioned, or a constructed myth to overcome the regional and social 
divisions within France. Today the French nation continues to be defined in the abstract
31 Translation by Safran (1991).
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terms of the Jacobins of the Revolution - despite the emphasis on the French language 
that introduces an ethno-linguistic element into the civic notion of being a French citizen - 
and this legacy still influences the government’s position on cultural and regional diversity. 
In a way, this legacy has been explicitly acknowledged in the preamble of the 1958 
Constitution: “The French people officially declares its attachment to the Human Rights 
and to the principles of national sovereignty as they were defined by the Declaration of 
1789”32
3.1.2. Refusal o f minority and group rights
In accordance with the Jacobin tradition, the French government has not allowed 
any departure from the principle of the indivisibility of the nation, rejecting all group 
distinctions. Recognising the existence of minorities or granting collective rights is 
perceived as a contradiction in terms because French democracy rests on an 
individualism that is a direct connection between the citizen and the state (Safran, 
1991:226). Instead, the French government puts the emphasis on the neutrality of its 
national institutions and on granting the same rights for all citizens. Within this conception, 
cultural and regional specificities are not proscribed, but confined to the private sphere 
and thus in theory depoliticised.
Internationally, the question of minority rights has been avoided by the denial of the 
existence of minorities within France. This was made explicit in the French reservations to 
Art. 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR): “Article 2 (of 
the French Constitution) declares that France shall be a Republic, indivisible, secular, 
democratic and social. It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without 
distinction [...] of origin, race, or religion. It shall respect all beliefs. Since the basic 
principles of public law prohibit distinction between citizens on grounds of origin, race or 
religion, France is a country in which there are no minorities”. This convenient position has 
enabled French authorities to embrace minority protection at the international level, 
notably in France’s external relations, while making the adoption of minority rights 
unnecessary at the national level. Consequently, France has not ratified any of the 
international documents of minority protection, including the key European standard 
setting documents in this area, namely the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.
Domestically, the government has been reluctant to develop a more pluralistic 
approach to the French national community. It has generally been argued that it would 
weaken the state and lead to separatism on the part of regional minorities. This follows the 
traditional Jacobin view that cultural differences could translate into political differences
32 "Constitution du 4 Octobre 1958”, Conseil Constitutionnel.
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and lead to the dismantlement of France as a single cohesive political unit. States often 
fear that granting minorities the right to regional autonomy and self government might lead 
to claims for secession and could jeopardize their territorial integrity. Consequently, 
minority matters have traditionally been kept within the realm of domestic politics and 
states adopt the political arrangements they deemed necessary for the preservation of 
their cultural diversity. Indeed, it has been .argued that state sovereignty often takes 
precedence over minority rights and limits the international law response to minority 
demands (Jackson-Preece, 1997; Malloy, 2005). Independently of its justification, 
France’s almost visceral fear of minorities does not bode well for minority nationalist 
parties.
3.1.3. Limited accommodation o f regional diversity
Perhaps paradoxically, regional diversity has been officially acknowledged in 
France. Regional cultures and languages are conceived not as features belonging to a 
specific region or minority group, but as part of the French cultural heritage. Several 
measures have been adopted to ensure the protection of this heritage, in particular 
regional languages which are a regular feature on the government’s agenda. In 1951, the 
Deixonne law defined them as those “languages other than French that are part of the 
Republic’s culture”, and provided for the teaching of the Basque, Breton, Catalan and 
Occitan languages in schools33. Although implementing regulations were not issued until 
1970, it was followed by several laws adding Corsican to the list of recognised regional 
languages34 and introducing their teaching in selected primary schools35. Today, regional 
language classes have been incorporated in schools curriculum, albeit on an optional 
basis36. An Academic Council for Regional Languages was created in 2001, whose task is 
to manage the content and teaching of classes in regional languages37, and a list of “living 
languages” has been released, including both foreign languages and regional languages 
which can be the subject of an optional exam at the Baccalaureat38. In addition, the
33 Law No 51-46 of 11 January 1951
34 Decree No 74-33 of 16 January 1974
35 Law Haby No 75-620 of 11 July 1975, Law Bas-Lauriol No 75-1349 of 31 December 1975 and 
LawToubon No 96-597of 4 August 1994.
36 Circular No. 95-086 of 7 April 1995 provides for the teaching of all regional languages in state
schools, although it is not mandatory and systematic, stating that “bilingual teaching will be
organised as long as parents make a demand for it and this demand has been officially 
acknowledged”.
37 Decree No 2001-733 of 30 July 2001 relative to the creation of an Academic Council of 
Regional Languages
38 Arrest of 13 January 2004. The regional languages mentioned are: Basque, Breton, Catalan, 
Corsican and Occitan.
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government funds a number of cultural institutes for the promotion of regional cultures39 
and supports a variety of cultural activities, such as the printing of Provencal poetry, the 
production of Breton theatre or the staging of an annual Celtic festival. These initiatives 
have however been criticised by minority nationalists as an attempt to turn their cultures 
into folklore, reducing them to “folkdances and folk costumes” (Safran, 1991:234). 
Furthermore, the public financing of cultural organisations requires them to remain strictly 
apolitical, thereby maintaining a distance between these cultural movements and their 
political expressions (Pasquier, 2006:94).
In the eyes of many, though, such accommodation of regional diversity has already 
gone too far and threatens the dominant position of the national culture and, above all, of 
the French language. These perceived challenges to the French language were such that 
a constitutional amendment was deemed necessary in 1992, stating that “the language of 
the Republic is French”. The intense debate that emerged following the signature of the 
Council of Europe’s European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML) -  and 
the subsequent failure to ratify the Charter -  also demonstrated that France is still very 
much committed to the Jacobin ideal of cultural and linguistic homogeneity. On the 
occasion of the 1997 Council of Europe summit, Lionel Jospin, then Prime Minister, made 
a speech on the importance of safeguarding the cultural diversity of Europe, linking 
tolerance and recognition of diversity at the supranational level to a “right to difference’” at 
the national. As a first step towards concrete action, he ordered the preparation of a report 
on regional and minority languages in France. The resulting Poignant report, which was 
delivered in July 1998, highlighted the need for better support and the promotion of the 
regional languages of France and advised the government to sign the ECRML40. The 
government accepted his advice and started the mechanisms to do so, by establishing a 
list of all the regional and minority languages spoken on the French territory41. The 
resulting document suggested that the government recognise 75 regional and minority 
languages, of which 55 were spoken in the DOM-TOM and 20 in mainland France42. On 7 
May 1999, Pierre Muscovici, then Minister for European Affairs, signed the Charter on 
behalf of the French government in Budapest.
39 For instance, the Basque Cultural Institute, the Academy of Basque Language, the Cultural 
Council of Bretagne, the Breton Cultural Institute and the Assembly of Corsica, which is in charge 
of most cultural matters.
40 Bernard Poignant, “Langues et Cultures Regionales”, Rapport a Monsieur Lionel Jospin, 
Premier Ministre, 1st July 1998.
41 Bernard Cerquiglini, "Les Langues de la France”, Rapport au Ministre de I’Education Nationale, 
de la Recherche et de la Technologie et a la Ministre de la Culture et de la Communication, Avril 
1999.
42 This list deviated significantly from the provisions spelt out in the Council of Europe document 
which made it clear that the Charter was concerned with languages of autochthonous minorities 
only. In his report, Cerquiglini argued that it would be against French practice to recognise only 
the “historic" languages, and since France subscribed to jus soli, from the second generation, 
immigrants were French citizens and thus their languages became languages of France in the 
same way as any other citizen speaking a language other than French.
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France agreed to 39 of the 94 articles in the Charter, barely above the absolute 
minimum (35) required, only accepting a mild version of the document. Education in a 
minority and/or regional language was made dependent on whether enough 
pupils/students sign up for the classes and it would not be mandatory in any case. In the 
section concerned with legal documents, the French government went no further than a 
general agreement to make the most important national texts available in the various 
languages when they could not be accessed through other means. Sub-national 
authorities in the areas where the regional and minority languages were spoken could 
publish official documents in the various languages of their constituents. Names of roads, 
towns and villages could be posted in languages other than French, as long as the signs 
were always in French as well. The government was to encourage television and radio 
programmes in the various languages and take the interests of regional and minority 
language speakers into account when setting funding for public broadcasting. It would 
generally encourage cultural and literary production in the languages, make sure that 
regional and minority language speakers were not prevented from using their languages in 
economic and social situations if they wanted, and make safety and consumer regulations 
available in these languages. Hence, there was not a great deal in these provisions that 
either committed the government to any significant concrete actions or which differed 
notably from practices already in place (Wright, 2000:417).
Although President Chirac had publicly supported the signing of the ECRML during 
a speech in 1996, he then turned to the Constitutional Court to assess the compatibility of 
the Charter with the French Constitution. It is difficult to know exactly what happened in 
the weeks following the 7 May, but it was suggested that Chirac changed his mind feeling 
that the adoption of the Charter could be electorally damaging43. The Constitutional Court 
was always going to be wary of a document requiring an amendment of the Constitution. 
On 15 June 1999, members of the Court rejected the ratification on the basis that “the 
Charter [...] contains provisions which are contrary to the Constitution”44. Constitutional 
Court judges stated unequivocally that the adoption of the Charter would force the 
government to deal with the rights of groups, something which they felt the French 
Constitution, with its insistence on the contract between the individual and the State, could 
not accommodate. Despite Jospin’s persistence, Chirac refused to allow the necessary 
amendments. Since then, any attempt to bring the ECRML back on the government’s 
agenda has been firmly opposed. In 2005,3 Breton MPs and MP Francois Bayrou (UDF) 
proposed a constitutional amendment in view of ratifying the Charter. On 26 January 
2005, the proposal was rejected by a large majority of MPs during an animated 
parliamentary session, illustrating the suspicious attitude of French officials towards
43 Jean-Yves Boulic, "Raidissement”, Ouest France, 24 June 1999.
44 “La Charte europ6enne des langues regionales ou minoritaires comporte des clauses
contraires a la Constitution”, Conseil Constitutionnel, Decision No 99-412 DC du 15 Juin 1999.
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regional cultures. For instance, an MP declared: “Those who like their regional language 
can practice it, those who love France can preserve it”45. This statement, applauded in 
Parliament, illustrates how measures for the protection of regional and cultural diversity 
continue to be perceived as a sign of disloyalty to the French Republic.
Jacobin traditions continue to shape the government’s positions towards the 
accommodation of cultural and regional diversity. The continued influence of Jacobinism 
means that minority nationalist parties are marginalised in French politics and demands for 
self-government stigmatised as a threat to national unity.
3.2. The French unitary state
The concept of the nation-state has also had implications for the nature of the 
French politico-administrative system. France was conceived as the unitary state par 
excellence, with limited or marginal institutions between the citizen and the state. 
Decentralisation reforms did however occur in the 1980s, not as a response to regionalist 
pressures, but as a step made necessary for economic and administrative reasons. While 
these reforms constituted a break from the past, they have remained modest in the actual 
empowerment of regional actors in the face of the state.
3.2.1. The decentralisation reforms
The law of 2 March 1982, concerning the rights and liberties of municipalities, 
departments and regions, is often seen as the starting point of the decentralisation of the 
entire French politico-administrative system46. The following reforms were justified by two 
main arguments, they were intended to serve as (1) an instrument for the management of 
the economy and (2) a form of modernisation of the French state. Growing economic 
disparities between the regions and the impact of the 1970s international recession had 
convinced the government of the need to develop regional economic development 
strategies, based on regionalised economic planning (Loughlin & Mazey, 1995:2). 
Decentralisation was also an attempt to decompress state functions through the transfer of 
executive responsibilities to local levels of government. In any case, the reforms were not 
intended as a response to regionalist pressures. The new laws did not bring any 
geographic modifications to the 26 administrative regions, despite the numerous demands
45 “Tous ceux qui aiment leur langue regionale peuvent la pratiquer, tous ceux qui aiment la 
France peuvent la conserver”, M. Le Rapporteur, Parliamentary Debate, 26 January 2005.
46 Law Defferre No. 82-213 of 2 March 1982
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made by minority nationalists for a redrawing of regional boundaries in accordance with 
historical regions (Douence, 1995:11)47.
The reforms undertaken in 1982 and 1984 did however create a regional level in 
the French political system48. Functional regions had already been set up in the 1970s, but 
the decentralisation reforms established the administrative region as collectivite 
territoriale, i.e. an entity with the same legal status as the municipalities and the 
departments. Regions were therefore granted directly elected assemblies and the first 
regional elections took place in 1986 through a system of proportional representation. This 
was a novelty as all other political elections (municipal, departmental and parliamentary) 
were and still are held under a two round majoritarian system. In addition, the 
decentralisation laws transformed the relations between the prefect, or representative of 
the government, and sub-national authorities. In this regard, two main changes were 
introduced: the suppression of the prefect’s administrative control over sub-national 
authorities, and the transfer of executive powers from the prefect to the presidents of the 
regional and departmental councils. In other words, the a priori tutelage of the prefects 
was replaced by simple a posteriori supervision. Hence, while state administrations were 
maintained, they no longer exerted a direct control over regional, departmental and 
municipal elected councils.
The decentralisation laws transferred a number of responsibilities from the central 
government to sub-national authorities, which were also given the corresponding financial 
resources. Mainly, the management of land and local facilities was attributed to 
municipalities, while departments were in charge of the distribution of social aid and road 
infrastructure. Regions also received their share, with the transfer of competences in the 
fields of economic planning and the environment49. The general logic behind this 
repartition of competences was that matters of immediate proximity were the preserve of 
municipalities, matters of intermediate proximity were the policy field of the departments 
while matters deemed strategic were given to the regions (Cole, 2006:35). However, it 
was made clear that the task of the regions should not impede on the prerogatives of the 
departments and municipalities over which they had no legal control. Indeed, while the 
reforms established regions as full fledged sub-national authorities, they did not introduce 
a hierarchical structure of territorial organisation. Rather, the emphasis was placed on the
47 While they were not meant as a response to minority nationalist demands, the decentralisation 
reforms have nevertheless contributed to a revival of minority nationalism by strengthening sub­
national consciousness. With the creation of sub-national levels of self-government, the reforms 
have opened up the political opportunity structures available for minority nationalist mobilisation in 
France.
48 Law No. 83-8 of 7 January 1983, Law No. 83-663 of 22 July 1983 and Law No. 84-130 of 24 
February 1984
49 Law No. 82-623 of 22 July 22 1982, Law No. 82-1153 of 30 December 1982 and Law No. 95-
115 of 4 February 1995 attributed the following spheres of competences to the regions: town and 
country planning, economic development, tourism planning, housing, fishing, train and air 
transportation, education (the lycees) as well as vocational training and apprenticeship training.
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fragmentation of sub-national governance and horizontal cooperation between the three 
sub-national authorities. This has remained one of the key features of French 
decentralisation: municipal, departmental and regional authorities are equal partners and 
can all refer directly to the central government.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the decentralisation reforms established a 
new system of intergovernmental relations between the state and sub-national authorities, 
in the form of planning contracts. A new process of bargaining and negotiation was 
introduced, producing new types of relationships between the central and the sub-national. 
Indeed, since 1982, regions have been given a role in the formulation and implementation 
of the national economic plan. The formulation of regional plans has two distinct phases, 
looking first downwards and then upwards. In the first stage, the government takes the 
initiative. Through the work of the national planning agency, it communicates its objectives 
for the forthcoming period. Regional prefects are then instructed to prepare provisional 
documents in cooperation with regional elected assemblies in charge of gathering all sub­
national preferences. Local consultation practices, however, are left up to the regional 
authorities. For instance, the regional economic and social councils (representing the 
major socio-economic interests) can be directly involved in the formulation of the regional 
plan or reduced to a formal consultation at the end. The law also demands that regional 
assemblies consult departmental assemblies and the mayors of the most important 
municipalities, but leaves the means at their discretion. Hence, although the preparation of 
planning contracts is left to the regional prefects, during the initial consultation phase, 
regional assemblies have been given the formal role of spokesperson for the municipal 
and departmental levels (Douence, 1995:14).
The provisional documents thus produced are then negotiated upwards between 
the regions and the state, to be inscribed in the priorities of the national plan and finally 
entrenched in planning contracts between the two parties. Regional assemblies then sign 
with the state a Contrat de projet Etat-region which defines a programme of economic 
development over a number of years. For many, however, contractual planning looks 
more like a means to mobilise the regions behind state policies than a mechanism to 
provide state support for regional policies (Balme & Bonnet, 1995; Le Gales, 1995). The 
University 2000 programme during the 1990s was a particular case in point, as sub­
national authorities across France have provided financial support for the construction of 
new universities, which are in theory educational property belonging to the state. This has 
been reflected again in the negotiations of regional plans for the period 2007-2013, when 
several presidents of regions have accused the government of trying to discharge its 
responsibilities on regional councils (Liberation, 11 August 2006). Thus, while a process of 
negotiation takes place between the government and the regions, the state has been able 
to maintain its leadership in contractual planning.
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3.2.2. The limited political assertiveness o f regions
Since 1982, French regions have become more powerful politically and 
economically. The introduction of directly elected regional assemblies and the 
regionalisation of the national economic plan have provided new opportunities for regions 
to assert themselves politically and promote regional economic development strategies. 
However, hopes that the region would become the most influential sub-national tier of 
government in France have yet to materialise (Loughlin & Mazey, 1995). Indeed, the 
political status and policy-making importance of regional authorities is still dependent on 
that enjoyed by the municipalities and the departments. Equally, the administrative 
influence of the French state over sub-national governance remains considerable.
First, the organisation of elections on a departmental rather than regional basis has 
been a major drawback to the political assertiveness of regions. Under the law of 10 July 
1985, regional representatives have been elected through proportional representation, 
with departments as the electoral constituencies50. It has been said that the hidden motive 
for this fragmentation of the electoral process was to prevent public opinion from 
developing a regional awareness (Douence, 1995:16). Regional councillors were elected 
from the lists that received more than 5% of the votes in their department and a fixed 
number of seats was awarded to each department within the regional council. This system 
posed problems for the election of coherent majorities in regional councils. In 2004, the 
electoral rules changed and for the first time, regions became the constituency for the 
election of regional councils51. However, while the number of votes is now calculated at 
the regional level, seats within regional councils continue to be divided among 
departments. In addition, the increase of the electoral threshold for representation, from 5 
to 10%, has had a decimating effect on regional parties (the chances of minority 
nationalist parties gaining regional representation have been dramatically reduced) and 
has reinforced the predominance of the main right and left political parties in regional 
elections.
Secondly, as mentioned above, decentralisation in France has not taken the form 
of a hierarchical organisation between the different levels of government. In contrast to the 
initial distribution of responsibilities, regions, departments and municipalities have not 
hesitated to intervene and compete with one another in all fields: economic development, 
regional development, agriculture, tourism, culture, transport, etc.52 (Thoenig, 2005:690). 
Another, potentially contradictory, principle of the 1982 reforms was that of the “free 
administration of local authorities”, meaning that all sub-national authorities should be free
50 Law No. 85-692 of 10 July 1985
51 Law No. 2003-327 of 11 April 2003
52 One exception is professional training policy which has remained under the control of regions.
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to develop policies in areas they deemed to be important for their constituents (Cole, 
2006:35). Consequently, a situation of competition has emerged among the different 
levels of sub-national government over the control of public policy areas. In this 
competitive set up, regions are clearly constrained by the influence of the long established 
departments, bases of local political notables for more than two centuries (Balme, 
1995:168). As pointed out by Crozier and Thoenig (1975), centre-periphery relations in 
France have traditionally been centred around the interactions between political notables 
(parliamentarians, mayors and departmental councillors) and state officials (either prefects 
or officials from the ministerial field services), leaving no space for third parties such as 
economic interests, cultural associations or political movements. The creation of regions-  
artificial administrative units for the most part -  has come as an infringement of this 
exclusive dual relationship. A rivalry has emerged between the “traditional” department 
and the “new" region to become the main sub-national political actor. Hence, although 
regional authorities have formally been attributed the role of spokesperson for all sub­
national authorities in the planning process, in practice, departments are often reluctant to 
allow the regions to take the lead in operations, preferring to deal directly with the regional 
prefects (Nay, 2002:257).
The territorial fragmentation of sub-national governance in France has resulted in 
an increase of state authority in sub-national policy-making. While the 1982 laws 
transferred executive power from the prefects to the elected chairpersons of the regional 
and departmental assemblies, this “abolition” of the prefect was short-lived. In February 
1992, territorial administrative reforms were introduced to strengthen the coordinating’ 
powers of the prefectures, i.e. state administrations present at every sub-national levels53. 
It seems that the absence of a hierarchical structure in territorial organisation justified a 
return of the state. As Nay explains, “the blurring of the areas of competence and, more 
generally, the dispersion of power have given new significance to the question of 
coordination of the actors involved in conducting local policy, and, going even further, that 
of responsibility in a situation where political authority is now shared” (Nay, 2002:249). The 
dispersion of decision-making centres and the de facto competition between sub-national 
authorities have reinforced the need for cooperation, providing prefects with a new 
legitimacy to act as coordinator and arbitrator on behalf of the French state. In addition, 
state agencies and field ministries have come to further complicate an already intricate 
policy-making process. In contrast with most EU member states, national ministries in 
France operate at the grassroots level instead of delegating to sub-national authorities. 
Their local units are also involved in the daily conduct of sub-national policies, as well as 
state administrations and sub-national assemblies. All in all, state employees located sub-
53 Law No. 92-125 of 6 February 1992 and Law No. 92-604 of 1st July 1992
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nationally outnumber sub-national authority employees by 40 per cent (Thoenig, 
2005:698).
Constrained from below by the departments and from above by the state 
apparatus, regions remain weakly consolidated as institutions, leaving their political 
influence limited. One indication is the pattern of accumulation des mandats following the 
1985 law which has (modestly) restricted the number of electoral mandates one individual 
can hold54. It says something about French decentralisation that the mayoral office, rather 
than the presidency of a regional or a departmental council, continues to be the most 
coveted among politicians with a local political base (Cole, 2006:41). When a choice had 
to be made, the vast majority of politicians have chosen to give up the regional mandate. It 
is primarily the heavy weight politicians who have abandoned the regions, giving way to 
more junior figures, less well established in the public mind and with less influence on 
central government (Keating, 1995:13). Another indication of the weakness of regions is 
that campaigns for regional elections tend to be dominated by national rather than regional 
issues and often act as practice ground for the next national elections (Balme, 1995:170- 
173). Initiated by a left-wing government, regionalisation was slowed down by the rise of 
right-wing parties in local and regional elections. As. a result, a right/left divide has been 
added to the expected rivalry between the state and the regions, and this obviously 
tempered the enthusiasm of the central government for further decentralisation. It has now 
become a recurrent fact that regional elections are won by parties of the opposition, as it 
was again the case in 2004 when almost all 26 regions were won by Left candidates, with 
the exception of Corsica and Alsace. This further complicates the negotiating process of 
regional planning and makes unlikely any extension of the competences accorded to the 
regions.
3.2.3. The 2003-2004 reforms
After the victory of the Right in the 2002 presidential and parliamentary elections, 
Prime Minister Raffarin -  previously President of the Poitou-Charentes region - committed 
himself to a new wave of decentralisation. The main feature of the following 2003 
Constitutional Reform55 and 2004 Decentralisation Act56 was the new reality of 
asymmetrical variation in sub-national governance (Cole, 2006). This was a significant 
departure from the principles of unity of the French people and of absolute equality of all 
French citizens from “Lille to Cayenne”. The reforms introduced two new ways in which 
outcomes can vary across the French territory: the creation of special statute authorities 
and "experimentation”. Four levels of sub-national authority are now recognised by the
54 Law No. 85-1405 of 30 December 1985
55 Constitutional Law no. 2003-276 of 28 March 2003
56 Law of 13 August 2004 relative to local freedoms and responsibilities
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French Constitution: the municipality, the department, the region (new) and those with a 
special statute (new). The special statute clause covers the various types of inter­
municipal bodies, but also refers to the merging of existing sub-national authorities into 
larger units, potentially a radical break with the past. Two separate mechanisms for 
institutional adjustment are now envisaged in the Constitution: an agreement between the 
elected representatives of two or more sub-national authorities and popular assent 
through local referendums. These provisions might one day produce varying institutional 
outcomes across France, on the condition that they are approved by the French 
Parliament. In addition, the Raffarin reforms have also introduced the possibility for the 
"experimental transfer of functions”, so that any sub-national authority can now bid to 
exercise responsibilities in areas such as training, roads or airports that were previously in 
the policy domain of the central state or other sub-national authorities. Strictly speaking, 
the procedure of experimental transfer of competences is not entirely new, it is just a 
general regulation of the de facto intervention of sub-national authorities in most policy 
fields. The new laws nevertheless comprised the transfer of EUR 10 billion of spending 
and 150,000 central state civil servants to the sub-national authorities, which have 
therefore been given the means to perform these new functions. The right to 
experimentation has been perceived by many as a retrenchment of the central state in 
territorial affairs to the advantage of sub-national authorities which have seen their 
autonomy increase as a result (Thoenig, 2005).
Needless to say, the formulation and adoption of these reforms have generated 
heated debates within the French Parliament. This new wave of decentralisation - whose 
implementation has occurred for the most part after the time period of this study - is 
indicative of a trend within centre-periphery relations in France. The principles of proximity 
and subsidiarity were invoked at the time of the reforms, but it seems that these changes 
were brought about by the need to simplify and clarify the French politico-administrative 
system. The fragmentation of sub-national governance was initially meant by the 1982 
decentralisation as a way of limiting the leverage of sub-national authorities against the 
central state. Twenty years later, ever-growing competition between sub-national 
authorities has had the opposite effect, by limiting the control exerted by the French state 
over sub-national policies. A complex web of interdependency has arisen since the 1980s, 
where thousands of sub-national bodies -  municipal, departmental and regional 
assemblies, but also prefectures, state agencies and field ministries - are involved in most 
policy fields. In this informal configuration, none of the parties plays a leading role and 
none can act in a fully autonomous way. The absence of a hierarchical structure has 
turned coordination into a near impossible task, even for the omnipresent state 
administration. Raffarin’s initial solution to this problem was to increase the influence of 
regions through the establishment of a relationship of subordination between the
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departmental and regional levels (Thoenig, 2005:705). He has however met strong 
resistance from the grands elus, who have turned out to be the great winners of French 
decentralisation. As mentioned above, French law allows the same person to hold several 
electoral mandates at the municipal, departmental, regional, national and even European 
levels. While there are some restrictions to the accumulation d es  m andates , the practice is 
widely used in French politics, so that the vast majority of members of the French 
Parliament will also be mayors of large cities or presidents of sub-national assemblies, if 
not both. In practice, it is these grands elus -  and not the state administration - who 
provide integration capacity between the different sub-national levels and across policy 
fields. The efforts of the French state to fragment sub-national governance and to maintain 
its influence at every level of government have ended up playing to its disadvantage. State 
units at the sub-national level are so numerous and uncoordinated that the leadership role 
of mayors and presidents of sub-national authorities has been significantly enhanced. In 
effect, sub-national politics are now under the rather conservative, as well as tight, control 
of an exclusive group of national politicians holding several sub-national mandates.
Decentralisation in France has consisted of little more than functions of the 
government being assigned to sub-national entities and managed by elected members, to 
whom the state provides resources. The most recent reforms point towards a retreat of the 
state, in that it is now just one player among the many involved in local policy-making. 
Centre-periphery relations in France have however remained seldom conducive to the 
empowerment of sub-national actors, with the notable exception of the grands elus.
3 .2 .4 . E U  regional policy
For all its shortcomings, decentralisation in France has provided a framework for 
the incorporation of French sub-national interests into the EU policy-making process. The 
procedures established by the European Commission for the allocation of the structural 
funds require member states to submit development plans corresponding to each of the 
EU funding priorities. Although there was no official connection between the 
decentralisation reforms and the EU regional policy, the newly regionalised planning 
mechanisms meant that France was equipped to respond to this request. Formally 
responsible for the preparation of regional plans and signatories to planning contracts, 
negotiated with the state, sub-national authorities have been drawn into the EU regional 
policy process.
The French government has been keen to monitor the involvement of sub-national 
actors in European regional policy. The French state has indeed reorganised itself, and 
has adopted the role of intermediary between Europe and the sub-national level. First, in
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contrast to the German Lander or Belgian regional governments, French regions play no 
formal role at the national level in the formulation of EU policy. French positions on EU 
policy are the result of inter-ministerial negotiations between concerned ministries, such as 
Industry, Employment, Agriculture and the Ministry of the Interior. Overall responsibility for 
the coordination of EU policy lies with the Secretariat General du Comite Inter-ministeriel 
(SGCI) for Foreign Affairs, headed by the Prime Minister. Even with regard to the 
preparation of regional development plans, the role of regional authorities is purely 
consultative. The regions are indeed excluded from the process of preparatory 
negotiations, which define the objects of intervention, the zones of eligibility and the 
interregional distribution of structural funds (Balme, 1995:182). They are brought in later, 
in the preparation of the Community Support Frameworks, when regional plans have to be 
presented within the guidelines established by the Commission. In addition, the 
government has imposed its territorial administrations, the prefectures, as pivotal actors in 
the implementation of European policy. The law of 6 February 1992 on the Territorial 
Administration of the Republic explicitly granted the prefects responsibility for the 
elaboration and execution of regional programmes implementing European policy57. The 
prefects thus became the principal coordinators of the negotiation between the different 
partners at the sub-national level, as well as between the latter and the French 
government. They were also publicly recognised as being the official interlocutors of the 
European Commission. The Council of Ministers confirmed this orientation by giving 
member states the choice of appointing the authorities responsible for the preparation and 
implementation of European programmes58. In France, this role was given to regional 
prefects instead of regionally elected officials59.
The regional prefectures therefore organise the partnership between the various 
sub-national actors who participate in European policy. More specifically, they fulfil a 
function of coordination between different partners on the identification, planning, 
monitoring and assessment of projects funded by the EU. With the exception of the 
European Social Fund60, most of the structural fund policies affect fields under the 
competence of all the French sub-national authorities, and this poses serious difficulties 
for the partnership procedures. All in all, this situation has largely benefited the state 
administrations, due to their presence at all sub-national levels. Indeed, the dynamics of 
negotiations over the implementation of European policy has brought about a strong 
mobilisation of municipalities and departments, as well as regions. Reluctant to cooperate
57 Law No. 92-125 of 6 February 1992 (consolidated on 15 April 2006) and Decree No. 92-604 of 
1st July 1992
58 Community Regulation No 2081/93 of 20 July 1993 on the Reform of Structural Funds
59 Circular of 17 February 1994
60 The ESF is one of the three main pillars of the structural fund policy. It is destined to support 
action of the member states and local authorities in the field of professional training and access to 
employment. This field of intervention has a specific character in France, as regions have been 
given the exclusive responsibility for managing this sector since 1982.
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with regional assemblies, municipal and departmental actors prefer the confidentiality of a 
direct relationship with the regional prefect rather than a regionalised negotiation that they 
cannot control (Smith, 1997). In addition, the departmental assemblies have a firm grip on 
all the political, economic and associative organisations concerned with European funding. 
The political influence that they exercise locally makes them necessary partners for the 
regional prefects, who do not hesitate to satisfy their financial demands, despite the fact 
that these clearly do not have a regional character (Nay, 2002:257).
While the French government has generally supported the regions in their quest for 
EU funding, it has also stressed the functional raison d ’etre of the regions, i.e. in terms of 
national economic development and planning, and insisted upon the constitutional 
supremacy of the state with regard to EU decision-making and external affairs (Loughlin & 
Mazey, 1995:133). Still, regional autonomy with regards to EU matters might increase as a 
result of the 2004 Decentralisation laws. The reforms have established that French 
regions can now bid to exercise complete control over the management of structural funds 
on an experimental basis. Alsace was the first (and only) French region being granted to 
manage the European Fund for Regional Development for the period 2007-2013. Sub­
national authorities have also been given the possibility to request control over the 
implementation of INTERREG initiatives. These are modest but significant changes in a 
domestic context where interactions with Brussels are for the most part state-centric.
3.3. Corsica
3.3.1. An exception in the French Republic
Corsica stands as an exception within the French conceptions of cultural 
homogeneity and national unity. Mainly due to its insularity, Corsica is regarded as 
sufficiently different from other French regions to warrant special treatment by the French 
government. Unlike ordinary regions, the law of the 2 March 1982 has granted Corsica its 
own regional institutions, i.e. a Statut Particulieror Special Status and an elected Corsican 
Assembly61. This was the first in a series of reforms meant to give Corsica a greater 
amount of autonomy in line with its cultural and geographical specificity. Although it was 
never officially acknowledged, the institutional concessions granted to Corsica were partly 
a response to several episodes of political violence since the 1970s62. The Corsican 
Assembly was therefore given extended competences in those fields relevant to the 
specific needs of the island: culture, transport, energy, planning and education (Lauwers, 
2003:54). The first Corsican elections were held on 8th August 1982, through a system of
61 Law No. 82-214 of 2 March 1982 relative to the Particular Status of Corsica.
62 The most famous of these episodes was the so called “Events of Aleria", when a group of 
Corsican nationalists occupied a wine cellar in Aleria on 21-22 August 1975. The incident ended 
with the death of two gendarmes and serious rioting in Bastia.
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proportional representation63. While some Corsican nationalists decided to continue the 
armed struggle, a significant number of them chose to take this opportunity to gain political 
representation. The latter participated in the elections and received just under 13 percent 
of the votes. The newly formed Corsican Assembly was given consultative power and 
could solicit the Prime Minister or be consulted by the government on all matters 
concerning Corsica. In this way, it had the right to remind the government of Corsica’s 
special character when legislation was being prepared. Nevertheless, this provision did 
not amount to legislative power, as the Prime Minister was under no obligation to follow 
the Assembly’s advice (Hintjens, Loughlin & Olivesi, 1995:124). In practice, while the 
government proved willing to accept Corsican recommendations on non-controversial 
issues (e.g. the protection of Corsican mountains and the development of the coast)64, it 
remained indifferent when the matter was political or emanating from Corsican nationalists 
(e.g. teaching of the Corsican language and creation of a special fiscal status)65. The 
same was true at the fiscal level: the Assembly was granted the opportunity to present 
Paris with an annual list of its priorities on how to spend the state budget for Corsica, but 
the government was not in any way obliged to follow its advice.
The Corsican Assembly rapidly became plagued with instability. Four elections 
were organised between 1982 and 1991, mainly as a result of irregularities in electoral 
lists. The situation led to the development of political clientelism and the discredit of the 
regional institution as a whole (Loughlin & Daftary, 1999:17). Hence, in 1991, Pierre Joxe, 
then Minister of the Interior, initiated the adoption of a new reform of Corsica’s status in 
order to enhance the effectiveness of the Corsican institution66. This transformed Corsica 
into a Collectivite Territoriale or Territorial Community which has greater powers than 
ordinary regions. The reformed status introduced new electoral rules for the Corsican 
Assembly in the form of a two-round proportional system, with a 5% electoral threshold to 
access the second round67. It also entailed a reform of the electoral registers of the 
island’s municipalities, reducing the electoral body from 200,000 to 158,000, in order to 
counter electoral fraud (Hintjens, Loughlin & Olivesi, 1995:125). These provisions were 
intended to produce clearer and more stable majorities within the Assembly. The Joxe 
reforms also mentioned specific rights related to Corsica’s insularity, i.e. the preservation 
of cultural identity and the defence of specific economic and social interests. However, it
63 Following these first elections, the Movement of the Radical Left (MRG) received 23 seats, the 
Rally for the Republic (RPR) 29 seats and the Corsican nationalists 9 seats.
64 Law No. 85-30 of 9 January 1985 relative to the development and protection of the Corsican 
mountains and Law No. 86-2 of 3 January 1986 relative to the development and protection of 
Corsica's coast.
65 For instance, propositions in favour of teaching the Corsican culture and language (July 1983), 
giving priority to Corsicans in local employment and the recognition of the Corsican people 
(November 1983), creation of a special fiscal status and a free exchange zone (April 1985).
6 Law No. 91-428 of 13 May 1991 relative to the status of the Territorial Community of Corsica
67 Prior to the revision, the Corsican Assembly was elected in one round, with proportional 
representation for all the lists receiving more than 1.6 percent of the votes.
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was also made clear that only the French government could guarantee these 
developments, and the new status did not confer legislative powers to the Assembly. As 
such, the Joxe reforms only represented a modest extension of the existing competences 
of Corsica.
3.3.2. No official recognition o f the Corsican people
Despite the territorial accommodation of the Corsican specificity, the government 
has never met the demand for recognition of the Corsican people. “French people, French 
people of Corsica”68, said President Giscard when addressing an audience on the island in 
1978. Almost thirty years later, this statement is still reflective of the government’s 
position, maintaining a clear support for the idea of the one and indivisible French nation. 
Interestingly, the recognition of Corsica’s special character has been based not on the 
rights of Corsicans, but on its geographical features, insularity becoming the official reason 
for its unique institutional status. This focus on insularity pre-empted any attempts by other 
French regions to claim similar prerogatives, while efforts to achieve official recognition for 
the Corsican people have been inhibited by the provisions of the French Constitution.
Initially, the original draft of the 1982 first Special Status included the notion of 
“Corsican people”. Expressing concerns that the term “people” might lead to similar 
claims on the parts of the Bretons or Basques, the Council of Ministers had opted for a 
different formulation, i.e. “the Corsican people, component of the French people”69. In the 
end, however, the reference to the Corsican people was restricted to the statement of 
motives and did not appear in the actual law. It has been suggested that such reference 
would have been deemed unconstitutional (Hossay, 2004:415) and could have 
jeopardised the whole decentralisation reforms. The Jacobin tradition seems to have 
dictated that an official recognition of the Corsicans as a people would constitute a threat 
to national unity and could trigger a domino effect with other regional groups asking for 
similar recognition.
Nevertheless, the expression “the Corsican people, component of the French 
people” was again mentioned in the 1991 Special Status for Corsica. The proposed first
68 Le Monde, 9 June 1978, p.8
69 Minister Chevenement: "On page 6 it speaks of a "Corsican people”. This expression bothers 
me. Will we be speaking tomorrow of a "Basque People” and a “Breton people”? We are putting 
our fingers in the machinery without knowing where it will drag us.”
[ . . . ]
President Mitterrand: “But France wasn't made all of the sudden. All these people are 
components of the French people."
Minister Defferre: "Eureka! That’s the solution. I propose that we write: "the Corsican people, a 
component of the French people".”
President Mitterand: "You have my agreement. The statement of motives will take your 
formulation." (Transcript of the Council of Ministers meeting of 6 January 1982, in Favier & 
Martin-Roland, 1990:150, my translation)
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article of law stated: "The French Republic guarantees to the living historical and cultural 
community which constitutes the Corsican people, a component of the French people, the 
right to preserve its specific economic and social identity. These rights, related to 
[Corsica’s] insularity, are exercised with respect to national unity and within the framework 
of the Republic and the present status”70. The reference to the Corsican people was 
however opposed by the Constitutional Court71. Stressing the “egalitarian principle", 
members of the Court argued that the Constitution recognised no other people than the 
French people and asked for the expression to be removed from the final law.
3.3.3. The Matignon Process
Corsica’s new status failed to satisfy the demands of Corsican nationalists and 
political violence intensified in the 1990s, not least because of the government’s refusal to 
officially recognise the Corsican people. Following the assassination of the prefect of 
Corsica on 6 February 199872, former Prime Minister Lionel Jospin entered into direct 
negotiations with the Corsican Assembly. Once again, political violence had acted as a 
trigger for further concessions from the central state. This process led to the signature of 
the Matignon Agreement on 29 July 2000, proposing broad changes that would result in 
some form of autonomy for Corsica. The key provisions of the Agreement included the 
transfer of some limited legislative powers to the Corsican Assembly, enabling it to adapt 
French law without consulting the Parliament. In an important symbolic change, the 
instruction of Corsican would also be mandatory in elementary schools during normal 
hours, rather than an after-school activity.
This Matignon Agreement was reworked into a law and adopted by the Parliament 
in January 200273, albeit with modifications. Indeed, the Senate and the Constitutional 
Court imposed several revisions of the initial document in relation to the legislative powers 
of the Assembly and the teaching of Corsican. The Senate, using its power of amendment, 
asked for the mandatory nature of Corsican teaching to be removed and replaced by 
“optional teaching during normal school hours”74. In addition, the Constitutional Court 
rejected the planned delegation of legislative powers to the Corsican Assembly on 17 
January 200275. In the end, members of the Court only permitted a diluted version of the 
initial proposal, enabling the Corsican Assembly to adapt the implementation of laws for a
70 Le Monde, 2 November 1990, p. 7
71 Conseil Constitutionnel, Decision No 82-138 DC du 25 Fevrier 1982 and Decision No 91-290 
DC du 9 Mai 1991.
72 On 4th July 2003, Yvan Colonna has been arrested for the murder of Claude Erignac, then 
regional prefect of Corsica. Colonna was close to the FLNC in the 1980s, but had seemingly 
distanced himself from the clandestine organisation since the 1990s. On 13 December 2007, he 
was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.
73 Law No. 2002-92 of 22 January 2002 relative to Corsica
74 Senat, Amendement No. 221 of 7 November 2001
75 Conseil Constitutionnel, Decision No. 2001-454 of 17 January 2002
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fixed period of time, subject in each case to the acceptance of the Parliament. In addition, 
the final document on the new status of Corsica contained no further reference to the 
Corsican people. Instead, the text begins with mention of “the specificities of Corsica in the 
Republic" while later references identify “the existence of a territorial community”. Hence, 
although the Corsican specificity has been acknowledged, constitutional recognition is still 
a long way off.
While these provisions cannot be considered full-fledged autonomy, they 
nevertheless attest to the attempts made by successive French governments to respond 
to the Corsican specificity. This was again the case when, on 6 July 2003, a referendum 
was organised for the adoption of a new territorial organisation for Corsica. This proposal 
envisioned the fusion of the two Corsican departments into a single territorial entity, but 
was rejected by 50.98 percent of the voters. Since then, and despite the declaration of 
President Sarkozy76, the “Corsica file” seems to have been shelved by the government.
3.4. France as a context for minority nationalist mobilisation
The domestic French context offers few opportunities and many constraints for 
minority nationalist parties. First, the pervasiveness of Jacobinism in French politics is a 
major constraint for these parties. The debate around the adoption of the European 
Charter for Regional and Minority Languages clearly illustrates the difficulties of French 
society to accommodate its internal diversity. Given its reaction to the Corsican example, it 
is highly likely that the Constitutional Court will continue to block any attempt to derogate 
from the norms of the indivisibility and unity of the French nation. Equally, although the 
possibility of institutional variations has been introduced in the last wave of 
decentralisation, there is a strong pressure to maintain the homogeneity and uniformity of 
the French territory. As a result of this legal and political tradition, demands for collective 
rights and self-government have been met with a considerable amount of suspicion from 
any actor outside of minority nationalist circles. Second, as the empirical chapters unfold, 
it will become apparent that a significant hindrance for minority nationalist mobilisation in 
France lies in the nature of electoral systems. The French preference for majoritarian 
electoral systems and the lack of proportionality in sub-national elections has limited 
minority nationalists’ access to elected assemblies. Regional elections are the only French 
elections organised on the basis of a proportional system, but the electoral threshold for 
taking part in the second round (raised from 5 to 10 % in 2004) has impacted on the
76 "Security in Corsica” was a major theme in the presidential campaign of Nicolas Sarkozy, who 
visited the island 25 times in the last 5 years in his capacity of Minister of the Interior and twice as 
a presidential candidate. In his last speech on the island on 30 April 2007, he declared his 
intention to put an end to terrorism and bring back the rule of law in Corsica during his mandate 
(Le Monde, 31 April 2007).
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representation of small parties. Also, regional elections are an opportunity only for those 
minority nationalists whose minority nation, i.e. the targeted electorate, and historic 
territory coincide with an administrative region in the French system77.
In any case, sitting in a sub-national elected assembly does not necessarily 
provide an efficient channel for putting forward minority nationalist demands in state 
policies. Decentralisation in France has remained for the most part functional and has not 
resulted in the creation of sub-national levels of government. Moreover, the French state 
has sought to maintain a presence in all aspects of sub-national governance, resulting in a 
complicated web of interdependency where no sub-national actor -  neither state 
administration nor sub-national authorities -  has much room for manoeuvre. The 
consequent polarisation of local power in single individuals, the grands elus, is a priori a 
constraint for minority nationalists due to a strong commitment among political elites to the 
Jacobin ideal of the indivisible French nation. However, real opportunities will arise if one 
of these powerful politicians happens to be sympathetic to minority nationalist demands, 
as chapter six will illustrate through the collaboration of Breton nationalists with Jean-Yves 
Le Drian, President of the Brittany region. Finally, while the French state could be seen to 
have lost some of its hegemony on sub-national governance, it has maintained a firm grip 
on all matters related to the EU Regional Policy. France is characterised by a rather tight 
and state-centric form of interaction with Brussels, within which sub-national actors have 
no direct access to the European policy-making process. It is clear from this overview that 
the French ideological, institutional and political opportunity structures are far from 
hospitable to minority nationalist parties, and this research will establish what changes, if 
any, European integration has brought to this set-up.
77 The administrative division of France in 26 regions and 100 departments has taken a 
strandardised form and has, for the most part, not coincided with the historical territories 
defended by minority nationalists. For instance, Occitan nationalists make claims over a large 
space encompassing roughly the southern third of the French territory. The Northern part of 
Catalonia, as defined by Catalan nationalists, corresponds to about two thirds of the department 
Pyrenees-Orientales. Similarly, the Northern Basque Country has no institutional recognition and 
forms with Bearn the department Pyrenees-Atlantiques. Yet another example is the historical 
region Bretagne, which comprises the administrative region Brittany and the department Loire- 
Atlantique, part of the region Pays de la Loire.
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Chapter 4 -  The Unione di U Populu Corsu
This chapter illustrates the significance of European integration for Corsican 
nationalist parties, by focusing on the Unione di U Populu Corsu (UPC). It starts with an 
overview of the Corsican nationalist movement in order to situate the UPC as the leading 
organisation of the moderate branch of Corsican nationalism demanding Corsica’s full- 
fledged autonomy. The chapter then surveys the party activity since the 1980s, illustrating 
how developments at the European level have affected, and been used by, the party in the 
context of Corsican and French politics. The objective is to contextualise the UPC’s 
perception and use of European integration in order to identify what concrete opportunities 
it has provided to the party. It will show that European integration has provided discursive 
resources to advance the UPC’s political project in relation to the French state, but also to 
re-assert its role within the Corsican nationalist movement through its connections at the 
European level.
4.1. The Corsican nationalist movement
The origins of contemporary Corsican nationalism can be traced back to the 
1950s, when the economic decline of Corsica became apparent in contrast with France’s 
booming post-war economy. In 1957, a Regional Plan of Action was adopted to counter 
the handicaps of the insular economy, through the development of tourism and the 
modernisation of the agricultural sector (Bernabeu-Casanova, 1997:52-56). However, the 
economic benefits of the policies designed by the French government were perceived to 
be distributed unequally, with “continental" interests, rather than the island’s inhabitants, 
profiting the most (Loughlin, 1989:138-145). In the 1960s, the process of decolonisation in 
Northern Africa exacerbated these frustrations, as considerable financial support was 
given to repatriated French citizens settling in Corsica, as well as privileged access to the 
new economic opportunities originally destined to benefit the Corsican population 
(Crettiez, 1999:27). This wave of immigration led some to fear that the historic Corsican 
community would disappear altogether, especially after the publication of a confidential 
report advising the French government to encourage immigration and mass tourism in 
order to weaken the Corsican identity78. Demands started to appear for the protection of
78 At the end of 1960s, the DATAR (Delegation for Land Planning and Regional Action) asked the 
Hudson Institute to draft a report on the future of Corsica. The American experts concluded that a 
change of governmental policy was necessary, offering two options: the State could either 
accelerate the disappearance of the Corsican identity by encouraging immigration and mass 
tourism, or the State could protect the Corsican identity and develop the island through the 
promotion of its historic and cultural features. The Hudson report was made public in 1971 by an 
organisation called Corsican Regionalist Action. In the same year, the Land Planning Scheme
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the Corsican language, threatened by the influx of non-Corsicans into the island, and for 
the re-opening of the University of Corte, in order to put an end to the exodus of young 
people getting educated on mainland France. The environmental consequences of 
economic modernisation also generated protest against a seemingly complete disregard 
for the island’s natural resources (Olivesi, 1998:176-177). In the 1970s, the events of "the 
red mud" -  7es boues rouges” - particularly caught the public attention: Montedison, an 
Italian company, dumped toxic residues off the shore of Cap Corse, causing the death of 
animal life, with the implicit consent of the French authorities (Lefevre, 2001 )79. The 
implications of these socio-economic and ecological developments for the Corsican 
identity acted as a catalyst for Corsican nationalist mobilisation80.
The French government remained for the most part indifferent to demands for the 
protection of the Corsican identity and increasing frustrations led to the events of Aleria. 
On 21 August 1975, eight men led by Edmond Simeoni proceeded to occupy the wine 
cellar of a “pied noid*1 winegrower at Aleria, who had been accused of trafficking low- 
quality wine. During the 30 hours of occupation, Simeoni conducted interviews with 
journalists, stating the main demands of the Corsican nationalist movement82. This 
incident ended with the death of two gendarmes and serious rioting in Bastia. The events 
of Aleria are seen by many authors as the founding moment of the contemporary Corsican 
nationalist movement (Bernabeu-Casanova, 1997; Crettiez, 1999). A period of political 
violence followed, with numerous attacks against governmental buildings in Corsica but 
also on mainland France83. It marked the start of a demand for the self-government of the 
Corsican people, as a result of the mistrust in the French government and its ability to 
solve Corsica’s economic problems while preserving the Corsican identity. When the 
Corsican assembly was created84, and with the amnesty of Corsican political prisoners by
adopted for Corsica suggested that the French authorities had opted for the first proposition, as it 
promoted a development based essentially on mass tourism with little concerns for the Corsican 
culture (Crettiez, 1999:33-35); Interview with Max Simeoni (19 September 2007).
79 The French government never took action against Montedison, which was eventually 
condemned by the Italian authorities on 27 April 1974.
80 Interview with Max Simeoni (19 September 2007)
81 French national born in Algeria during colonial times.
82 "We demand [...] the imprisonment of the five colon conmen, and that their 2000 hectares of 
land and wine cellars be seized and given to the most deprived young Corsican farmers [...]. Our 
action is for the exclusive benefit of the Corsican people and supports other Corsican demands 
such as job creation for Corsican young people, the "Corsicanisation" of employment, the 
implementation of a Charter for the return of exiled Corsicans, the establishment of official 
bilingualism, with the promotion of the Corsican language and culture through all the necessary 
technical means. Our movement also asks for our land currently devoted to agriculture and 
tourism to be reclaimed and used to develop a sustainable Corsican economy [...] as well as for 
the regeneration of the Corsican countryside”, Edmond Simeoni, on 22 August 1975 (my 
translation), in Arritti, Occupation de la cave Depeille, 22 August 1995 (1470).
83 On the night of the 4th May 1976, 20 attacks were perpetrated by the FLNC in Corsica, Paris, 
Marseille and Nice. On 27th February 1978, the Ministry of Finances was dynamited.
84 The law of the 2 March 1982 has granted Corsica its own regional institutions, i.e. a Statut 
Particulier or Special Status and an elected Corsican Assembly which was given extended 
competences in the fields relevant to the specific needs of the island: culture, transport, energy,
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newly elected President Mitterrand, the intensity of Corsican violence decreased -  
although it never disappeared completely - in favour of the use of democratic means to 
bring forward nationalist demands. However, while it stemmed from a common position 
that the Corsican people is distinct from the French nation and has a right to self- 
determination, the Corsican nationalist movement has become increasingly fragmented. 
Two main tendencies, autonomist and independentist, have defined the parameters of the 
nationalist political space in Corsica since the 1970s. Beyond differences in terms of party 
goals, the question of the use of political violence has also divided Corsican nationalists. 
While autonomist parties have renounced political violence, independentists are still linked 
to several clandestine military groups. The distinction between autonomists and 
independentists has corresponded to two contradictory strategies: “legal action" and 
“clandestine action” (Molas, 2000). The autonomists have accepted the new institutional 
and democratic channels created by the government since the 1980s whereas, for the 
independentists, the occupation by French authorities justifies the use of non-democratic 
means in the struggle for the national liberation of Corsica. There has nevertheless been a 
lot of fluidity within the Corsican nationalist movement, with individuals going from one 
tendency to another, and strategic alliances have taken place in several elections between 
the two tendencies.
The Unione di u Populu Corsu (UPC) has been the main representative of the 
autonomist branch of Corsican nationalism since the 1970s85. The UPC was founded in 
1977 and seeks Corsica’s autonomy within the French Republic. The basis for this claim is 
the notion that Corsicans constitute a distinct people and that this specificity should be 
recognised through the increase of Corsica’s autonomy, and in particular the extension of 
the legislative powers of the Corsican Assembly. The UPC also makes demands for an 
official status for the Corsican language and its mandatory teaching in the island’s schools 
(Olivesi, 1998:177-179). Although party leaders Edmond and Max Simeoni had resorted to 
political violence prior to the creation of the UPC86, the party has always declared itself 
opposed to any form of violence. The UPC has been one of the few Corsican political 
parties to maintain a certain degree of organisational continuity, mostly resistant to internal 
tensions and scissions. The UPC merged with smaller groups, Scelta Nova and Mossa 
Naziunale, in November 2000, and was later dissolved to create U Partitu di a Naziona
planning, and education. The Corsican Assembly was also given consultative power, and could 
solicit the Prime Minister or be consulted by the government on all matters concerning Corsica.
85 Other political parties have emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s, such as U Rinnovu 
Naziunale, A Ghjama pa I’lndipendenza and A Manca Naziunale, and can be grouped within the 
autonomist tendency, having either emerged from the UPC or abandoned independentist goals in 
favour of a more moderate interpretation of the nationalist struggle.
86 Edmond Simeoni occupied a wine cellar in Aleria on 21 August 1975, he was sentenced to 5 
years in prison and released in January 1977. Exactly a year later, on 22 August 1976, his 
brother, Max Simeoni, occupied and blew up a wine cellar in Aghione. He was never arrested and 
benefited from the 1982 Presidential Amnesty.
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Corsa (PNC) in December 2002 (Dominici, 2004). However, this name-changing is more a 
re-packaging, rather than a re-formulation, of the UPC’s moderate nationalist agenda, of 
which the PNC is clearly a continuation (Elias, 2009:112).
An independentist tendency also emerged, after the events of Aleria, called the 
Front de Liberation Nationale de la Corse (FLNC). The FLNC was created on the “blue 
night” of 4-5 May 1976, during which 20 attacks were perpetrated in Corsica, Paris, 
Marseille and Nice. In the 1980s, A Cuncolta Naziunalista (aCN) became the public front 
of the clandestine organisation87. The party advocates the independence of Corsica based 
on the right of nations to self-determination. As explained by Crettiez (1999:44), with the 
creation of the FLNC, “les problemes corses” -  economic, social and cultural -  became “le 
probleme corse", namely the use of political violence as a strategy in the pursuit of a 
nationalist political project. In the late 1980s, a struggle over the control of the organisation 
led to the implosion of the military structure and a series of splits which complicated the 
radical nationalist panorama considerably (Crettiez & Sommier, 2002:30-31). One time 
leader of the FLNC, Pierre Pogioli left aCN in 1989 to form his own party, Accolta 
Naziunale Corsa (ANC), with links to its own clandestine group Resistenza. The FLNC 
split again in 1990, to create the FLNC canal “habituel" with its new public front, the 
Mouvement pour I’Autodetermination (MPA)88, and the FLNC canal “historique”, whose 
front organisation remained aCN.
An electoral alliance between independentist and autonomist parties was formed in 
1992 under the name Corsica Nazione, bringing together the UPC, ANC, aCN and the 
Greens89. This led to the best electoral results to date for Corsican nationalists, with a total 
of 24.8 percent of the votes in the second round, and 13 seats in the Corsican Assembly90. 
However, the refusal by the aCN to give up political violence ultimately drove the UPC, the 
ANC and the Greens out of the alliance, leaving Corsica Nazione to be the electoral 
branch of radical nationalism, mainly led by the aCN (Crettiez & Sommier, 2002:38). The 
latter changed its name to A Cuncolta Independentista in 1998 and then to Indipendenza 
after its fusion with Corsica Viva in 2001. The close relationship between Indipendenza
87 The public front of the FLNC underwent several name changes during the 1980s. Initially called 
Cuncolta di I Cumitati Naziunalisti (CCN), the party was dissolved by the French authorities in 
September 1983 due to its close links to the clandestine organisation. It was replaced by the 
Muvimentu Corsu per I’Autodeterminazione (MCA), which was also declared illegal in January 
1987. A Cuncolta Naziunalista was therefore created in June 1987, and has remained since then.
88 In March 1996, the MPA declared himself in favour of autonomy and the end of violence, and 
dissolved the FLNC canal "habituel”. The MPA was then disbanded in 1999, with most of its 
members joining the newly created U Rinnovu Naziunale, while the remaining others opted for 
the formation of yet another party, Corsica Viva, with its own clandestine group, the FLNC du 5 
Mai.
89 The national Green party often forms electoral alliances with minority nationalist parties for 
strategic purposes, but its Corsican branch, I Verdi Corsi, also makes claims for cultural 
autonomy.
90 This includes 4 seats for MPA (8% votes) and 9 seats for the coalition Corsica Nazione (16.8% 
votes).
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and Corsica Nazione has recently been formalised by yet another name change to 
Indipendenza-Corsica Nazione (Elias, 2009:113). In addition, in the last few years, 
Indipendenza-Corsica Nazione seems to have opted for a more progressivist strategy and 
seeks the increase of the legislative, fiscal and executive powers for the Corsican 
Assembly, as a first step towards independence91.
On the 6th February 1998, the assassination of the French prefect in Corsica, 
Claude Erignac92, started a new phase in the evolution of the Corsican nationalist 
movement, one which Crettiez and Sommier (2002:31) have referred to as “the politics of 
reconciliation”. Although Corsicans support many of the demands made by nationalists, 
the majority of the population remains completely opposed to the armed struggle (Loughlin 
& Daftary, 1999:15). This realisation, as well as a decrease in electoral results at the 1998 
regional elections, seemed to trigger the emergence of a status quo among Corsican 
nationalists. By the end of 1999, eight parties had come together to form an electoral 
alliance called Unita93, quickly followed by the clandestine organisations which created the 
FLNC “Union des Combattants”94. Efforts to consolidate the Corsican nationalist 
movement reached their climax with the 2004 regional elections and the creation of 
Unione Naziunale, a nationalist coalition bringing together independentists and 
autonomists95. Unione Naziunale obtained 8 seats96, making it the third largest group in 
the Corsican Assembly. Despite being the most successful attempt at unity since 1992, 
the alliance suffered from the rivalry between the UPC/PNC and Corsica Nazione to gain 
leadership of the Corsican nationalist movement. After months of internal friction, the 
coalition eventually broke up at the beginning of 2008. The unfortunate timing of the split, 
just weeks before municipal and cantonal elections, attests to the degree to which division 
continues to prevail in Corsican nationalist contestation.
91 http://www.corsica-nazione.com/accoltafrancesa.htm. accessed on 10 May 2007
92 On 6th February 1998, Claude Erignac, the regional prefect of Corsica, i.e. the most important 
French government official on the island, was shot dead in the streets of Ajaccio. On 4th July 
2003, Yvan Colonna has been arrested for the murder. He was close to the FLNC in the 1980s, 
but had seemingly distanced himself from the clandestine organisation since the 1990s. On 13 
December 2007, he was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.
93 These parties included ANC, Chjama per I’ Indipendenza, Corsica Viva, Corisca Nazione, 
Cuncolta Indipendentista, Associu per a Suvranita, Partitu per I Indipendenza and I Verdi Corsi. 
Notably absent from the alliance was the UPC. The alliance was short-lived, strategic 
disagreements quickly led to a new wave of scissions, name changing and the creation of new 
aroups in the following years.
4 Among the groups making the "Union des Combattants" were FLNC Canal historique, FLNC du
5 Mai, Resistenza, Clandestinu and Fronte Ribellu.
95 The members of Unione Naziunale include: Independenza-Corsica Nazione, PNC, the ANC 
and A Chjama Naziunale, Edmond Simeoni’s party. Rather than joining the coalition, U Rinnovu 
Naziunale and A Manca Naziunale both preferred presenting their own lists in the 2004 regional 
elections.
96 Unione Naziunale received 12.14 percent of votes, just above the 10 percent electoral 
threshold in the first round of elections. The results of U Rinnovu Naziunale (2.2%) and A Manca 
Naziunale (0.6%) were not sufficient for gaining representation.
76
4.2. The Unione di U Populu Corsu
4.2.1. Before 1989
Immediately after its creation in 1977, the autonomists of the UPC sought to 
develop contacts with other European minority nationalist movements. The Corsican 
Assembly had not yet been created and this strategy of internationalisation appeared as a 
necessity, due to the absence of a local democratic platform, to bring exposure to the 
Corsican nationalist struggle97. Also, party leaders hoped to circumvent the stigma 
associated with Corsican nationalism in the French context following the rise of political 
violence and the events of Aleria98. International links with strongly established and 
democratic minority nationalist parties in Europe were used to differentiate the moderate 
and legal UPC from the pro-violence and clandestine FLNC -  which had made contact 
with ETA in the Basque Country and the IRA in Northern Ireland99. The UPC found 
support in Wales and Flanders, and party delegations attended the annual meetings of 
Plaid Cymru (1977) and Volksunie (1979). The party then signed with four other minority 
nationalist parties -  Volksunie (Flanders), Fryske Nasjonale Partij (Friesland), Partei 
Deutschsprachiger Belgier (German-speaking Community of Belgium) and the Elsass- 
Lothringische Volkspartei (Alsace) - the Declaration of Bastia in 1979100, in order to 
establish a common manifesto for the first direct elections to the European Parliament. 
This initiative subsequently led to the creation of the European Free Alliance, the 
“stateless nations” party group in the European Parliament, when Volksunie returned one 
MEP in the 1981 European elections. Soon after, however, the UPC’s attention shifted 
back to the national level where presidential elections were taking place. Since its 
creation, the UPC had adopted an apolitical stance, distancing itself from right/left politics 
in order to mobilise the largest number possible around the demand for Corsica’s 
autonomy (Dominici, 2005). Making an exception, the party campaigned in favour of 
Socialist candidate Francois Mitterrand (Simeoni, 1995:204). His programme included the 
adoption of a Special Status for Corsica and the amnesty of Corsican political prisoners101. 
Mitterrand’s victory on 10th May 1981 raised much hope among UPC members102 as well 
as the entire Corsican nationalist movement (Bernabeu-Casanova, 1997:137-141). One 
year later, regional elections were held for the first time on the island and the UPC 
obtained seven seats in the newly created Assembly of Corsica. Following this democratic
97 Interview Edmond Simeoni, 23rd September 2009
98 Arritti, Arritti et I’UPC: Au coeur de I’internationalisation du probleme corse, 19th August 1993y36i)Interview Edmond Simeoni, 23 September 2009
100 Representatives from Volksunie, Fryske Nasjonale Partij, Partei Deutschsprachiger Belgier 
and the Elsass-Lothringischer Volkspartei attended the UPC annual meeting on 19th August 
1979, and signed the Declaration of Bastia on the same day.
101 110 Propositions of Candidate Mitterrand, 1981,
http://www.DSinfo.net/entretiens/mitterrand/110.html. accessed on 18 March 2008.
Arritti, Espoir pour tous ceux qui souffrent, 13 May 1981
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opening, the party concentrated its efforts on local politics while its international dimension 
diminished103.
From 1982, the party invested all its resources on the Assembly of Corsica and on 
taking advantage of this new institutional channel. The FLNC had not taken part in the 
elections, as this would have been the sign of an accreditation of the French state 
(Crettiez, 1999:76-78). With its seven seats, the UPC was therefore the sole 
representative of the Corsican nationalist movement in the Assembly. However, it was 
soon clear that the decisions of the Assembly had little political weight in the eyes of the 
French government104. In September 1983, a motion on bilingualism proposed by the UPC 
and adopted by the Assembly was vetoed by the Prime Minister. Later that year, the 
French government declared invalid the decision to close the thermal station of Vazziu, 
despite the Assembly’s competences in energy matters (Bernabeu-Casanova, 1997:166). 
Consequently, in February 1984, the UPC stopped sitting in the Assembly, causing its 
dissolution. In the following elections, however, the UPC was less successful, only 
returning three seats. This was mainly because, this time, the public front of the 
independentists, the MCA, had presented candidates and gained 3 seats. The popularity 
of the FLNC, particularly among young Corsicans, was starting to take its toll on the UPC’s 
electoral appeal105. The party also suffered from the premature retirement of its 
charismatic founder, Edmond Simeoni, for health reasons106. Deprived of its leader and 
threatened by the rise of the FLNC, the UPC made an electoral alliance with the MCA for 
the 1986 elections. The party had however always defined itself in opposition with 
clandestine organisations acting for the national liberation of Corsica, emphasising its 
fundamental incompatibility with the FLNC regarding the way to conduct the nationalist 
struggle (Bernabeu-Casanova, 1997:118-120). But Max Simeoni, who had taken over 
from his brother Edmond, instigated this rapprochement with the independentists as an 
attempt to ensure political representation for the UPC107. The UPC-MCA list achieved the 
lowest electoral score of the Corsican nationalist movement to date, 8.44 %108. While it 
enabled the UPC to keep its three seats in the Assembly, this strategy of unity ended up 
discrediting the two parties. It confused both the autonomist electorate, opposed to the 
political violence promoted by the FLNC, and the independentist electorate, perceiving the
103 Interview Max Simeoni (19 Sept 2007), Interview Francois Alfonsi (18 Sept 2007)
104 Arritti, Statut ou chiffon de papier?, 271 July 1983
105 Interview Edmond Simeoni (25 July 1996) in Bernabeu-Casanova, 1997:220-240
106 Interview Edmond Simeoni (25 July 1996) in Bernabeu-Casanova, 1997:220-240
107 Interview Max Simeoni (19 Sept 2007)
108 The day after the elections, on 17 March 1986, representatives of the UPC-MCA filed a 
complain for electoral frauds in the department Haute-Corse. On 8 July 1986, the Constitutional 
Court declared the cancellation of the 1986 elections, and ordered the organisation of new 
elections on 22 March 1987. In the meantime, Max Simeoni was appointed President of the Ad 
Hoc Committee on Electoral Fraud. In the 1987 elections, the UPC-MCA again obtained 3 seats.
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UPC as collaborators with the French government109 (Bindi, 1990). The alliance was put to 
an end when French authorities ordered the dissolution of the MCA in January 1987110.
' From early on, the UPC had been vocal about its support for European integration, 
which was clearly stated in the founding charter of the party. This position made a clear 
contrast with the anti-Europeanism of the various political parties gravitating around the 
FLNC111 and their mistrust of “the federalist type solutions [which] only serve to 
camouflage the dominant political system with new political and administrative 
divisions”112. Beyond this self-professed Europeanism, however, developments at the 
European level did not feature prominently in the concerns of the UPC for the best part of 
the 1980s. It is only after the signature of the Single European Act that the party raised 
concerns over the opening of the Single Market and its potential consequences for the 
island : “Against speculations, Corsica is defenceless [...]. The takeover bid is getting 
prepared and it will [...] be done on the only thing available: natural sites, beaches, 
sun...”113. In the party’s perspective, French authorities had prevented Corsicans from 
developing their local economy and, with the Single Market, the island risked being robbed 
of its only wealth, its natural resources114. Progressively, the UPC also began to exploit the 
contacts it had established at the European level. The party used the European Free 
Alliance (EFA) to bring resonance to the debates ongoing between the French 
government and the Assembly of Corsica, such as the ICO cable. The EFA proposed a 
resolution to the European Parliament asking the French government to renounce the 
installation of the ICO cable, an electric cable linking Corsica to Italy and Sardinia, and 
instead to develop Corsica’s own hydro-electric resources115. For the UPC, it was a clear 
instance of France serving its own interests, i.e. opening the Italian market for the public 
electricity supplier EDF, to the detriment of Corsican interests116. Although the French 
government never responded officially to the resolution, the ICO cable, also opposed by 
the Green party, was not installed. In addition, at the demand of the UPC, the EFA opened 
a debate on the specificity of the socio-economic problems encountered by Corsica and 
Sardinia, which led to a European report by the EP Committee on Regional Policy117. This 
idea would run its course in the 1990s, and be exploited by the UPC to highlight the 
contrast in the institutional arrangements of Corsica and Sardinia -  which has had regional 
autonomy since 1948 - and to ask for an autonomous status in line with its insular 
specificity. Hence, it is only towards the end of the 1980s that the UPC started using
109 Interview Edmond Simeoni (25 July 1996) in Bernabeu-Casanova, 1997:220-240
110 Council of Ministers, Decree of 22 January 1987.
111 Interview Edmond Simeoni, 23rd September 2009
112 U Ribombu, “Non A I’Europe! Oui a la Mediterranee’’, July-August 1979, p.1
113 Arritti, Autonomies et Europe, Editorial de Max Simeoni, 16th June 1988 (1106)
114 Arritti, La proie pour la speculation, Editorial de Max Simeoni, 6th August 1987 (1061)
115 Arritti, Cable ICO: le Parlement Europeen saisi par I’ALE, 7th May 1987 (1048)
116 Arritti, Cable ICO: le Parlement Europeen saisi par I’ALE, 7th May 1987 (1048)
117 Arritti, Corsica-Sardinia: le rapprochement par I’Europe, 12th January 1989 (1136)
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European developments as opportunities to highlight the inadequacies of the French state 
in defending Corsican interests. There was however little in the party’s discourse - at this 
point at least - suggesting that European integration was perceived as a process with 
direct relevance for the achievement of Corsica’s self-government.
4.2.2. The UPC in the European Parliament (1989-1994)
The UPC found a new interest in Europe when Max Simeoni, through his 
cooperation with the Green Party, obtained a seat in the European Parliament in 1989. In 
electoral decline since 1984, the UPC had sought to reassert the environmental dimension 
of its nationalist struggle in order to mobilise a wider audience (Lefevre, 2001:36-37). 
Hence, in the presidential elections of 1988, the UPC campaigned in favour of the Green 
candidate, Antoine Waechter. Max Simeoni himself went around French regions to ensure 
the support of other minority nationalist, autonomist and regionalist parties118. This enabled 
Antoine Waechter to have the signatures of elected officials necessary to validate its 
candidacy to the presidential elections119. In return, Max Simeoni was given the fourth 
position on the Green list for the European elections that resulted in its MEP mandate from 
1989 to 1994. His election, in the capacity of representative of minority nationalist and 
regionalist parties of France120, had a symbolic importance. It was the first time that an 
actor of the Corsican nationalist movement -  or of any minority nationalist movement in 
France -  would sit in a supra-national political assembly. At first, he seized this opportunity 
to publicly challenge French ministers attending sessions at the European Parliament. For 
instance, on 27 July 1989, he questioned Foreign Minister Roland Dumas121 on the 
government’s lack of accommodation of regional diversity and its rejection of the Council 
of Europe’s Resolution 192 on minority languages122. However, this channel proved largely 
ineffective to initiate a dialogue with the French government, as Simeoni’s limited speaking 
time (5 minutes) made it all too easy for French officials to dismiss his interventions and 
any written follow up123. After he became Budget Rapporteur for the Committee of Culture 
and Youth, Simeoni obtained the doubling of the European budget line for “Minority
118 Interview Max Simeoni (19 Sept 2007)
119 In accordance with the French Constitution of 4 October 1958, an individual must be 
sponsored by at least 500 elected officials, from any level of government, in order to be candidate
to the presidential elections.120Accordingly, his parliamentary assistants were Christian Guyonvarc’h, leader of the UDB in 
Brittany and Jean-Guy Talamoni, of A Cuncolta Naziunalista.
121 On the same topic, he also challenged Lionel Jospin, then Minister of Education, on 7 
November 1989 and Jack Lang, Minister of Culture, on 27 November 1989.
122 In 1988, Resolution 192 of the Standing Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of 
Europe launched the preparation of the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages, 
which was adopted by the Council of Europe in 1992.
123 Interview Max Simeoni (19 Sept 2007)
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Languages and Cultures"124. While this went relatively unnoticed at the European level, 
Simeoni's action was a political victory for the UPC, as “all will know that a Corsican MEP 
is behind this achievement”125. For the party, Simeoni’s European mandate was a source 
of visibility for Corsica and the Corsican nationalist predicament. In turn, Simeoni raised 
the UPC’s attention on the deficiencies of Corsica’s European policy and the under-use of 
European funding opportunities by Corsicans126. Using data provided by the European 
Investment Bank, he found evidence that Corsica had received 25 times less financing 
than Sardinia between 1986 and 1990127. Identifying a need to coordinate between 
Corsicans and funding bodies at the European level, the UPC made an official demand to 
the Corsican Assembly for the creation of a Corsican bureau in Brussels128. This did not go 
through, but Corsican representation in the EU became one of the UPC main demands 
from then onwards.
In the meantime, the UPC leader became the government’s advisor in the context 
of increasingly unstable Corsican politics. Indeed, within just one decade, the Assembly of 
Corsica had become plagued with electoral irregularities and political clientelism (Loughlin 
& Daftary, 1999:17)129. Frustrations also came from the consultative nature of the 
Assembly, whose proposals were hardly given any consideration by the Prime Minister 
(Lauwers, 2003:50). Hence, in 1991, Minister of the Interior Joxe initiated a reform of 
Corsica’s status in order to enhance the effectiveness of the Corsican institution. Possibly 
as a result of the legitimacy acquired through his European mandate, Simeoni was one of 
the four Corsican elected officials130 secretly consulted for the preparation of the Joxe 
status (Lefevre, 2001:37). Although this demonstrated a certain acknowledgement of the 
Corsican nationalist predicament by the government, one issue remained contentious: the 
official recognition of the Corsican people. During the negotiations, Simeoni insisted that 
the term “Corsican people’’ was used in the proposed Joxe law, as already suggested -
124 This budget line, amounting to 2 millions of ECU, was voted in the European Parliament on 25 
October 1990.
125 Arritti, Max Simeoni au Parlement Europeen : Premier Bilan du Mandat, 18th December 1990 
(1238).
26 Arritti, Pour pallier les carences de la politique europeenne en Corse, 25th June 1991 (1265) 
127 EIB Financing in millions ECU, 1986-1990 (Source: Arritti, 25th June 1991 (1265))
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Total Per Habitant
Baleares 0.1 9.3 16 13.6 39 390
Canarias 8.7 1.4 114.4 36.2 28.5 189.3 880
Corsica 4.4 0.1 0.8 0.3 5.5 154
Kriti 17.9 3.6 23 4.7 20.3 69.4 935
Sicilia 257.5 221.7 158.2 306.9 264 1208.3 1690
Sardegna 152.7 142.6 280.9 213.9 241.4 1031.6 4004
128 Motion avec Demande de Priorite Deposee par le Groupe UPC, 17th June 1991.
129 Interview Edmond Simeoni, 23rd September 2009
130 In addition to Max Simeoni (UPC), Jose Rossi (UDF), Laurent Croce (PS) and Henri Antona 
(RPR) were also part of this secret consultation.
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but finally dropped -  in the 1982 Special Status131. However, the Constitutional Court 
opposed the formulation, arguing that the Constitution recognised no other people than 
the French people132. Simeoni made use of the European arena to publicise the Court’s 
decision and subsequent lack of recognition for the Corsican people, intervening in the 
European Parliament and sending written questions to the Commission and the Council of 
Minister133. This proved unsuccessful as the reference to the Corsican people was finally 
removed from the final Joxe status, which introduced only a modest extension of the 
existing administrative and fiscal powers of the Corsican Assembly134. Nevertheless, the 
involvement of Max Simeoni, and therefore of the UPC, in the Joxe process was 
significant for the party, as it confirmed its self-definition as the legal and democratic face 
of Corsican nationalism. The party’s involvement in the EFA and its formal representation 
in the European Parliament also reinforced the contrast with the clandestine organisations 
acting for the national liberation of Corsica. As explained in the manifesto Autunumia, “the 
choice of democracy as an end and a mean, conceived as the historic feature of the 
Corsican people and as the only way to ensure its durability, is in clear opposition with the 
principle of the struggle for the national liberation according to which colonialism does not 
allow for democracy and therefore imposes the use of non-democratic means"135. This is a 
paradox of the UPC in the early 1990s : although its electoral base was in decline -  the 
FLNC attracting most of the votes -  the UPC did not stop exerting influence on Corsican 
politics, due to it being the only party of the “legal action” with democratic connections and 
representation at the European level (Dominici, 2005:13).
In accordance with Corsica’s new institutional status, elections were organised on 
the island in 1992. Despite its opposition to “clandestine action", the UPC had prepared 
the ground for another electoral alliance with the FLNC. In October 1990, the party had 
officially recognised the right to self-determination of the Corsican people, in solidarity with 
the FLNC position. In exchange, the UPC convinced the FLNC canal “historique” to accept 
the concept of autonomy as a first step towards independence (Dominici, 2005:14-15). 
This newfound programmatic compatibility allowed for the creation of Corsica Nazione, an 
electoral coalition bringing together the UPC, the Greens, as well as the ANC and the can 
- both public fronts of the FLNC. The UPC had no other choice than to join this strategy of 
unity due to its limited partisanship, all the more since its founder Edmond Simeoni had 
returned to politics in order to preside over Corsica Nazione136. Equally, the 
independentists needed the actors of the “legal action” if they were to have any chance of 
attracting voters from the island’s traditional clans (Colas, 2000:14). This strategic alliance
131 Interview Max Simeoni (19 Sept 2007)
132 Conseil Constitutionnel, Decision No 91-290 DC du 9 Mai 1991.
133 Arritti, Peuple Corse, Max Simeoni interpelle le PE, 11 June 1991 (1263)
134 Law No. 91-428 of 13 May 1991 relative to the status of the Territorial Community of Corsica
135 Autunumia, Projet politique de I’UPC, Juin 1991
136 Interview Edmond Simeoni, 23rd September 2009
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earned the Corsican nationalist movement its best electoral score to date, 24.8% of the 
votes137, and established it as one of the main political forces on the island. However, the 
alliance did not last long, mainly due to some members’ refusal to give up political 
violence. On 6 May 1994, following the assassination of ACN member Robert Sozzi by the 
FLNC canal “historique”, Edmond Simeoni left Corsica Nazione and resigned from his seat 
at the Assembly of Corsica138. This led the UPC to abandon the alliance, leaving Corsica 
Nazione to become the mouthpiece of Corsican independentists. Isolated within the 
Corsican nationalist movement, the UPC was also unable to retain its European 
representation at the end of Simeoni’s mandate. Indeed, the Greens had not renewed 
their offer to Max Simeoni of a prime position on their list for the 1994 European 
elections139. He subsequently tried to lead a “regionalist and federalist list” to the European 
elections, with the support of parties in other French regions. His list only achieved 0.39 
percent of the votes and he lost his seat in the European Parliament. This was a major 
drawback for the UPC, for which Simeoni’s European mandate was a vital source of 
visibility and credibility in times of electoral decline. A positive development nevertheless 
came out of Simeoni’s initiative with the creation of Solidarity Region-People (R&PS), a 
federation of regionalist and minority nationalist parties140. Over the next years, R&PS 
grew to become the mouthpiece of minority nationalist mobilisation in France, most 
notably by maintaining a close relationship with the Green Party, arguably the best political 
ally of minority nationalists in the French context.
Under Max Simeoni’s influence, the party developed its European discourse 
around the idea of a “Europe of the Regions” and began to advocate a federal system at 
the European level. At that time, the party saw this development as inevitable -  “Europe 
cannot avoid it. Europe will become a Europe of the Peoples and the Regions”141 -  and 
believed that only a federal system would “give full rights to all cultures and to all nations, 
by proposing the free-association of all within a common political framework”, as a basis 
for “a new political ethics which will banish cultural and colonial domination”142. 
Developments at the European level could be presented by the UPC as the reaffirmation 
of the validity of democratic means -  as opposed to “clandestine action” - to find a solution 
to the Corsican nationalist struggle. The fact that the UPC’s European sentiments echoed 
the aspirations of other political actors within the European political space reinforced and 
legitimised this discourse. It also provided the basis for a common platform for promoting
137 Corsica Nazione got 16.8% votes (9 seats), and the public front of the FLNC canal “habituel”,
the MPA obtained 8% (4 seats).
138 Interview Edmond Simeoni, 23rd September 2009
139 Interview Max Simeoni (19 Sept 2007)
140 Created in 1995, the federation Solidarity Region-People currently has 8 members: UDB in
Brittany, Bloc Catala and ERC in Northern Catalonia, UPA in Alsace, Partit Occitan in Occitania,
EA and PNB in the Northern Basque Country, and the UPC/PNC.
141 Arritti, Qu’est ce que I'Europe? Que peut-elle etre?, 9th March 1991 (1249)
142 Arritti, La Corse et I’enjeu europeen, 26th February 1987 (1038)
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minority nationalist concerns within the supranational sphere: “locating the struggle of the 
Corsican people at the heart of the struggle of the peoples of Europe for the recognition of 
their rights will allow for our demands to be heard”143. Nevertheless, while European 
integration could bring a new legitimacy to the party’s demands, it was never presented as 
an alternative to Corsica’s link with the French state, even within long-term plans. Rather, 
the constitutional reform of the French state was seen as a prerequisite for an 
autonomous Corsica to get involved in the European polity: “Autonomy provides the 
means to allow us to adapt to the European continental and economic context. Autonomy 
is not meant to satisfy a desire for an independent Corsican state. It is necessary in order 
to survive in, and adapt to, a world which is constantly moving and changing"144. Beyond 
these general references, however, the UPC did not give much details as to what the 
“Europe of the Regions" would look like and what would Corsica’s place be within it. 
Instead, it seems that the party’s support for European integration came from the idea that 
“the Europe that is being constructed will apply pressure on the Jacobin state, [...] bring to 
the fore its internal contradictions and will force it to transform itself’145.
European regional funds also started featuring in the UPC’s discourse as new 
resources to help the island’s economy146. In 1986, Corsica was made eligible for the 
Integrated Mediterranean Program, i.e. special projects responding to the problems of the 
Mediterranean’s insular economies in order to reverse economic decline and increase the 
competitiveness of islands within the European Common Market, and received 90 million 
ECU from the EU. In 1989, Corsica was placed under Objective 1 of the Structural 
Funds147, reserved to regions lagging behind in their development and in need of priority 
European funding. Structural funds and Community Initiative Program (INTERREG, 
LEADER) included, the island was given 180 million ECU for the period 1989 to 1993, and 
250 million ECU for 1994 to 1999. Despite the financial aid coming from the EU, the UPC 
did not approve of the Maastricht Treaty. In the referendum, the UPC campaigned in 
favour of abstention on the grounds that “it is a treaty which does not take into account the 
reality of the Corsican people; it has been written by and designed for states, and as such, 
a Europe of Peoples is not present in this treaty”148. The Treaty was perceived as 
reinforcing the domination of economically strong states over peripheral regions. The UPC 
also saw it as an opportunity to blame the French government for failing to defend
Corsican interests at the European level. Unlike other member states that had negotiated
143 Autunumia, Projet politique de I’UPC, Juin 1991; Interview Edmond Simeoni, 23rd September
2009
144 Arritti, Editorial de Max Simeoni, 271h June 1996
145 Arritti, Editorial de Max Simeoni, 24th May 1991
146 Arritti, La Corse et I’enjeu europeen, 26th February 1987
147 Objective 1 of the Structural Funds is the main priority of the European Union's cohesion
policy. It concerns regions lagging behind in their development and where the GDP is below 75%
of the Community average.
148 Arritti, Editorial, 29th July 1992
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specific derogations for their most vulnerable regions, notably in the form of fiscal 
exemptions149, French authorities had not made such demand in relation to Corsica150. 
French representatives had only concentrated on fiscal arrangements for France’s 
overseas territories in the Maastricht negotiations. Later, in 1994, Prime Minister Edouard 
Balladur would try and fail to negotiate a POSEICOR (Program of Specific Options for the 
Remoteness and Insularity of Corsica) with Brussels. The UPC accused the French 
government of purposefully failing to negotiate fiscal exemptions for Corsica with the EU in 
order to impose, in 1996, a Free Trade Zone151. There was a certain ambiguity in the 
UPC’s perception of European integration, which was a development opening new 
perspectives for the democratic resolution of the Corsican nationalist predicament, but 
also a process emphasising the French government’s economical neglect of Corsica.
4.2.3. Europe and the “legal action" rhetoric
After its departure from the Corsica Nazione coalition, the UPC was in need of new 
strategic resources in order to maintain its influence both within the Corsican nationalist 
movement and over Corsican politics. First, while the party had previously expressed its 
disagreement with political violence, it now officially condemned it (Colas, 2000:19). Even 
more than before, the UPC sought to insert its action within a set of values that were 
democracy, human rights, minority rights, social justice and environmental protection 
(Dominici, 2005:15-16). The UPC therefore fell back on the one political space where 
these values were being promoted: the European level. Europe was used by the UPC as 
a strategic tool to define itself in relation to other political forces in Corsica. Although the 
party did not have an MEP anymore, it still had solid and long-term connections with the 
European Free Alliance (EFA). The party also became active in the federation Solidarity 
People-Region, bringing together most of the EFA members in France152. It is really at this 
point that the UPC started to develop its European discourse as an extension of the “legal 
action” rhetoric. References to the EU could provide legitimacy to both the “legal action” in 
Corsican politics and the demand for autonomy within the broader French context. In the 
party’s perspective, European integration and the UPC’s action were mutually reinforcing 
processes acting for the transformation of the French state153. The whole French system 
was portrayed as disconnected from the European reality: “Europe is slowed down by 
France. Because Europe is primarily an institutional model conceived to organise diversity
149 *For instance, Azores and Madeira or the Canaries benefited from the POSEIMA and the
POSEICAN programs respectively.
150 Interview Francois Alfonsi (18 Sept 2007)
151 In accordance with the law Nb. 96-1143 of 26 December 1996 in relation to the Free Trade
Zone in Corsica, small Corsican firms (up to 30 employees) are dispensed from paying trade
taxes and certain social security contributions.
152 Interview Francois Alfonsi (18 Sept 2007)
153 Arritti, Pour la Corse, I’Europe commence en Sardaigne, 13-19 Juillet 2000 (1716)
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and solidarity, as opposed to the Jacobin model which glorifies unity, indivisibility, and 
actually uniformity”154. In contrast, Corsican nationalists appeared as the champions of 
Europeanism, autonomy being the way forward for the necessary reform of the French 
state: “The struggle against the Jacobin system allows to act not only for the salvation of 
Corsica, but also for the modernisation of France as a whole”155. Still, the UPC remained 
under no illusion regarding the transformative power of the EU on the French system. With 
the creation of the Committee of the Regions, the party assessed the possibilities 
emerging from the regionalisation of European politics for Corsican nationalism:" What 
can we expect from this wave of regionalisation for the nationalist struggle in Corsica, for 
the recognition of the Corsican people and nation? Not much, actually, in the shortterm. 
The road leading to the French regionalisation, to the Europe of the Regions, will be long 
and full of obstacles”156. While the new kind of European politics could offer increased 
competences and influence to regions, it was clear to the party that the European polity 
was still under construction. In addition, regionalisation in itself was not an end for 
Corsican nationalism. Regional autonomy was only one part of the UPC’s political project 
and needed to be accompanied by the official recognition of the Corsican people: “ And if 
[regionalisation] guarantees a form of political autonomy for our island [...] it gives no 
guarantee whatsoever that the national interests of the Corsican people will be taken into 
account”157.
Although the EU could not offer a direct answer to the Corsican political problem, 
European integration had enabled the UPC to link-up with other actors and to insert its 
action within larger political movements. As explained by Simeoni during his European 
mandate, “the issue is to find a point of convergence with other forces, in similar situations 
within Europe [...] And there are two axes: the axis of the islands and the axis of the 
peoples”158. This is reflective of the two aspects of the Corsican question that the UPC has 
sough to exploit in the European context: insularity and identity. Like many in the Corsican 
elite, the UPC has perceived regional cooperation with other insular regions as a way to 
assert the specificity of Corsica in France and in Europe. Establishing Corsica as one of 
Europe’s Mediterranean islands, the party considered that insularity should lead to a 
preferential treatment from Brussels: “Europe must urgently take into account insularity 
and define global projects of development directly with each island [...]. These 
development plans must be accompanied by a regime of insular derogation with regards 
to European norms [... ] these derogations must be sufficient to guarantee to the Corsican 
people the control of its destiny”159. The projects of cooperation between insular regions in
154 Arritti, La situation en Corse est le revelateur d’un mal francais, 10-16 Juin 1999 (1662)
155 Arritti, Autonomie de la Corse, 24-30 Juin 1999 (1664)
156 Arritti, La Region, une chance pour I’Europe ?, 4-10 Janvier 1996 (1490)
157 Arritti, La Region, une chance pour I’Europe ?, 4-10 Janvier 1996 (1490)
158 Kyrn, 3 February 1989
159 Autunumia, Projet politique de I’UPC, Juin 1991
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the EU, such as IMEDOC, confirmed the UPC’s view. IMEDOC has been created in 1995 
as a regional cooperation network formed by the authorities of the Balearics, Corsica and 
Sardinia160. The objective of the IMEDOC initiative has been to ensure the representation 
of the interests of the three regions in the EU and manage projects of economic, 
environmental and cultural cooperation between Mediterranean islands. In this network, 
the party has seen an opportunity to pave the way for an autonomous status for Corsica: 
“IMEDOC will constitute a new catalyst for the political debate in Corsica [...] an 
opportunity to express the local identity in an autonomous way [and] to establish the 
cultural differences advocated by the nationalists”161. The UPC has particularly favoured 
more cooperation with Sardinia. Although Corsica and Sardinia have had little in common 
historically162, European integration has triggered a rapprochement between the two 
islands, featuring among the poorest regions of France and Italy respectively163. Corsican 
and Sardinian elites have seen in the European level an opportunity to change their 
island’s relationship with their states (Bernabeau-Casanova, 2001). In 1990, the 
department Haute-Corse and the province of Sassari were chosen in the framework of the 
trans-border cooperation project INTERREG, in order to “open up the Corsican-Sardinian 
geographic entity”. The project has then been renewed in 1994 and in 1999, these times 
including Tuscany. For the UPC, “any increase of the [...] cooperation will de facto 
reinforce the autonomous reality of Corsica or Sardinia, in the face of France and Italy, as 
well as in the face of Europe”164. Indeed, Sardinia has had regional autonomy since 1948 
and highlighting the similarities between the two islands has enabled Corsican nationalists 
to ask for a similar degree of autonomy for Corsica.
In addition, the UPC conceived the European arena as a context where the 
backward ideological and political positions of the French government with regards to 
cultural diversity could be exposed in contrast with the standards of other member 
states165. France was presented as an archaic exception within Europe and as bound to 
adapt to the changing European reality through the recognition and accommodation of its 
internal diversity166. On the evidence of the comparable cases of other small nations and 
historic regions in Europe, an autonomous Corsica in Europe appeared not as
160 Sicily joined the IMEDOC in 2000, and the network is planning to include three other 
Mediterranean islands : Crete, Malta and Cyprus.
161 Le Figaro, Corse : la solution europeenne, 24 Mars 1996
162 Corsica and Sardinia have had a different fate since the 14th century : Corsica was under 
Genoa rule from 1284 to 1729, while the Spanish (Aragon) were in control of Sardinia from 1323 
to 1713. After a short period of independence (1755-1769), Corsica was definitively integrated to 
France in 1789. Sardinia, on the other hand, was given to Savoy in 1718 and formed part of the 
Piedmonts’ kingdom which then became Italy.
163 The Corsican economy contributes to 0.3% of the French GNP, while Sardinia represents 
2.2% of the Italian GNP.
164 Arritti, Combat des Peuples : I’Union fait la force, 12-18 Octobre 2000 (1726)
165 Arritti, “UPC Scelta Nova et Mossa Naziunale: Accord Politique d’Union", 24h January 2002 ; 
Interview Francois Alfonsi (18 Sept 2007)
166 Autunumia, Projet politique de I’UPC, Juin 1991.
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inconceivable but, on the contrary, demonstrably preferable to any other minority 
nationalist project167. The EU was seen as an ally particularly in the protection of linguistic 
diversity168, following the adoption of the European Charter on Regional or Minority 
Languages (ECRML). The Charter was to become a pivotal reference in the UPC’s 
discourse, both as a positive initiative in the protection of linguistic diversity in Europe and 
as an opportunity to expose the backwardness of the French state in its refusal to adopt 
minority rights169. Already in 1992, Corsica Nazione had proposed a motion asking the 
French government to sign the ECRML adopted by the Council of Europe on 22 June 
1992. The motion also stated that Corsican was the official language of Corsica (Lefevre, 
2002)170. The French government retaliated against the pressure to sign the ECRML by 
amending the French Constitution, stating that “the language of the Republic is French”171. 
At that time, the UPC had campaigned for the signature of the ECRML and for the 
protection of regional languages in France172. As Max Simeoni argued, “only a legal status 
can guarantee rights for our languages mistreated by Jacobinism [...] administrative 
measures do not amount to legal protection”173. However, it is only when Lionel Jospin 
became Prime Minister in 1997 that the debate on France’s linguistic diversity re-emerged. 
On 7 May 1999, the French government finally consented to the signature of the ECRML. 
This victory was short-lived, as the Charter was quickly after deemed unconstitutional174, 
preventing the ratification and therefore the entry into force of the ECRML. Regardless, 
the mere existence of the Charter was for the UPC further evidence of France’s 
deficiencies in contrast with other member states’ more progressive attitude towards 
cultural and linguistic diversity175.
The UPC had derived important discursive resources from European integration, 
mainly to expose France’s exceptional stance on internal diversity and strengthen the 
party’s demand for autonomy and the recognition of the Corsican people. The introduction 
of the Euro was also seen as a positive development for the UPC, essentially because it 
meant a loss of national sovereignty for the French state176. However, not all the 
implications of European integration were deemed advantageous to Corsica. The
167 Arritti, L'UPC s’engage dans un processus de refondation,13-19 Novembre 1997 (1583); 
Interview Max Simeoni (19 Sept 2007); Interview Edmond Simeoni, 23rd September 2009
168 Arritti, La politique linguistique francaise: une exception europeenne, 29 May -  3rd June 1997 
(1561)
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Arritti, La Liste Regions et Peuples Solidaires, 5 May 1994, p.3
170 The motion was rejected by the Assembly of Corsica (23 votes against, 22 votes for).
171 As stated in Article 44 of the 1958 French Constitution, members of the National Parliament 
and members of the Government have a right to amend the Constitution.
172 Edmond Simeoni had organised a petition to attract the attention of the Council of Europe and 
the European Parliament on the lack of linguistic rights in France.
173 Arritti, L’Europe, une nouvelle dimension de lutte, 1993 (1361)
174 “La Charte europeenne des langues regionales ou minoritaires comporte des clauses 
contraires a la Constitution”, Conseil Constitutionnel, Decision No 99-412 DC du 15 Juin 1999
175 Arritti, "UPC Scelta Nova et Mossa Naziunale: Accord Politique d’Union”, 24th January 2002
176 Arritti, Euro: c’est un peu d’Etat francais qui disparait, 22-27 May (1610)
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“steamroller of European harmonisation”177 raised the concerns of the UPC, the EU being 
a “formidable technocratic machinery to destroy fiscal and economic specificities”178. The 
fiscal status of Corsica had been a contentious matter between the nationalists and the 
French government, as Corsica had historically benefited from specific fiscal 
arrangements to counter the problems linked to its insularity179. Yet, despite repeated 
demands, the Assembly of Corsica has never been granted fiscal powers. European 
harmonisation180 and European competition policies made fiscal exceptions and public 
subsidies, one of the island’s main resources, more unlikely: “In the European logic, there 
is no room for public investment schemes and other fiscal regimes”181. This shows how the 
UPC’s assessment of the benefits of European integration for Corsica was ambivalent: 
“More Europe, it’s more federalism but [...] more Europe, it’s also more indifference”182. 
The European Council of Berlin also reminded the UPC of how much control the French 
government had over the funds coming from Brussels. In 1999, Corsica was removed 
from the list of European regions under Objective 1, following the re-evaluation of the 
island’s GDP by the National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE). 
Corsica’s GDP was then estimated at 82 per cent of the European GDP while only regions 
with GDPs below 75 percent of the European GDP could be eligible for Objective 1. The 
UPC contested this re-evaluation, arguing that a change in the INSEE’s methods of 
calculation had resulted in the misevaluation of the Corsican GDP183. The party mentioned 
that Spain and Italy had managed to negotiate for their insular regions to remain under 
Objective 1, despite an increase in their GDP. In its view, the French state had voluntarily 
failed to defend its interests in the European institutions, meaning that European funds 
were diminishing whereas Corsica’s insularity required specific attention from Brussels184. 
For all its European rhetoric, the party could not ignore the reality of Corsica’s economy, 
heavily depending on the French government for public funding and access to European 
funds.
Led by Edmond Simeoni, the UPC went alone in the 1998 regional elections. The 
party failed to go beyond the 5 percent electoral threshold in the first round, and for the
177 Arritti, Le gouvernement est comptable de la situation en Corse, 6-12 Juin 1996 (1512)
178 Arritti, L’Euro est arrive !, 28 Janvier -  3 Fevrier 1999 (1643)
179 Corsicans have been exempted from paying inheritance taxes by the ‘Miot Decrees’ (‘Arretes 
Miot’) dating back to 1801. A special fiscal regime was also put into place to compensate for the 
high costs involved in the transportation of goods to the island (Law of 15 November 1994). In 
addition to reduced value added tax on certain items, a special free trade zone was created in 
December 1996. Finally, Corsica receives the product of taxes levied on local sales of tobacco 
and alcohol.
180 Arritti, La France est comptable de la situation en Europe, 6-12 Juin 1996 (1512)
181 Arritti, L’Euro est arrive !, 28 Janvier -  3 Fevrier 1999 (1643)
182 Arritti, Un Euro pour la Corse, 7 - 1 3  Janvier 1999 (1640)
183 Arritti, L’Assemblee de Corse supprime sa ‘commission europeenne’ I, 6 -  12 Mai 2004 (1897)
184 Arritti, Conseil Europeen de Berlin: Trahis par Paris, 8-14 Avril 1999 (1653)
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first time in 15 years, did not gain representation in the Corsican Assembly185. The 
strategy aimed at raising the UPC’s profile by presenting it as the defender of Corsican 
interests in the European arena had not been enough to stop the party’s electoral decline. 
This is primarily because Europe was no longer a field of action and a discourse reserved 
to the UPC. Although a European dimension had initially been largely absent from the 
language of Corsican independentists, the FLNC elites had changed their attitudes 
towards European integration since Maastricht186 and moved towards advocating Corsican 
independence within Europe, as an alternative framework to the French state187. In fact, 
the independentists’ analysis of the opportunities emerging from the EU for Corsica 
focused primarily on the receipt of European funds (Elias, 2009:129-130). A key theme of 
Corsica Nazione’s European discourse had become the lack of representation of Corsican 
interests in Brussels and the under-use of European funds on the island. Corsica Nazione 
was active in pushing for the creation of a Commission .for European Affairs within the 
Corsican Assembly, and in 1999, its leader Jean-Guy Talamoni was appointed President 
of the new Commission. It was clear at that point that the UPC could no longer claim to be 
the first point of contact for the European affairs of Corsica. While Europe had been the 
exclusive terrain of the UPC up to the 1990s, it had now become a central issue in 
Corsican politics on which every political actor would position itself.
4.2.4. A new strategy of internationalisation
At the beginning of the 2000s, the salience of Europe diminished in the discourse 
of the UPC. Instead, the party’s attention was turned towards local developments. Indeed, 
following the assassination of the prefect of Corsica on 6 February 1998, then Prime 
Minister Lionel Jospin had entered into direct negotiations with the Corsican Assembly. 
From 2000, the Matignon process was being negotiated, generating much expectation 
among Corsican nationalists188. Because it did not sit in the Assembly of Corsica, the UPC
185 Following a complaint from Edmond Simeoni, the State Council cancelled the results of the 
1998 elections for frauds. The subsequent elections in 1999 did not change much for the UPC 
which got 4.96% of votes in the first round, while Corsica Nazione obtained 5.23% of votes and 8 
seats in the second round.
186 The Maastricht Treaty caused a split within the FLNC tendency, when the MPA declared itself 
in favour of the Treaty seeing it as a step towards a federal Europe, the disappearance of the 
nation-state and the legal and institutional recognition of national identities. At the other extreme, 
the ANC campaigned for ‘no’ vote in the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, arguing that the 
costs of economic integration as managed by states and transnational business outweighed the 
as yet unsubstantial opportunities for the re-assertion of national self-determination. In between, 
the aCN, like the UPC, campaigned for abstention, justifying their position by saying that “an 
analysis of the Treaty shows clearly that no derogations have been given to Corsica, either in the 
cultural, fiscal or political domains” (Elias, 2006:202-204).
187 U Ribombu, “Presentation du Nouvel Executif, 9th July 1998.
188 This process led to the signature of the Matignon Agreement on 29 July 2000, proposing 
broad changes that would result in a new form of autonomy for Corsica. The key provisions of the 
Agreement included the transfer of some limited legislative powers to the Corsican Assembly, the
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was excluded from the preparation of Corsica’s new institutional status, leaving leaders of 
Corsica Nazione189 to put forward nationalist demands. The Prime Minister’s acceptance 
to negotiate with nationalist actors who did not condemn political violence had put into 
question the validity of the "legal action" advocated by the UPC. Indeed, despite the 
government’s insistence that it would not respond to violence, it was the power struggle 
between the FLNC and the French State that had led the government to revise Corsica’s 
institutional status. Nevertheless, the aftermaths of the Matignon process have also had 
consequences for the independentists, who became increasingly divided between those 
wishing to pursue the national liberation through political violence and those in favour of 
negotiating with the French government (Dominici, 2005). In contrast, the UPC had long 
opted for democratic strategy over clandestine action and remained largely unaffected by 
this debate. On 29 January 2000, the party merged with two smaller organisation, Scelta 
Nova and A Mossa Naziunale190, and was later renamed Partitu di a Nazione Corsa 
(PNC). The party’s leadership changed too, as the Simeoni brothers had distanced 
themselves from the UPC/PNC since 1999191. The PNC was now led by younger party 
members, organised around Francois Alfonsi and Jean-Christophe Angelini. This did not 
however involve a change in the party’s programmatic profile, as the new generation of 
party elites mobilised around a demand for the full autonomy of Corsica and a strong 
opposition to any form of violence192. In 2002, the PNC took part in the legislative elections 
for the French National Assembly. These elections are usually overlooked by minority 
nationalist parties, as a two-round majoritarian electoral system makes political 
representation nearly impossible for these parties. This was an electoral strategy to gain 
visibility as the UPC’s rival Corsica Nazione - the only Corsican nationalist party sitting in 
the Assembly of Corsica -  would not compete in the legislative elections. The PNC’s 
results, just below 5 percent of the votes193, were not improved but the elections had still 
proved to be a platform where the party could project itself as a leading force of the 
Corsican nationalist movement.
mandatory instruction of Corsican in elementary schools, a new system of tax credits and a public 
investment scheme. This Matignon Agreement was reworked into a law and adopted by the 
Parliament in January 2002, albeit with modifications. Indeed, the Senate and the Constitutional 
Court imposed several revisions of the initial document. The Senate, using its power of 
amendment, asked for the mandatory nature of Corsican teaching to be removed and replaced 
by “optional teaching during normal school hours”. In addition, the Constitutional Council only 
permitted a diluted version of the initial proposal, enabling the Corsican Assembly to adapt the 
implementation of laws for a fixed period of time, subject in each case to the acceptance of the 
Parliament. The final document on the new status of Corsica contained no reference to the 
Corsican people, although such official recognition was the main demand of Corsican 
nationalists.
189 Jean-Guy Talamoni and Paul Quastana, elected members of the Assembly of Corsica.
190 Arritti, “UPC Scelta Nova et Mossa Naziunale: Accord Politique d’Union'’, 24th January 2002
191 Interview Max Simeoni (19 Sept 2007)
192 Arritti, Faire du PNC un outil strategique majeur au service d’une Corse souveraine, 10-16 
October 2002 (1822)
193 The PNC got 4.58 percent of the votes. The independentists of A Manca Naziunale also 
participated in the legislative elections and obtained 1.8 percent of the votes.
91
In 2003, a referendum took place in Corsica regarding the administrative 
reunification of the island’s two departments, Haute-Corse and Corse-du-Sud, and the 
creation of the Territorial Community of Corsica194. This was the last part of the reform 
envisioned by Lionel Jospin, even though a change in government meant that new Prime 
Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin and then Minister of the Interior Nicolas Sarkozy organised 
the referendum. The government was supportive of the reform, the Corsican nationalist 
movement was for once relatively unified in favouring the “yes" vote, but it was 
unexpectedly rejected by 51 percent of the islanders195. The arrest of Yvan Colonna - 
accused of murdering the prefect of Corsica in 1998 - just days before the referendum was 
said to have influenced Corsicans away from the perspective of more autonomy196. In 
addition, the traditional clans had turned against the reform, presumably because the 
reunification of Corsica into one single politico-administrative entity would have reduced 
the number of elected seats on the island197. In any case, the results of the Corsican 
referendum were perceived as the islanders’ reaction against the political violence of the 
FLNC (Crettiez & Sommier, 2002:31). This anti-violence climate triggered the emergence 
of a status quo among Corsican nationalists around the need for unity and for a common 
nationalist programme. On 11 November 2003, the FLNC-Union des Combattants 
declared a truce which opened the way for an electoral alliance between the PNC and 
Corsica Nazione -  Unione Naziunale - in preparation for the 2004 regional elections198. 
The coalition’s programme included measures for an increase of European funds for 
Corsica and a better representation of Corsican interests in European policy-making199. 
This new common ground indicated that the whole Corsican nationalist movement, not just 
the UPC, was now committed to enhancing Corsica’s status within the EU. The alliance, 
led by Edmond Simeoni, received 17.34 percent of the votes: a disappointment in the light 
of the near 25 percent obtained by the last alliance in 1992, but also in comparison with 
the independentists’ score in the 1999 elections, 16.77 percent. These elections had 
nonetheless enabled the PNC to reintegrate the Assembly of Corsica. With two regional 
seats and participation in the third largest group in the Assembly, the party was now back 
as one of the main political forces on the island200.
194 Law Nb. 2003-486 of 10 June 2003 organising the consultation of Corsican voters on the 
modification of the institutional organisation of Corsica
195 According to Arsh Opinion on 23 April 2003, 62% would vote ‘yes', and the Sofres poll done 
on 5-7 June predicted 55% of ‘yes' votes while for the Ipsos study of 11 June, it would be 54%.
196 Interview Francois Alfonsi (18 Sept 2007)
197 Interview Max Simeoni (19 Sept 2007)
198 The main members of Unione Naziunale were Independenza-Corsica Nazione, PNC and A 
Chjama Naziunale.
199 Unione Naziunale (2004) Lista d'Unione Naziunale: Un Votu p e r l ’Unione, Un Passu pe a 
Nazione, Bastia: Unione Naziunale.
200 The Unione Naziunale coalition secured eight seats in the Corsican Assembly out of a total 51 
but collapsed in early 2008 due to internal rivalries and disagreements over the armed struggle 
within the Corsican nationalist movement.
92
This change of fortune for the PNC coincided with a new international direction: 
“the strategy of international cooperation started by our movement [...] will now be 
enhanced”201. Although the UPC had somewhat neglected the opportunities arising from 
the European Free Alliance (EFA) since the end of Simeoni’s European mandate, the 
PNC now seemed eager to maximise its involvement in the Alliance. The PNC then 
multiplied the meetings with the MEPs of the EFA, which publicly took position in favour of 
Corsican nationalists on domestic issues such as the teaching of Corsican in primary 
schools202, changes in the electoral system203 or the privatisation of the Societe Nationale 
Maritime Corse Mediterranee204. The EFA was a strategic asset for the PNC within the 
Corsican nationalist movement since rival Corsica Nazione had been refused EFA 
membership due to its support for the FLNC’s armed struggle. In addition, PNC’s leader 
Francois Alfonsi made an alliance with the Greens to represent the EFA on their list for the 
2004 European elections205. His 16th position on the list did not earn him a seat, but it laid 
the ground for another alliance with the Green Party in the 2009 European elections. This 
collaboration would prove to be more profitable and yield the PNC a seat in the European 
Parliament. For now, featuring on the Green list served as a way of re-asserting the PNC 
as the representative of minority nationalist and regional parties in France through the 
Region-People Solidarity federation206. In December 2005, Corsica was granted an extra 
30 million Euros on top of the Objective 2 funding for 2007-2013, to help with the transition 
from Objective 1. The PNC was able to take some credit for this funding. The EFA had 
organised a meeting between the party leaders and the President of the European 
Commission a few months before in order to explain the alleged miscalculation of 
Corsica’s GDP207. This was an important achievement for the PNC, as the leaders of 
Corsica Nazione had come to Brussels in 2003 but failed to secure any additional funding 
from the Commission.
The debate on the European Constitution was an occasion for the PNC to re­
assert its Europeanism. In its referendum campaign, the PNC’s arguments in favour of a 
“yes” were based on the significance of the European Constitution for the nationalist 
struggle, for the protection of minority languages, the rights of peoples, the improvement 
of democracy and the weakening of the legitimacy of the French state208. Unlike Corsica 
Nazione, still essentially concerned with Corsica’s receipt of European funds, the PNC
201 Arritti, Faire du PNC un outil strategique majeur au service d’une Corse souveraine, 10-16 
Octobre 2002 (1822)
202 Arritti, La France montree du doigt par I’ALE, 16 -  22 Janvier 2003 (1834)
203 Arritti, Pour I'ALE, « La France d’en haut tue la diversite », 13 - 19  Fevrier 2003 (1838)
204 Arritti, Participation majoritaire de la puissance publique au capital de la SNCM : A la 
demande du PNC, I’ALE interroge I’Europe, 13-19  Octobre 2005 (1964)
205 The Greens list obtained 3.06% in the first round, 7.41% in the second round and 6 seats.
206 Interview Francois Alfonsi (July 2003) in Dominici, 2005.
207 Arritti, Fonds Structurels, le PNC rencontre Jose Manuel Barroso, 9-15 June 2005 (1950)
208 Arritti, Auropa: Avvene, 7 - 1 3  Mars 2005 (1937)
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was willing to play a role in the construction of Europe and influence the trajectory of 
European integration209. At the same time, the party was well aware of the entrenchment 
of state interests in European policy-making: “Brussels gives the impression of 
disengaging itself from the regional policy and giving it back to each member state”210. The 
PNC was also clear about the possibilities for EU intervention in the face of the French 
state: “Europe, as it stands, does not have any direct power to improve the legal status of 
the island [...] It is within the French system that Corsica lives its present and plays its 
future”211. In the context of this pessimistic assessment of the EU, the response of the 
European institutions to the Basque conflict inspired a new strategy to the leaders of the 
PNC.
In 2004, the PNC started adopting the language of conflict resolution and tried to 
mobilise the widest audience (and not necessarily nationalist partisans) around the start of 
a peace process in Corsica212. This reframing of the Corsican issue was an attempt to use 
political violence as an incentive for institutional change, while taking advantage of the 
clean democratic record of the PNC to lead the peace process negotiations with the 
government. Unsurprisingly, Corsica Nazione was in total disagreement with the PNC 
taking leadership of the peace process, arguing that a resolution could only be found with 
the actors of the conflict, i.e. the FLNC213. The PNC used the European context to provide 
resonance to the so-called Corsican peace process by stressing the similarities between 
the Corsican political situation and the conflicts undergoing in the Basque Country and 
Northern Ireland. In both cases, the international community intervened to help reach a 
political solution between minority nationalists and their national governments214. By 
portraying the Corsican political situation as a conflict, and promoting the start of a peace 
process, the PNC tried to raise the attention of the European community in order to put 
pressure on the French government215. Although the PNC reproved the attacks of the 
FLNC, it used security arguments in an effort to embarrass the French government in front 
of the international community and open up a room for dialogue216. Rather than leading a 
minority rights campaign, the party tried to expose the inability of the French government 
to maintain political stability within its borders. Yet, the strategy of the PNC found little 
success with the French government, which had not adopted the language of conflict 
resolution in relation to Corsica and had been unwilling to re-open the “Corsican file” since
209 Interview Jean-Christophe Angelini (November 2005) in Arritti, 17-23 November 2005 (1969)
210 Arritti, La Corse et I’Europe ‘elargie’, 7 - 1 3  Mars 2005 (1937)
211 Arritti, La Corse et la France, I'Europe et le Monde, 16 -22  Juin 2005 (1951)
212 Arritti, L’heure est a la relance du processus de paix, pas a la relance de la clandestinite, 1 - 7  
Juin 2006 (1996)
213 Arritti, Un evenement important, 30 November- 6  December 2006 (2018)
214 Arritti, Le parlement europeen legitimise le dialogue avec ETA !, 6-8 Novembre 2006 (2014)
215 Arritti, L’heure est a la relance du processus de paix, pas a la relance de la clandestinite, 1 - 7  
Juin 2006(1996)
216 Interview Francois Alfonsi (18 Sept 2007)
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the failure of the 2003 referendum. The party nevertheless achieved its objective within 
the friendly audience of the EFA, which now supports the peace process in Corsica, as 
well as the Basque Country and Ireland217. All in all, this strategy was the latest attempt by 
the PNC to use the European arena to find a place within the Corsican nationalist 
movement, while putting forward its project of autonomy to the French government.
4.3. Summary of European responses
Although France is one of the founding members of the EEC, the UPC has only 
started showing an interest for Europe since the end of the 1980s. The influence of Max 
Simeoni during its European mandate has played a big part in the introduction of 
European themes in the discourse and programme of the UPC. Support for European 
integration has first stemmed from its potential to facilitate the increase of Corsica’s 
autonomy by weakening French centralisation. The EU has also provided a context where 
the refusal of the French government to recognise the rights of the Corsican people could 
be exposed in contrast with the standards of other member states. More than European 
institutions themselves, it is the institutional arrangements of other European regions that 
the UPC has used to legitimise its demand for self-government and highlight the 
anachronistic nature of the unitary French state. The party has however never gone as far 
as devising a comprehensive European policy detailing what would be the place and role 
of Corsica within the Europe of the Regions. It has in fact not seemed to consider the EU 
as an alternative to Corsica’s link with the French state, at least not in the foreseeable 
future. Rather, the UPC’s involvement with the EU has been motivated by the prospect 
that it would change, rather than replace, the relationship between Corsica and France.
This pragmatism in the UPC’s European discourse can be explained by the fact 
that, since the 1960s, the Corsican nationalist movement has been structured essentially 
around the relation between Corsica and the French state. Within this paradoxical 
relationship, the French government is the only referent of Corsican nationalists, being 
both the enemy and mediator in the nationalist struggle (Lefebvre, 1992). European 
perceptions of the UPC/PNC have been shaped within this frame of reference. For 
instance, there is a fundamental contradiction in the programme of Corsican nationalists, 
between the demand for self-government and for public subsidies from the French 
government. The same inconsistencies have been transposed to the party’s analysis of 
the concrete implications of European integration. While European funds have become 
one of the island’s main resources, the EU also prevents investment scheme and other 
public subsidies from the French government. The party has on many occasions stressed
217 http://www.e-f-a.org/home.php
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the perceived indifference of the EU for the island’s specific needs, which could only 
reinforce the economical neglect of Corsica among French regions. Yet, Corsican 
nationalists have clearly found it difficult to mobilise at the European level and to have 
their voice heard in Brussels. Simeoni’s MEP seat was a significant achievement for the 
UPC (and minority nationalists in France) but has proved limited as a channel to bring 
exposure to the Corsican predicament. Despite getting help from the European Free 
Alliance, the UPC has rarely been in direct contact with European institutions in order to 
defend Corsican interests.
Europe has however turned out to be a strategic tool for the local mobilisation of 
the party. Europeanism has progressively become a defining feature of the UPC/PNC, 
from which it has gained political visibility and credibility. The UPC’s representation in the 
European Parliament, if only symbolic after Simeoni’s mandate, gave a unique status to 
the party in Corsican politics. These connections at the European level have helped the 
UPC assert its local influence, despite being in electoral decline. Furthermore, in the 
context of the power struggle among nationalists, the European profile of the UPC/PNC 
has helped establish the party as the democratic option within the Corsican movement. As 
explained in this chapter, the Corsican nationalist space has been divided between two 
competing strategies, the parties of “clandestine action” whose political violence is the 
engine behind the successive institutional arrangements granted to the island, and the 
parties of “legal action” whose distance from this violence puts in a position to negotiate 
with the French government. At one time, this distinction mirrored the two branches of 
Corsican nationalism, led by the independentists of Corsica Nazione and the autonomists 
of the UPC/PNC, but it has become blurry in the last decade. Regardless, the dynamics 
remain unchanged, and Europe has played a role along them with regards to the internal 
organisation of the Corsican nationalist movement. The European mandate of Max 
Simeoni, as well as the party’s involvement with the European Free Alliance, has enabled 
the UPC/PNC to insert its action within larger political movements at the European level, 
thereby validating the “legal action”, i.e. the use of democratic means to conduct the 
nationalist struggle in Corsica. As such, European integration has provided the UPC/PNC 
with additional means to maintain a durable and stable presence within Corsican politics.
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Chapter 5 -  Abertzaleen Batasuna
This chapter analyses the significance of European integration for Northern 
Basque nationalists -  referred to as the Abertzale - by focusing on the party Abertzaleen 
Batasuna (AB). It starts with an overview of the Northern Basque nationalist movement to 
follow its development and the process of unification which led to the creation of AB, as 
well as its relations with the parties of the Southern Basque Country. Basque nationalism 
on the two sides of the French-Spanish border shows distinct features, demonstrating how 
strongly it has been conditioned by the political, social, economic and cultural evolution of 
the two respective states within which it is inserted. It is, however, also true -  given the 
greater political strength of nationalism in the Basque territories of Spain -  that the latter 
has had a direct influence on the movement in the Northern Basque Country, also known 
as Iparralde. The chapter then goes on to survey party activity since the 1980s218 in order 
to establish the relevance of developments at the European level for AB’s mobilisation. It 
will show that European integration has never gained prominence in the concerns of AB, 
which has made few attempts to engage in European politics, instead, the Abertzale have 
invested all their resources on mobilising local actors around the demand for a Basque 
department and contributing to the “national construction” of the Basque Country. Several 
features specific to the Northern Basque nationalist movement - such as its lack of 
organisation, internal divisions and reluctance to condemn ETA - provide some 
explanation in relation to this limited interest in the EU. But the lack of institutional 
recognition of the Northern Basque Country has also limited the opportunities that AB 
could derive from European integration, not least those related to cross-border 
cooperation.
5.1. The Northern Basque nationalist movement
The first nationalist demands emerged in Iparralde219, the Northern Basque 
Country, at the beginning of the 1930s. A local member of the clergy, the Abbe Pierre 
Lafitte, started mobilising around a demand for decentralisation and an official status for 
Euskara, the Basque language220. When the Spanish civil war broke out, however, the 
Northern Basque elites became hostile to the large number of Southern Basque
218 The chapter will start by surveying the party activity of EMA and EB, the two organisations that 
formed Abertzaleen Batasuna in 1992.
219 Euskadi, the historic Basque country, is divided into Hegoalde (southern Spanish part) and 
Iparralde (northern French part).
2 0 A document entitled “Eskual Herriaren Aide”, published on 20 November 1933, stated the 
principles of his Eskualerriste movement and soon after Aintzina, the movement’s magazine, was 
created (Larronde, 1991).
97
refugees221, mainly because of their controversial alliance with the communists222 (Jacob, 
1994:93-96). This hostility quickly contaminated the very idea of Basque nationalism, 
forcing Lafitte and his supporters to take a back seat and concentrate on aiding the 
refugees. After the Second World War, Northern Basque nationalists re-emerged briefly 
when four Basque candidates participated in the 1945 local elections223. Despite their 
marginal electoral performance, they convinced local notable and independent MP Jean 
Etcheverry-Ainchart to present a project for an “Autonomous Status of the Northern 
Basque Country in the French Republic” to the National Assembly (Gurrutxaga, 2005:77). 
The proposal was rejected even before being put to the vote in parliament224. During the 
1960s, under the influence of refugees from a new terrorist organisation called Euskadi Ta 
Askatasuna (ETA), the Northern Basque nationalist movement evolved from its Catholic 
and clerical origins into a secular political movement (Jacob, 1994:129-137). The role 
played by ETA refugees in the development of Northern Basque nationalism would create 
lasting links between the Abertzale and the organisation’s public front, Herri Batasuna. On 
15 April 1963, the Charter of Itxassou was signed, asserting that the Basques were one 
people, nation and democracy, and calling for the right to unity225. As the founding 
manifesto of Northern Basque nationalism, the Charter expressed the determination to 
achieve the unification of the Basque territories of Spain and France in the framework of 
the “Europe of the Peoples" (Loyer, 2003:103). On the basis of these proposals, Enbata, 
the first Northern Basque nationalist party, was created. The newly founded party took part 
in the departmental elections of 1964 and 1967, and in the parliamentary elections of 
1967, gathering nearly 5% of the votes.
At the beginning of the 1970s, Enbata radicalised its discourse around the theme 
of the national liberation of the Basque people and became closer to ETA (Jacob, 
1994:170-179). The French government ordered the dismantlement of the party shortly 
after, leading to the implosion of the Basque nationalist movement (Crettiez & Sommier, 
2002:45). The following outbreak of violence in the Northern Basque Country -  in the form 
of the pro-independence military organisation Iparretarrak (IK) -  divided the Abertzale 
between those conceiving violence as a valid instrument of struggle and those rejecting it
221 An estimated 194,000 refugees flowed in France in three stages corresponding to the battles 
occurring in the Southern Basque Country between August 1936 and June 1938.
222 The Spanish Basque Catholics had made a tactical alliance with Communist and anarchical 
forces in defence of republican institutions during the Civil War. This did not go down well with the 
conservative Northern Basque elite.
223 Marc Legasse run as a 'Basque nationalist’ in the canton of Saint-Jean-de-Luz (95 votes), 
Jospeh Darmendrail as a ‘Basque nationalist’ in the canton of Bayonne Nord-Est (549 votes), 
Pierre Landaburu as 'Nationalist Basque’ in the canton of Biarritz (59 votes) and Andre Ospital as 
an 'Independent’ in the canton of Bayonne Nord-Ouest (57 votes).
224 Jean Etcheverry-Ainchart introduced the proposal before a committee of the National 
Assembly working on the new French constitution, where it was rejected as encouraging 
separatism.
225 Enbata, Charter of Itxassou, 15th April 1963, Itxassou.
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in favour of peaceful democratic means (Gurrutxaga, 2005:78)226. The only legal 
alternative to IK was Euskal Herriko Alderdi Sozialista (EHAS), a party advocating the end 
of French colonialism and the reunification of the Basque Country227. Following IK’s 
physical intimidation of EHAS leaders, however, the party stopped its activity in Iparralde 
on 5 May 198122a, leaving IK to be the sole carrier of Northern Basque nationalist ideas. In 
the following years, the intensity of IK’s violence increased to the point of firing at 
policemen and breaking into government prisons229. The French government responded 
with a massive police presence in the region and the arrest of IK leader Philippe Bidart in 
1988 sent the organisation into disarray.
The actions of IK had served to discredit Basque nationalism not only in the eyes 
of the French government, but also with regard to the Basque population (Jacob, 
1994:329). Hence, the mid-1980s saw the rise of Basque moderation and of political 
parties which sought to distance themselves from Basque violence. First, Ezkerreko 
Mugimendu Abertzalea (EMA) was created in preparation for the 1986 legislative and 
regional elections230. The ambition of EMA was to unify Northern Basque nationalists 
behind the national liberation and independence of the Northern Basque Country. Yet, the 
party refused to condemn the armed struggle231 and this limited its appeal as a unifying 
force able to overcome the stigma of association with IK232. Political mobilisation, in the
226 Iparretarrak, literally meaning “those of ETA of the North”, was never connected to ETA, 
although the two organisations shared similar ideas and objectives.
227 As the first trans-national Basque party, EHAS had been created in 1975 through the merging 
of two parties of socialist ideology, Herriko Alderdi Sozialista in France and Euskal Alderdi
Sozialista in Spain.
228 Euskaldunak 81 (May 1981), p.2; The Southern Basque section of EHAS had already been 
integrated into Herri Batasuna in 1978. Since then, EHAS had maintained a presence in Iparralde 
but stopped participating in elections.
229 In July 1986, IK opened fire on two CRS guarding the Palais de Justice of Bayonne , and on 
13 December 1986, a team of IK commandos called ‘Commando Didier’ (after IK member Didier 
Lafitte who had been killed by the police three years before) succeeded in breaking into the 
prison of Pau and liberating IK members Marie-France Heguy and Gabriel Mouesca, who were 
serving sentences of four and thirteen years respectively, for their actions with IK.
230 The Herri Taldeak groups (HT) had started mobilising around the idea of a reunified and 
socialist Basque Country, in view of the 1986 legislative and regional elections. While the HT 
supported the armed struggle of ETA in the South and IK in the North, they no longer wanted to 
limit their nationalist ambitions to “the political ghetto of violence" (Ateka 20 (May 1985)). Hence, 
they created EMA as a self-defined nationalist-socialist party acting for the recognition of the 
Basque people as one nation in two different political contexts and for its right to self- 
determination (Ateka 29 (February 1986)).
231 In reality, the party’s positions were very close to the ones of IK, although the two 
organisations diverged on the role of violence as a tool for Basque nationalism. At its first general 
assembly, EMA clarified its position with regards to the armed struggle by establishing that (1) the 
first political violence was that of the state, (2) the armed struggle was a political struggle, (3) 
there were different means of action available to the Abertzale and (4) EMA would be an 
exclusively open and public organisation (Jacob, 1994:341).
232 All the more since the actions of the Grupos Antiterrorista de Liberacion (GAL), death squads 
targeting ETA in the Northern Basque Country, had reinforced the strong anti-violence feelings of 
the Northern Basque population. Between 1983 and 1987, the GAL targeted ETA members and 
supporters who had found refuge in the Northern Basque Country, caused the deaths of 27 
persons, the majority ETA refugees but also civilians. Following an investigation by the Spanish 
newspaper El Mundo, it was revealed that the GAL had connections with Spanish government
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Northern Basque Country, was initially conceived as a means to prevent the consolidation 
of Iparretarak as a symbolic referent for Basque nationalism (Letamendia, 2000). Unlike 
what can be observed in the Corsican case, the political dimension of the Northern 
Basque movement was never subordinated to the military dimension represented by IK. A 
significant number of Abertzale did not sympathise with the radicalism of EMA’s demands 
and called for a more moderate nationalist agenda233. This led to the creation of Euskal 
Batasuna (EB) in 1986 by Jakes Abeberry and others interested in building a gradualist 
agenda for achievable changes234. The party mobilised for the territorial recognition of the 
Northern Basque Country and an official status for Euskara, the Basque language235. EB’s 
position on political violence remained ambiguous: the party was strongly opposed to the 
use of violence in the Northern Basque Country and condemned the actions of IK, but it 
“understood” ETA’s fight in the South. In fact, EB’s criticism of IK mirrored the position of 
Herri Batasuna (HB) and ETA, according to which Iparralde should not be a front of the 
armed struggle236. This understanding of political violence as a valid strategy in one 
context and inappropriate in another became fundamental to the Abertzale of the Northern 
Basque Country in the 1990s. While the Northern Basque movement grew to 
unequivocally condemn IK’s actions, there would be little questioning of the legitimacy of 
ETA’s struggle.
A major novelty in the Northern Basque political landscape was the arrival of 
political parties from the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country (CAPV)237. In the 
past, HB had close contacts with Northern Basque nationalists but had never directly 
engaged with French politics. In contrast, moderate Basque nationalist parties started 
becoming active in Iparralde following the entry of Spain in the EU. Eusko Alkartasuna 
(EA) opened an office in Bayonne in 1987 and started taking part in French elections 
under the name EA-lparralde. This move triggered a redefinition of moderate Basque
officials. In the 1994 trial, it was established that the GAL were funded by the Spanish Ministry of 
the Interior when the Socialists were in government (Woodworth, 2001).
233 Enbata, Editorial, 13 March 1986 (913)
234 Enbata, 29 Mai 1986 (924)
235 Enbata, Euskal Batasuna, 17 Juillet 1986 (931)
236 Initially, there was no conflict between IK and ETA. According to the strategy of the “single 
front", the presence of armed organisations on each side of the border was a reflection of the 
existence of a single people and a single fight, albeit with different methods and rhythms. This 
changed in the 1980s, when ETA became critical of the struggle led by IK. ETA had decided to 
cease political activity in the Northern Basque Country, replacing the theorisation of the “single 
front” by that of the "priority front”: until self-determination was achieved in the South, the priority 
of the struggle would be centred exclusively on these territories (Jacob, 1994:274). Within this 
conception, the Northern Basque Country was destined to be a sanctuary, i.e. a place of relative 
safety for ETA members, and it should therefore not be a front of the armed struggle. This 
strategic change in ETA’s position was also an attempt to avoid provoking French authorities, 
which had become harsher towards ETA members since the 1980s, denying them political 
refugee status and facilitating extraditions to Spain.
237 In 1979, three provinces of the Southern Basque Country (Biscaye, Alava, Guipuzcoa) formed 
the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country. The province of Navarre, while being part of 
the historic territory, refused to be associated with the other three provinces and gained its own 
autonomy status through the creation of the Foral Community of Navarre.
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nationalism around the (re-)construction of the Basque Country, made of its 7 historic 
provinces, in the EU (Izquierdo, 2001:167-171). This prompted the Partido Nacionalista 
Vasco (PNV) -  the dominant political party in the CAPV - to open a Northern section, the 
Parti National Basque (PNB), in 199 1 238. Most of the Abertzale however favoured the 
development of the Northern Basque nationalist movement independently of its Spanish 
counterpart. Also, Northern Basque nationalists were not ready to officially condemn the 
struggle led by ETA. This was a point of disagreement with EA and the PNV which created 
difficulties for electoral alliances within the movement. After an encouraging electoral 
performance in the 1992 regional and cantonal elections - the overall Abertzale vote in the 
Basque Country was 9.98 percent -  EMA and EB formed a political platform called 
Abertzaleen Batasuna (AB), Left out of the Abertzaleen Batasuna platform, EA-lparralde 
and the PNB failed to establish a strong electoral base in Iparralde, participating only 
intermittently to French local elections. Since 1997, AB has promoted the creation of a 
Basque department as well as the official recognition of the Basque language, Euskara239. 
Following an electoral breakthrough in 2001, AB ceased to be a political platform and 
became its own political party240. With more than 150 municipal councillors, 16 mayors 
and even a seat in the departmental council241, AB emerged as a steady force in the 
Basque political scene. Internal divisions appeared when some party members, led by 
Xabi Larralde, left AB to join the newly created Batasuna. As the new public front of ETA, 
Batasuna chose to advocate a full autonomous status for the Northern Basque Country. 
Undoubtedly weakened by the scission, AB has maintained its focus on the demand for a 
department but its electoral performances remained affected by the presence of Batasuna 
- hugely subsidised from the South - in Northern Basque elections.
The fragmentation of the Basque movement is reminiscent of the divisions among 
Corsican nationalists. AB, EA-lparralde, the PNB and Batasuna have divergent positions 
regarding the use of political violence and the best strategy to achieve autonomy (demand 
for a Basque department vs. right to an immediate autonomous status) but also in relation 
to the “domination of the South”. Recently, Northern Basque nationalists have started to 
work jointly, mainly due to the weakness of their electoral results. Euskal Herria Bai, a new 
nationalist coalition has been formed by AB, EA-lparralde and Batasuna in the 2007 
legislative elections, although the PNB declined taking part in it. This alliance is clearly
238 Yet, the PNV only started taking part in French elections in 1996.
239 Gara, Entretien avec Jakes Abeberry, 9th October 1999.
240 AB’s membership was essentially composed of members of EMA and EB, as well as several 
independent Abertzale.
241 Alain Iriart was elected Mayor of St Pierre d’lrube, a town in the suburbs of Bayonne, and 
Jean-Michel Galant became the representative of the canton of St Etienne de Baigorry in the 
departmental council.
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motivated by strategic reasons and does not suggest that a new common ground is 
emerging for the nationalist struggle in the Northern Basque Country.
5.2. Abertzaleen Batasuna
5.2.1. The arrival o f nationalist parties from the CAPV
At the start of the 1980s, the European dimension of Northern Basque nationalism 
was pretty much inexistent. At a time when most minority nationalists over Europe were 
establishing contacts abroad and the European Free Alliance was being created, the 
Abertzale remained impervious to developments at the European level. The Northern 
Basque nationalist movement was in a critical state and the Abertzale struggled to 
distance themselves from the shadow of Iparretarak (IK). Mainly as a result of IK’s 
intimidation tactics (Jacob, 1994:225), Basque nationalists had not taken part in French 
elections since 1978242. This lack of political participation combined with episodes of 
political violence had contributed to the marginalisation of Basque nationalism. The priority 
was therefore to establish the Northern Basque nationalist movement as a positive, and 
above all democratic, local political force. EMA was created for the 1986 regional 
elections, quickly followed by EB, and by the second half of the 1980s, Northern Basque 
nationalists were present in all the local elections. Once re-organised politically, the 
Abertzale started paying attention to European integration, a process with very tangible 
effects for the Northern Basque nationalist movement.
More specifically, Europe had transformed the position of the moderate branch of 
Southern Basque nationalism towards the Northern Basque Country. The Southern 
Basque nationalist movement had for decades been divided between moderate 
organisations opposed to political violence, led by the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV), 
and a more radical branch centred around ETA and its public front, Herri Batasuna. 
Another difference between the two dimensions was their distinct positions vis-a-vis 
Iparralde as a territory. Historically, Iparralde had been conceived by the PNV as a refuge 
during the Civil War and a sanctuary for Basque nationalists under the Franco regime. The 
PNV had in fact never integrated Iparralde into its political project, either short or long 
term. In contrast, ETA and Herri Batasuna had always considered Iparralde an integrant 
part of the Basque Country, which they saw as a territory occupied by the Spanish and
242 When EMA took part in the 1986 elections, it had been almost ten years since a Northern 
Basque nationalist party had faced the public vote. The last elections to which the Abertzale had 
participated were the f978 legislative elections, where EHAS obtained an average of 3.89 
percent over the districts of the Northern Basque Country. Across the Northern Basque Country, 
EMA’s score was 3.77 percent in the legislative elections and 4.21 percent in the regional 
elections (Enbata, 20 March 1986 (914) and 27 March 1986 (915)). This electoral performance 
was similar to that of EHAS in 1978 or even Enbata in 1967, proving that there was a small but 
stable electorate for Basque nationalist ideas.
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French states. ETA’s definition of the Basque territory goes some way into explaining the 
Abertzale’s support for the organisation, despite their uncertainties about political violence 
as a strategy243. In any case, a change in moderate Basque nationalism occurred with the 
combination of two factors: when Spain became an EU member state in 1986 and when, 
in the same year, Carlos Garaikoetxea left the PNV to create Eusko Alkartasuna (EA). The 
ambition of EA was to depart from the essentially CAPV-centred discourse of the PNV in 
order to attract the electorate favouring the reunification and independence of the Basque 
Country, but opposed to the use of violence. EA renewed with the rhetoric of “Zazpiak 
Bat”, meaning “Seven in One” and referring to the reunification of the seven provinces 
constitutive of the historic Basque Country, of which three are in France and four in Spain. 
By altering the significance of the French-Spanish border, European integration had made 
this political project, i.e. the (re-)construction of the Basque Country, acceptable for a 
moderate minority nationalist party, albeit as a long-term goal (Izquierdo, 2001:167-171).
In practice, this re-orientation of moderate Basque nationalism towards ideas of 
reunification and independence meant that EA, and a few years later the PNV, became 
active on the Northern Basque political scene. The PNV and EA’s presence on both sides 
of the border enabled the parties to draw new imaginary spaces for their political project 
and nationalist aspirations (Izquierdo, 2001). Still, it is worth pointing out that neither EA 
nor the PNV would ever make a real effort to pull their weight in French local elections244 
and to adapt their programmes to the specificities of Iparralde245. Their interest in the latter 
remained essentially as a discursive resource for political debates taking place in the 
CAPV and for the defence of the construction of the Basque Country within Europe 
(Izquierdo, 2001). Still, while engaging in Northern Basque politics, EA and the PNB 
introduced the Abertzale to the possibilities emerging from “the participation of both parts 
of Euskadi, separated by the French-Spanish border, in the same European 
institutions"246. The seven provinces of the historic Basque Country now had a chance of 
being represented in the same political assembly, the European Parliament. The 
European concept of cross-border region also opened significant new avenues for Basque 
nationalism and provided an unprecedented institutional framework for the links existing 
within the Basque Country247. With both Spain and France in the EU, cross-border 
cooperation was to become easier and greater, despite the limitations imposed by the 
French and Spanish governments. These were just the premises of a European discourse 
but, unlike EA which went on to build its identity as a Basque political party around the
243 Interview Jean-Noel “Textx" Etcheverry, 11th September 2009
244 EA-lparralde and the PNB do not take part in all the municipal, cantonal, departmental and 
legislative elections and, unlike AB, make no effort to present candidates in all the electoral 
districts constitutive of the Northern Basque Country.
245 Interview Jean-Noel "Textx” Etcheverry, 11th September 2009
246 Enbata, Une Chance ?, 2 Janvier 1986 (903); Interview Peio Etcheverry-Ainchart, 4 
December 2007
247 Enbata, Euskal Batasuna, 17 Juillet 1986 (931)
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idea of Europe (Gonzalez, 1999), EMA and EB did not expand on these general 
postulates. Their analysis of the advantages of European integration remained for the 
most part centred on its potential to weaken the Spanish and French governments: “the 
construction of Europe [will] weaken the dogma of absolute sovereignty of our two jailer 
states”248. Like most minority nationalists in France, EMA and EB gave their support to the 
candidacy of the Corsican Max Simeoni on the Greens list for the 1989 European 
elections249. The Abertzale were however keen to stress that European integration was a 
means to achieve their nationalist goals, not an end for their political project250. This was 
clearly directed to the PNB and EA-lparralde, both seeing the EU as the only institutional 
framework within which the Basque Country could be reunited. Northern Basque 
nationalists were more reserved in their assessment of the opportunities emerging from 
European integration, no doubt influenced by Herri Batasuna’s strong rejection of the EU.
In the 1988 legislative and cantonal elections, EMA, EA-lparralde and EB 
presented joint candidates in the Basque electoral districts. The three parties campaigned 
for the creation of a Basque department and the official status of the Basque language, 
under the slogan “Europe now gives us a chance to exist as a people"251. As an average 
over the cantons constitutive of the Northern Basque Country, Basque nationalists 
received 5.85 percent in the legislative elections and 7.49 percent in the cantonal 
elections252. After the success of this first electoral alliance -  a 2  percent increase from 
EMA’s score two years earlier - the parties joined forces again for the municipal elections 
of 1989, gathering 9.26 percent on average. Nevertheless, the question of political 
violence surfaced to disrupt the fragile unity of the Northern Basque nationalist movement. 
On 12 January 1988, EA had signed the Ajuria Enea pact condemning ETA’s violence and 
this was causing tensions between EA-lparralde and the Abertzale253. Disagreements on 
the use of political violence as a minority nationalist strategy, as well as a strong desire not 
to be subordinated to the Southern Basque nationalist movement, ended up creating an 
irreconcilable gap between the parties254. Although EMA and EB continued working 
together, the two parties would only form another electoral alliance with EA-lparralde a 
mere 20 years later, for the 2007 legislative elections.
Enbata, Une Chance ?, 2 Janvier 1986 (903)
249 The Green party had given the third position on their list to Max Simeoni, as the representative 
of the minority nationalist movements in France. The Abertzale Ramuntxo Camblong (EA) also 
featured on the list, at the 43rd position.
250 Enbata, 29 Juin 1989 (1083)
251 Enbata, Elections du 5 Juin, 26 Mai 1988 (1028)
252 Enbata, 26 Mai 1988 (1028)
253 Enbata, 28 Septembre 1989 (1094)
254 Interview Jakes Abeberry, 3rd December 2007; Interview Jean-Noel “Textx” Etcheverry, 11th 
September 2009
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5.2.2. The emergence o f Abertzaleen Batasuna
Far from the original and unified Enbata movement of the 1970s, the Northern 
Basque nationalist movement was now divided in four political formations: EMA, EB, EA- 
lparralde and the PNB. Furthermore, although the arrest of IK’s leader Philippe Bidart255 
had significantly weakened the organisation, IK had resumed its activity in 1989 and 
claimed four attacks within one year256. The Abertzale sought to distance themselves from 
this violence and to unite behind a moderate agenda, in order to present a credible 
platform to the Basque public and the French government (Jacob, 1999). In addition, 
concerns arose that if Northern Basque nationalists did not organise themselves quickly, 
their struggle would be taken over by the parties of the South through their recently 
established branches, EA-lparralde and the PNB257. This realisation favoured the 
emergence of a new common ground around the specificity of the Basque struggle in the 
North. This meant acknowledging that, unlike the Southern Basque Country, Iparralde was 
a small territory without institutional recognition and where the nationalist vote rarely 
exceeded 10 percent in local elections258. The consensus was that, within this context, the 
best strategy to adopt was to conceive institutional recognition as arriving in stages259. 
Such a gradualist vision enabled most of the Abertzale to unite behind short term 
objectives, without necessarily agreeing on common long term goals. The independentists 
of EMA and pro-autonomy EB could agree on a set of common propositions, such as the 
creation of a Basque department-region with extended cultural competences as a first step 
towards territorial recognition260. In the 1992 regional elections, Jakes Abeberry led a 
common EB-EMA list under the name “Abertzaleen Batasuna” and won 6.92 percent of 
the votes in the Basque Country261.
Following this electoral success -  the Abertzale vote had doubled since the last 
elections - EMA and EB formed Abertzaleen Batasuna (AB), a political platform destined 
to create unity within the Northern Basque nationalist movement. The idea of a political 
platform was suited to the involvement of the independent Abertzale, i.e. not associated to 
any political party. The electoral support of independent Abertzale, usually running for
255 Philippe Bidart was arrested on 20 February 1988. Condemned to a life sentence in prison for 
the murder of 3 policemen, he has been released on 14 February 2007, after 19 years of 
imprisonment.
256 In 1989, IK claimed an attack against the tax office of Bayonne, against the gendarmerie of 
Maignon, the bombing of the railway in Biarritz during the visit of Pierre Joxe, Minister of the 
Interior, and the arson of the DDE in Bayonne.
257 Interview Jakes Abeberry, 3rd December 2007
258 Interview Jean-Noel "Textx” Etcheverry, 11th September 2009
259 For instance, in 1991, EB endorsed a double political project, full autonomous status for the 
long term and a "proposal in line with the traditional principles of common law” in the short term 
(Enbata, 7 Fevrier 1991 (1163).
*60 Enbata, 21 Novembre 1991 (1202)
261 EA-lparralde made an electoral alliance with Entau Pais, an Occitan political party, which 
enabled the two parties to present candidates all over the Pyrenees-Atlantiques department, in 
the Basque Country but also in Occitan Bearn. It obtained 1.1 percent of the votes in the Basque 
Country. The PNB, only just established, did not take part in the 1992 regional elections.
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mayor seats, was considerable at the local level and their personal electoral bastions 
could not be overlooked by EMA and EB. The creation of AB provided a neutral common 
ground for Abertzale from across the political spectrum sharing the common objective of 
advancing Basque interests at large262. Differences remained over the use of political 
violence263 but the issue was deliberately left aside as a matter of individual conscience 
(Jacob, 1999:80). This way, AB was able to concentrate on goals supported by the 
majority of Abertzale, such as the institutionalisation of the Northern Basque Country, the 
opening of a Basque Chamber of Agriculture, an official status for the Basque language 
and the establishment of a Basque university264. Electoral results were quick to 
demonstrate the success of the initiative: AB won 5.48 percent of the votes in the 1993 
legislative elections265, 11.3 percent in the 1994 cantonal elections266, and 11 percent as 
well as 18 seats in the 1995 municipal elections.
The debate over the Maastricht referendum revealed a clear line of division within 
the Basque nationalist movement, in that EMA and EB did not share what they described 
as the blind optimism of the parties of the South towards anything related to the EU267. 
The historic attachment of the PNV268 -  and subsequently of EA -  to the idea of a federal 
Europe meant that the two parties were strongly in favour of the Maastricht Treaty. In their 
views, it was a step towards more economic and political integration, which could only 
help to achieve self-government for the Basque Country (Gonzalez, 1999). For EMA and 
EB, on the other hand, the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty were not the right bases on 
which to build Europe and contributed above all to serve the interests of member states269. 
The EU was criticised for being technocratic and not taking into account the plight of the 
Basque people struggling for its right to self-determination270. There were also 
discrepancies between EMA and EB’s leftist ideology and the ideas driving European 
integration: “The Europe of capitals that is being proposed to us is very far from fulfilling 
our wishes”271. EMA advised its members to abstain from voting in the referendum, 
because “the EC has nothing to offer in response to our legitimate claims, and [...] the
262 Interview Michel Berhocoirigoin, 3 September 2009.
263 In short, the Northern Basque nationalist movement was divided in three groups: those 
opposed to any form of violence (EA-lparralde, PNB and the majority of independent Abertzale), 
those opposed to violence in the North but who “understood” ETA’s struggle (EB), and those 
supporting the action of both IK and ETA (EMA).
264 Enbata, 15 Decembre 1994 (1358)
265 Enbata, 29 Avril 1993 (1275)
266 Enbata, 5 Mai 1994 (1325)
267 The PNB campaigned for the ‘yes’, considering that any further integration should be 
welcome, while EA-lparralde advised voting ‘yes’ on the grounds that Maastricht opened the way 
to a federal Europe (Enbata, 10 Septembre 1992 (1242)).
268 Since the Doctrine Aguirre, dating back to 1976, the PNV supports the idea of a Europe of the 
Peoples, whereby a federation of European historic regions, such as the Basque Country, would 
progressively replace the European state system.
69 Enbata, Maastricht, 4 Juin 1992 (1230)
270 Enbata, Vous avez dit technocrate?, 2 Juillet 1992 (1234)
271 Enbata, 4 Juin 1992 (1230)
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Maastricht Treaty would not bring anything positive to the Basque Country”272. EB 
campaigned for a “yes”, but only just, on the basis that “the more Europe there will be, the 
more cracks there will be in Jacobin France”273. While being in disagreement with the 
content of the Maastricht Treaty, the party considered that the process of European 
integration was nevertheless a step in the right direction.
With the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty and the opening of the Single Market, 
AB members formulated a common position on the EU, along the lines of “Europe helps 
those who help themselves”274. As before, their support for European integration primarily 
came from the fact that it would undermine the French and Spanish states and diminish 
the significance of the border dividing the historic Basque Country275. However, a key point 
in AB’s discourse was that European integration should not be seen, like the PNV or EA 
would suggest, as a process that will in due course solve out the problems of the Basque 
Country. Instead, it was the Abertzale’s task to exploit the weaknesses created in France 
and Spain in order to achieve self-determination for the entire Basque people276. In this 
view, the EU was not perceived as looking after the interests of the Basque people, nor 
was European integration seen as a process with direct relevance for Northern Basque 
nationalism. Accordingly, the Abertzale still showed no interest in European politics and 
did not join other Basque nationalist parties in the ranks of the European Free Alliance277. 
Arguably, AB’s sympathy for the struggle led by ETA limited its opportunity for party 
cooperation, as the EFA demands a clear condemnation of political violence from its 
members. The same could be said about party cooperation within France, since AB did 
not join the newly created federation Solidarity Region-People (R&PS), which brought 
together minority nationalists of most French regions. Going full circle, this lack of 
socialisation outside of the Basque nationalist movement explained the absence in AB’s 
European discourse of references such as the Europe of the Regions, multi-level 
governance and subsidiarity.
The same themes as in the Corsican and Breton case had nevertheless started to 
emerge in AB’s discourse: France and its Jacobin principles were pictured as an exception 
in Europe, as backward in comparison to other member states278 and ill-adapted to the 
process of European integration279. The European Charter for Regional and Minority 
Languages was an important document, as the progressive European provisions to 
minority languages offered a way out of the discrimination of the French government
272 Enbata, 10 Septembre 1992 (1242)
273 Enbata, Oui a Maastricht, 10 Septembre 1992 (1242)
274 Enbata, Le nouveau droit linguistique vient d'Europe, 27 Aout 1992 (1240)
275 Interview Michel Berhocoirigoin, 3 September 2009.
276 Enbata, Basque et Europeen, 7 Janvier 1993 (1259)
277 EA joined the EFA in 1987, but the PNV has preferred sitting with the European People's
Party in the European Parliament.
278 Enbata, L’Europe des Etats Regionaux, 20 Avril 2000 (1624)
279 Enbata, Jacobinisme archaique et isole, 29 Avril 1993 (1275)
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towards any language other than French280. The Abertzale would also praise the practical 
advantages of European integration, which meant that, for the first time, Basques of 
French and Spanish nationality could vote in the same local elections and share the same 
currency281. In practice, however, the Spanish and French states left little room for 
manoeuvre to Basque nationalist parties in terms of trans-national cooperation. For 
instance, EB and EMA had planned to feature on the HB list led by Karmelo Landa in 
Spain for the 1994 European elections, but the Spanish government adopted a decree 
prohibiting French nationals from being candidates in Spanish elections282. Consequently, 
AB members chose to spare their limited resources by not taking part in European 
elections, thereby reiterating that these were not a priority for the Abertzale.
5.2.3. Pays Basque 2010
By the mid-1990s, Europe had seemingly disappeared from the considerations of 
Northern Basque nationalists. AB had emerged as one of the Basque political forces and 
found itself in a position to introduce its demand for the institutionalisation of the Basque 
Country into the local debate. In 1992, an unprecedented opportunity had opened up in 
the Northern Basque political landscape when the sub-prefect of Bayonne initiated a study 
of the local situation in which 500 local representatives took part. One year later, 
responding to the economic and cultural diagnosis established in the subsequent report 
“Pays Basque 2010”283, these personalities took positions on a series of questions that 
Basque nationalists had been alone in defending until then, notably acknowledging the 
role of local identity as a factor of development284. Consequently, the Council for 
Development (CDPB) and the Council of Elected Officials (CEPB) were created between 
1994 and 1995285. While the CDPB and CEPB hardly had any competences and 
essentially played a consultative role in the French politico-administrative system, they 
had provided the first democratic platform where all Basque actors could interact and
280 Enbata, Le nouveau droit linguistique vient d’Europe, 27 aout 1992 (1240)
281 Enbata, Oui a Maastricht, 10 Septembre 1992 (1242)
282 Enbata, Declaration d’EB du 6 Juin 1994, 8 Juin 1994 (1330)
283 CDPB, Pays Basque 2010, December 1993 (for a summary of the report, see 
http://www.lurraldea.net/bibliodocs/svnthese2010.pdf. accessed on 25 November 2008)
All the actors involved in "Pays Basque 2010" agreed on the following points: (1) the specificity 
and territorial unity of the French Basque Country was accepted, (2) the decision was taken to 
strengthen trans-border cooperation with the Spanish provinces, (3) the role of local identity as a 
factor of development was accepted, with the resolution to promote the Basque culture and 
Euskera; and (4) the demand was made for the establishment of mechanisms of representation 
for the French Basque Country (CDPB, Pays Basque 2010, December 1993 (for a summary of 
the report, see http://www.lurraldea.net/bibliodocs/svnthese2010.pdf. accessed on 25 November 
2008).
285 The CDPB brought together the great majority of the social, cultural, economic and political 
actors of the Northern Basque Country - including state representatives - in the view of drawing a 
development policy. The CEPB was constituted by the elected officials of the territory and had the 
decision-making capacity (Chaussier, 1996).
108
express their views. Through their involvement in the CDPB and CEPB, AB members 
were able to intervene in the local political debates and to make alliances with Basque 
economic and political actors outside of the nationalist circles.
In 1996, the CEPB voted for the adoption of a Territorial Planning Scheme 
proposed by the CDPB286. The Planning Scheme did not fully satisfy AB members, not 
least because it transformed the Basque Country into a “pays” -  an administrative concept 
of inter-communal cooperation287. The Councils struggled to set in motion the other 
proposals of the Planning Scheme, due to the lack of resources and funding allocated by 
the municipal, departmental and regional authorities288. For some, “Pays Basque 2010” 
had been the French government’s attempt to respond to -  and ultimately put an end to - 
demands for the institutionalisation of the Basque Country (Pierre, 2006)289. The opposite 
happened, in that “Pays Basque 2010" turned out to be a great opportunity for the 
Abertzale to mobilise the local elites around the demand for a Basque department290. 
Indeed, the development policies initiated by the state administration had paved the way 
for a more general discussion over the future of the Northern Basque Country. The 
Abertzale were not alone in demanding institutional recognition: since the 1970s, a 
growing number of economic and political actors also favoured the creation of a Basque 
department291. Their rationale was different: while the nationalists advocated the right of 
the Basque people to self-determination, these local elites saw it as a necessity for the 
development of the territory (Loyer, 2003). With “Pays Basque 2010", these two sectors - 
the Abertzale and the local elites also favouring the institutionalisation of the Basque 
Country -  could work together. Th rough their joint efforts, the idea of a Basque
286 The document envisioned the implementation of a comprehensive strategy for the economic 
development of the territory, both urban and rural, and the creation of a Council of the Basque 
Language, destined to enhance the preservation of Basque culture and language. CDPB,
Schema d’Amenagement et de Developpement du Pays Basque, 26 Octobre 1996 
(http://www.lurraldea.net/bibliodocs/schema.Ddf accessed 12 August 2008)
Without a territorial institution, AB questioned how the proposals of the Scheme would be 
implemented. Besides the institutional demand, the Abertzale had also made requests for the 
opening of a Chamber of Agriculture and of a local university, which had not been retained by the 
CDPB in the final document (Enbata, 31 Octobre 1996 (1449))
288 A "pays” has the capacity to promote development plans, but no powers to implement them. 
Hence, the role of implementing the policy remained in the hands of the municipal, departmental, 
regional and state institutions. Frustrated by the lack of response over the implementation of the 
development proposals, the President of the CDPB resigned, sending the local initiative into 
disarray. In fact, although the Planning Scheme was assumed by the three territorial instances 
(Department, Region and State), none of them was to concede -  until the end of 2000 -  sufficient 
funds to finance the programs.
289 The demand for the creation of a Basque department has existed since 1792, cyclically 
reasserted in 1836, 1945, 1963 and 1981. On this last occasion, Francois Mitterrand, then 
socialist candidate in the presidential elections, had incorporated the Basque department into its 
"110 Proposals for France” (http://www.psinfo.net/entretiens/mitterrand/110.html - accessed on 
24 November 2008). Once elected, the Socialist government however did not honour its electoral 
promise to the Basques, and the Basque department was not mentioned again in the 1982 
decentralisation reforms.
290 Interview Jean-Noel "Textx" Etcheverry, 11th September 2009
291 Interview Michel Berhocoirigoin, 3 September 2009.
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department had found wide support in the Basque local elites and even penetrated the 
most mainstream spheres of French politics292. On 30 October 1996, 63.7 percent of the 
Mayors of the Northern Basque Country voted in favour of the Basque department293. 
Despite the resistance of some high profile politicians294, the local political climate had 
never been more pro-department. On 3rd October 1997, a possible division of the 
department was even discussed in the General Council of Pyrenees Atlantiques. Under 
the impulse of Abertzaleen Batasuna, the mobilisation behind the development of the 
territory had transformed itself into a mobilisation for the institutionalisation of the Basque 
Country.
In this instance, AB had acted as a real “ethnic entrepreneur” according to De 
Winter and Tursan’s definition (1998:1). The Abertzale’s influence on the debates over the 
future of the Northern Basque Country had gone way beyond what would be expected 
from their electoral performance. While demanding territorial recognition, AB members 
had yet to officially agree on the political form that institutionalisation should take in the 
Basque Country. This was due to the variety of positions within AB: while many 
independent Abertzale pushed for a department, EB wanted the creation of a department- 
region and EMA opted for a full autonomous status295. Following a deep debate in 1997, 
AB members chose to assume the demand for a Basque department and to adopt a 
gradualist strategy in line with the French politico-administrative context. Abertzaleen 
Batasuna clearly defined a pro-department strategy based on three stages: (1) to place 
AB at the centre of the pro-department mobilisation; (2) to then generate a broad 
movement to socialise the demand, trying to achieve a social majority in favour of 
institutionalisation; and (3) to spread a dynamic of civil disobedience making it impossible
292 Following a public consultation -  whereby 76.14 percent of the Basque population declared 
itself in favour of the creation of a Basque department - MP Michel Inchauspe proposed an 
amendment for the creation of a region 3B (Basque Country, Bearn, Bigorre) and a department 
Pays Basque -Adour. The National Assembly refused the proposed amendment on 30 
November 1994, but it served to bring exposure to the institutional demand at the national level. 
Lionel Jospin, then candidate in the 1995 Presidential elections, declared himself in favour of the 
creation of a Basque department if the majority of elected officials demanded it. On 19 November 
1998, MP Inchauspe re-presented his institutional project and the National Assembly again voted 
against it. On 19 January 1999, he proposed an amendment to Article 19 of the Law 95 -115 of 4 
February 1995 relating to territorial planning and development, according to which a "pays” 
composed of more than 20 cantons should be granted the status of department. This amendment 
would have opened the way for the Basque department, but it was rejected by the National 
Assembly.
293 It should be noted that the mayors of the most important Basque cities (Bayonne, Biarritz, St 
Jean de Luz and Hendaye) did not participate in the vote.
294 A group of local politicians, led by MP and President of the Regional Council of Aquitaine 
Francois Bayrou and including the mayors of the largest Basque cities (Bayonne, Biarritz, Anglet), 
opposed the institutional demand on the ground that the Basque department would not be 
sustainable economically and insisted that the development policies should be differentiated from 
the institutional debate (Enbata, 31 October 1996 (1449)).
295 Interview Michel Berhocoirigoin, 3 September 2009.
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to maintain the status quo296. By focusing on the Basque department, AB had opted for a 
tactic of minimum demands adapted to its political weight and to the opportunity windows 
opening up in the local political scene297. From that point on, AB became the backbone of 
the broad coalition of political, economic, social and cultural actors in favour of 
institutionalisation. In the 1998 regional elections, AB centred its campaign on two major 
demands, the Basque department and an official status for the Basque language298. The 
electoral platform obtained 9.35 percent of the votes in the cantonal elections and 8.40 
percent in the regional elections, improving again its electoral performance299.
5.2.4. The “national construction” of the Basque Country
Shortly after, AB members Richard Irazutza and Merxte Colina participated in the 
drafting of the Lizarra-Garazi pact, which was signed on 12 September 1998 by the PNV, 
Herri Batasuna, EA and AB as well as 24 Basque political parties, trade unions and social 
movements300. Inspired by the success of the Irish peace process, Basque nationalists 
signed this joint declaration to set in motion a negotiation process with the Spanish and 
French governments301. The pact reasserted the demand for the creation of a Basque 
Country made of all its historic provinces currently in France and Spain, and stated: "the 
Basque question is an historical conflict of political nature within which both the Spanish 
and French states are involved. Its resolution will necessarily be political"302. Four days 
after the signature of the Lizarra-Garazi pact, ETA declared an unlimited truce to show its 
support to the peace process303. It was the first time that Basque nationalists from the 
North and from the South united to become one single political actor representing the 
whole Basque Country304. Although the Lizarra-Garazi initiative did not meet the expected
296 AB, Proposition de campagne soumise a I’approbation d’Abertzaleen Batasuna (lors de la 
prochaine assemblee generate de juin), 1998.
Interview Jean-Noel “Textx" Etcheverry, 11th September 2009
298 Enbata, 26 Fevrier 1998 (1516)
299 The alliance EA-PNB obtained 4 percent of the votes in the regional elections and did not take 
part in the cantonal elections.
Political parties: Abertzaleen Batasuna, Batzarre, EAJ-PNV, Eusko Alkartasuna, Herri 
Batasuna, Iniciativa Ciudadana Vasca, Ipar Euskal Herriko Berdeak, Izquierda Unida-Ezker 
Batua, Partido Carlista-EKA, Zutik. Trades unions: EHNE, ELA, ESK-CUIS, Euskal Laborarien 
Batzarra, Ezker Sindikala, Hiru, LAB, STEE-EILAS. Observers: CFDT. Social movements: 
Amnistiaren aldeko batzordea- Gestoras Pro, Amnistia, Anai Artea, Autodeterminazioaren 
Biltzarrak, Bakea orain, CAR/Ahaideak, Comite de defense de droits de I'homme en Pays 
Basque, Egizan, Elkarri, EPSK/Gureak, Gazteriak, Gernika Batzordea, Gogoa, Gurasoak, 
Hautetsi Abertzaleen Elkartea, Herria 2000 Eliza, Herriarekin, Jarrai, Presoen Aldeko, 
Koordinaketa, Senideak, Sostengu Komiteak, UDA-Trevino
301 They wished to follow the example of the Stormont Negotiation in Northern Ireland (1994- 
1998), and the Signature of the Agreement of Belfast (101 April 1998).
302 Enbata, 17 Septembre 1998 (1543)
303 Similarly, Iparretarak, which had re-emerged after years of silence with two highly publicised 
attacks in 1997, also declared a unilateral truce (IK Press Release, 2 June 1997
(http://mokoka.free.fr/info ik2.htm. accessed on 8 July 2008)).
*04 Enbata, 15 Octobre 1998 (1547)
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reaction from Madrid and Paris305, being part of this movement was significant for AB as a 
recognition of the platform’s role and presence in Iparralde.
Following on from the Lizarra-Garazi pact, the first trans-national political institution 
was set up in order to assert the existence of the Basque Country as a nation. On 18 
September 1999, an Assembly of Basque Mayors and Municipal Councillors, called 
Udalbiltza, was created with 2000 members from both sides of the French-Spanish border, 
including AB representatives. The constitution of a specific institution, without the 
presence of state parties, had been a symbolic way of defending an alternative political 
project for the entire Basque Country. As a trans-national institution, the Udalbiltza began 
promoting “joint work over and above the legal, political and administrative divisions 
imposed upon the Basque Country"306. Concretely, its task of promoting the “national 
construction” of the Basque Country has taken the form of organising and financing trans­
national projects all over the territory. However, divisions appeared in the Udalbiltza just a 
few months after its creation when ETA broke its self-declared truce307. Unlike other 
members, the PNV and EA representatives officially condemned the violence of ETA and 
have left the Udalbiltza to form their own assembly, called Udalbide. The two institutions 
have co-existed since then, although the Udalbiltza has experienced difficulties in the 
context of the prosecution and subsequent illegalisation of Herri Batasuna -  its most 
powerful member -  by Spanish authorities308. AB was forced by ETA’s resurgence to 
clarify its position on political violence. During an ad hoc assembly in September 2000, AB 
adopted a position on violence that could be referred to as “neither for, nor against” and 
indicated that it did not officially support ETA’s struggle309. It was the first time that AB 
members expressed a joint opinion on political violence, an issue which had so far been 
left aside as a matter of individual conscience. While seemingly unassuming, this position 
did not sit well with the most radical members of AB and caused tensions within the 
platform.
305 The Spanish government refused to engage the dialogue, responding with repression against 
Basque nationalists. In 1998, Herri Batasuna was vetoed by the Spanish judicial power, which 
took legal actions to forbid the different offspring of HB (the party nevertheless re-emerged under 
the name Euskal Herritarrok). As for the French authorities, they did not make an official 
response, thereby denying having any reason to take part in this development. Only the Socialist 
Party made a declaration to "emphasise that neither the territory, nor the citizens of the French 
Republic, were to feel concerned, in any way possible, by the events [of Lizarra-Garazi]” (Enbata, 
24 Septembre 1998(1544)).
306 http://www.udalbiltza.net/fr/node/582 (accessed on 5 August 2008)
307 ETA’s truce lasted a bit more than a year, until the organisation announced that it would 
resume its activity on 28 November 1999. IK also broke its truce in 2000 when it attacked a police 
station in Lecumberry and a holiday resort near Bayonne.
308 In May 2003, Judge Garzon suspended and confiscated the totality of the Basque Funds for 
Development and Cohesion created by the Udalbiltza, due to the relations of its members with 
ETA.
309 AB declared “having made the choice of using systematically and exclusively pacifist means in 
order to defend its claims", and that consequently "it was not, and would never be, the political 
front of any armed organisation”, for its objective was to “rise above this violence in order to find a 
political solution to the Basque conflict" (Enbata, 5 Octobre 2000 (1646)).
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With all of AB’s attention directed towards the pro-department mobilisation and the 
“national construction” of the Basque Country, Europe remained an issue of secondary 
importance for the Abertzale. To be sure, the sense of opportunity that AB derived from 
European integration invariably remained practical and down-to-earth: “Europe diminishes 
the significance of state borders dividing Euskal Herria, [it] has brought the same currency 
on our seven provinces, [it] makes possible for a Basque of French citizenship to 
participate and vote in the European and local elections in Spain and vice-versa”310. 
Beyond this, AB did not seem to perceive any European opportunity to serve its local 
mobilisation for the creation of a Basque department. Nor did it see the EU as an arena 
where to expose its minority nationalist demands311. Once more, AB declined taking part in 
the 1999 European elections, arguing that the single constituency in which these elections 
were held made its participation pointless and unnecessary312. In contrast, by making 
electoral alliances with other minority nationalist parties in Spain, the PNV and EA had 
managed to overcome the problem of the single constituency and ensure their 
representation in the European Parliament for more than a decade313. Due to its isolation 
from other minority nationalist movements in France and in Europe, such a strategy was 
not available to AB whose only option was to face the European ballots alone or not at all.
One aspect of European integration had however sparked interest among AB 
members: the new forms of cross-border cooperation emerging from the EU314. In the 
Abertzale’s view, “European integration, the emergence of a Basque autonomous 
authority in the South, the new consciousness of a collective identity project in the North: 
these three developments work together to radically modify the political and cultural 
context of trans-border relations”315. Several projects of cross-border cooperation had 
emerged since the 1980s, such as the Consorcio Bidassoa-Txingudi316, the Euro-city 
Bayonne-Donosti317 and the Euro-region Aquitaine-Euskadi-Navarre. In light of these 
initiatives, some AB members saw a possibility for the creation of a trans-border structure 
including the seven provinces of the Basque Country318. A motion for the Euro-region 
Euskal Herri was presented at AB’s 1998 annual meeting. The motion proposed that AB’s
310 Enbata, 25 mars 1999 (1570)
311 Except in June 1996, when EB and several organisations concerned with the treatment of 
Basque political prisoners demonstrated in Brussels, denouncing the oppression of the Basque 
people and asking for the recognition of Iparralde. The event did not have much of an impact, and 
was not reiterated.
312 Enbata, 1er avril 1999(1571)
313 In 1987, Carlos Garaikoetxea was elected for EA; in 1989, Garaikoetxea was re-elected, as 
well as Jon Gangoiti for the PNV; in 1994, Josu Jon Imaz won a seat for the PNV; in 1999, Josu 
Ortuondo represented the PNV while Gorka Knorr-Borras was elected for EA.
314 Interview Michel Berhocoirigoin, 3 September 2009.
315 Enbata, 27 Fevrier 1997 (1466)
316 Created in 1988 with the French town of Hendaye, and the Spanish cities of Irun and 
Fontarabie.
317 Created in 1993 with the province of Gipuzkoa in Spain, and the district of Bayonne-Anglet- 
Biarritz in France.
318 Enbata, 26 Fevrier 1998 (1516)
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long-term objective, once the Basque department was in place, became the creation of a 
Basque Euro-region. This Euro-region would ensure the representation of Basque 
interests in Brussels and would permit the establishment of a single electoral constituency 
for the election of Basque MEPs. As stated in the motion, “the Basque European 
institution will be a way to escape the context of the French state and to construct the 
Basque Country through the will of the Basque people only”319. In the end, however, the 
Euro-region motion was not adopted. Instead, a full autonomous status for the Northern 
Basque Country was voted as AB’s long-term political project. The majority of AB 
members felt it more important to concentrate on the short to medium term goals, such as 
the institutionalisation of the North, before envisaging the reunification of the Basque 
Country320. In addition, even in the event of the creation of a Basque department, the 
Euro-region project was perceived by many AB members as an “empty shell”321. Beyond 
getting funds from Brussels, Euro-regions do not have increased political capacity, nor do 
they offer the possibility to bypass the national level322. The competences of Euro-regions 
only go as far as those of the sub-national authorities part of it and these are limited to 
functional responsibilities in the French politico-administrative system. A Basque Euro- 
region would be submitted to the control of the state administration of the French and 
Spanish governments and these are likely to oppose it for fear of separatism. While the 
European question had been fully integrated to the PNV and EA’s political project -  both 
parties advocate a self-governed Basque Country in the EU - AB did not reformulate its 
demands in relation to the European level. Instead, the Abertzale focused on the 
achievement of the first step of institutional recognition, i.e. the creation of a Basque 
department.
5.2.5. The pro-department mobilisation in Iparralde
In the meantime, the pro-department mobilisation planned by Abertzaleen 
Batasuna had followed its course. The Lizarra-Garazi initiative had galvanised the 
population of the Basque Country and demonstrations were being held on both sides of 
the border323. On 30 January 1999, AB brought together 6,000 people on the streets of 
Bayonne to demonstrate in favour of the creation of a Basque department. A variety of 
local actors had united around AB to create a social movement called “The Appeal of the
319 Enbata, Motion construire I’Euro-region Euskal Herri, 15 Octobre 1998 (1547)
320 Enbata, Iparralde ficelee, 30 Septembre 1999 (1595); Interview with Jakes Abeberry, 3 
December 2007.
321 Interview with Jakes Borthayrou, 4 December 2007
322 Enbata, Vers I’Euro-region, 26 Fevrier 1998 (1516); Interview with Jakes Borthayrou, 4 
December 2007.
323 On 9th January 1999, a large demonstration was held in Bilbao to demand the return of 
Basque political prisoners to the Basque Country; on 4th April 1999, public gatherings took place 
all over the Basque Country to celebrate the Aberri Eguna, the Basque national day; on 21 May 
1999, the Basque trade unions ELA and LAB organised a general strike.
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100”. The movement was made up of representatives of the majority of the political 
formations (AB, UDF, RPR, PS, Greens), economic groups (Chamber of Commerce, 
worker and agricultural unions) and all of the cultural associations in Iparralde. By then, 
the Abertzale had become the reference point of the institutional demand in the public eye, 
despite the fact that such demand was supported by a whole set of non-nationalist actors. 
The dynamic started by AB culminated in the biggest demonstration held in the streets of 
Bayonne since the end of the Second World War: on 9 October 1999, 13,000 people 
demanded a department for the Basque Country. A survey was published at that time, 
indicating that 67% of the population of the Northern Basque Country favoured the 
creation of a new department324. Despite the massive demonstration called by “The 
Appeal of the 100”, the French government did not respond to the demand for the creation 
of a Basque department325. Following AB’s plan, the movement then radicalised its 
positions to the point of setting in motion a strategy of mass civil disobedience. The activity 
of civil disobedience was taken up by another organization, the group Demokrazia Euskal 
Herria-rentzat, also called the Demo. The Demo’s actions included the theft of the seats of 
the 21 Basque elected councillors of the General Council of the Pyrenees-Atlantiques, the 
“kidnapping” of two dozen Mariannes, the replacement of monolingual traffic signs by 
bilingual ones326. These were meant as challenges to the French authorities triggering 
solidarity around the demand for a Basque department (Ahedo, 2004).
At the end of 2000, the French state attempted to retake the initiative following its 
rejection of Basque institutionalisation. A Specific Convention was signed by the State, the 
Region, the Department, the Council of Elected Officials and the Bayonne-Anglet-Biarritz 
area. Four hundred million euros were granted to the Council for Development for setting 
the Planning Scheme proposals underway327. Five years after its creation, a period of self- 
government finally started for the CDPB enabling the implementation of the development 
policies voted by the CEPB, such as the creation of a Council for the Basque Language in 
July 2001. However, tensions arose in the CDPB when it emerged that the demand for the 
creation of a Basque department would not be considered in the debates on
324 Exclusive Survey CSA, Sud Ouest, 29th August 1999
325 Ministry of the Interior Jean-Pierre Chevenement expressed its entire disagreement with the 
idea of a Basque department during a meeting with his Spanish counterpart, Jaime Mayor Oreja, 
on 5 March 1999.
326 The General Council of the department Pyrenees-Atlantiques brings together 52 councillors, of 
whom 21 are elected in Basque cantons and the rest in Bearn. By stealing the 21 seats, the 
Demo intended to constitute the seats of the Basque institution that is demanded. The bust of 
Marianne occupies a place of honour in all the mayors’ offices of France, as it is the symbol of the 
French Republic. When the Demo stole these busts, this was an attempt to symbolize that the 
democratic values represented by Marianne have been kidnapped. Finally, the Planning Scheme 
of the French Basque Country was favourable to traffic signs being translated into Euskera.
Facing the lack of progress, the Demo
changed the monolingual French signs into bilingual ones in French and Euskera (Demo, 2002; 
Ahedo, 2004).
327 Specific Convention Basque Country, 22 December 2000 
(http://www.lurraldea.net/bibliodocs/conv-SDedecQ1.pdf accessed on 6 August 2008)
115
decentralisation opened by the Raffarin government. Soon after, some members led by 
AB proposed a motion threatening to dissolve the Council if the department was not 
created328. The Council chose not to follow AB and the motion was rejected, although the 
CDPB 2003 report deplored “the lack of an institutional perspective [which] could 
undermine the Council’s efforts for the development of the Basque Country”329. From that 
point, however, the pro-department mobilisation started by AB showed signs of slowing 
down, in the sense that its high-profile supporters appeared less widespread in the 
Basque political spectrum. Furthermore, the idea of a Basque department encountered 
strong resistance in the French government, which was under pressure from Spanish 
authorities not to encourage the national construction of the Basque Country with an 
institutional reform (Pierre, 2006). In that respect, AB’s two main goals -  the national 
construction of the Basque Country and the creation of a Basque department -  were 
incompatible in strategic terms.
Meanwhile, AB had made its electoral breakthrough in the 2001 cantonal and 
municipal elections330. The Abertzale were now represented in the councils of the three 
largest Basque cities: Biarritz, Bayonne and Anglet, and for the first time, a member of AB 
had obtained a seat in the general council of Pyrenees-Atlantiques331. AB members had 
become unavoidable on the Basque political scene, but developments from the South 
were creating divisions within the Northern Basque nationalist movement. In May 2000, 
the Batasuna process had been initiated by Euskal Herritarrok - the organisation that had 
replaced Herri Batasuna after its dissolution by Spanish authorities - in order to create 
unity among all the leftist Basque nationalist parties on both sides of the border. The 
Batasuna process conceived the Basque nationalist struggle as a whole: “one party, one 
strategy, one territory, one political movement”332. Some AB members started taking part 
in the debates but the majority urged Euskal Herritarrok to suspend the process in their 
territory. AB was preparing for the 2001 municipal elections at the time and its members 
asked for the Batasuna process to be delayed until after the elections. The process was 
not suspended but AB rejected the proposal for its integration in the organisation that had 
emerged from Euskal Herritarrok: Batasuna. On the general assembly of 6 October 2001, 
two thirds of AB members adopted the “Motion of the 80" refusing the single strategy 
promoted by the Batasuna process on the grounds that it overlooked the specificity of the
328 Interview Jakes Abeberry, 3rd December 2007
329 CDPB, Le Pays Basque a mi-parcours entre 1992 et 2010, 13 February 2003, p.67 
(http://www.lurraldea.net/bibliodocs/rapportPB2002.Ddf accessed 6 August 2008)
Across the historic Basque Country, AB won 10.21 percent of the votes in the cantonal 
elections, while EA-lparralde got 0.61 percent and the PNB 1.18 percent.
331 With 44.11 percent of the votes in the second round of the cantonal elections, Jean-Michel 
Galant has been elected in the district of St Etienne de Baigorri.
332 Batasuna, Party Manifesto, 2001.
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Northern Basque Country333. The “Motion of the 80” also called for AB to become the main 
political party of the Northern Basque movement. In the last years, AB had overcome 
many internal differences by reaching a consensus on the questions of violence and of 
territorial institutionalisation. AB had developed its own political project tailored to the 
socio-political context of Iparralde and a strategy adapted to the territory’s needs and 
possibilities. In that sense, AB’s transformation into a political party, almost 10 years after 
its creation as a political platform, was a natural progression. It however provoked a 
scission, with the third of AB members leaving to join Batasuna.
The departure of its most radical members enabled AB to take a firmer stance on 
the armed struggle, by stating that the end of political violence was a necessary first step 
for the political resolution of the Basque conflict and calling for an immediate truce from 
ETA334. ABthen tried to reassume its role at the centre of the pro-department movement, 
together with other sectors favouring institutionalisation. New demonstrations were 
organised in the streets of Bayonne to challenge the uncompromising stance of the 
government but their intensity decreased a bit more each time335. Hoping to take 
advantage of the decentralisation debates started by new Prime Minister Raffarin, AB 
created the Batera platform. Composed of five economic, political and cultural 
associations336, Batera concentrated on four demands for the Northern Basque Country: 
the creation of a department, a chamber of agriculture, a university and the co- 
officialisation of the Basque language337. In January 2004, bearing in mind the state’s 
rejection of these demands, Batera defined a new line of work based on holding a 
referendum on the department question338 and a strategy of civil disobedience through the 
formation of a Basque Chamber of Agriculture in 2005339. However, institutional demands 
for the Northern Basque Country, once backed up by a wide range of Basque actors, 
seemed to have fallen back into isolation340. Tellingly, the new Planning Scheme adopted 
in 2006 by the CEPB has emphasised the idea of governance and stayed clear of any
333 Enbata, 13 Septembre 2001 (1693); Interview Jean-Noel "Textx" Etcheverry, 11th September 
2009
334 Enbata, 11 octobre 2001 (1697)
335 On 1st February 2003, 7000 persons demonstrated for the creation of a Basque department, 
but on 21st June 2003, AB only managed to gather 500 persons.
336 The Association for a Basque Department, the Association of Elected Officials, Euskal 
Konfederazioa, the ELB trade union, and the University Collective. The Batera platform is 
presided by AB.
37 http://www.batera.info/article-5617940.html (accessed on 8 August 2008)
338 Batera’s plan is to gather 46 000 signatures from the inhabitants of the department Pyrenees- 
Atlantiques , corresponding to the 10 percent of the population required by the decentralisation 
laws of 2004 for the General Council to organise a referendum. The campaign has started in May 
2006, and to date, almost 35 000 signatures have been collected.
339 Created on 15 January 2005, Euskal Herriko Lanborantza Ganbara provides legal consultancy 
to Basque farmers and expertise on local environmental projects.
340 Abertzaleen Batasuna, 1995-2005-2015 : dix ans de gagn6s, dix ans & gagner, 2005.
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mention of the institutionalisation of the Basque Country341. The window of opportunity, 
which had previously enabled AB to gather a momentum around the demand for a Basque 
department, had been closed342.
5.2.6. The beginning o f a European dimension for AB?
From 2002 onwards, European references had become more frequent in the 
discourse of AB, which showed interest in the regional dimension of European integration 
and the opportunities opening up through the principle of subsidiarity343. The party had 
also turned its attention to the structural funds and highlighted the necessity to bypass the 
national level in the management of European funding344. While these remained discursive 
considerations, AB seemed to renew with the Europeanist vision laid out in the original 
project of the Charter of Itxassou345. The Green Party approached AB in order to gain the 
Abertzale’s support for the 2004 European elections. As part of an agreement with the 
federation Solidarity Region-People (R&PS), Green leader Gerard Onesta had planned to 
have minority nationalist representatives featuring in high positions on his list. Although AB 
was not part of R&PS - and EA-lparralde and the PNB were members of the federation - 
Onesta offered the third position on his list to AB member Gorka Torre346. This could be 
seen as a point of rupture with AB’s previously isolationist policy preventing electoral 
alliances outside of the Basque nationalist movement. AB’s collaboration with the Greens 
was not an easy step for the party347, which faced a great deal of criticism from Batasuna. 
The latter had counted on AB’s support for the list it presented under the name Herritarren 
Zerrenda in France -  following its ban from Spanish authorities, Batasuna could not 
participate in European elections in Spain348. Yet, AB felt there was enough programmatic
341 The CDPB and CEPB started the "Pays Basque 2020” initiative, bringing together all the local 
actors in the view of re-actualising the Planning Scheme for the development of the Basque 
Country. The resulting document identified four areas where the attention of the CDPB was 
required: employment, transports, academic research and healthcare. Lurraldea, Pays Basque 
2020, Acte II du Projet de Territoire, 8 Juillet 2006
(http://www.lurraldea.net/bibliodocs/PB 2020 note 5 defis forum.pdf accessed 15 August 2008) 
The new CEPB President was Jean-Jacques Lasserre has been firmly opposed to the 
creation of a Basque department. Abertzaleen Batasuna, Pays Basque 2020 et Signature du 
Contrat Territorial: le point de vue d'AB, 24 Juin 2006 (http://www.abertzaleen- 
batasuna.com/article-20728676.html accessed on 15 August 2008); Interview Jean-Noel “Textx” 
Etcheverry, 11tn September 2009
343 Enbata, 31 Janvier 2002 (1713)
344 Enbata, 12 Septembre 2002 (1743)
345 Enbata, 29 Avril 2004 (1826)
346 Interview Jakes Borthayrou, 4 December 2007
347 Interview Michel Berhocoirigoin, 3 September 2009; Interview Jean-Noel "Textx” Etcheverry, 11th 
September 2009
348 Batasuna candidates in Spain campaigned for using the French list also in Spain, to be 
counted as null vote. There were more than 98,000 null votes in the Basque Autonomous 
Country and more than 15,000 in Navarre. Batasuna leaders interpreted the high rate of null 
votes, which was 12% of the total, as a sign that most of the nulls were for the Herritarren 
Zerrenda list, since the null vote was less than 1% in the previous European elections.
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proximity with the Greens to make a tactical alliance349. Onesta had agreed to take on 
several of AB demands, such as the creation of a Basque electoral constituency going 
across the border, the recognition of the political nature of the Basque conflict and of the 
Basque people’s right to self-determination350. AB’s decision to take part in the 2004 
European elections was also related to a change in the electoral constituencies351. These 
elections were not held with France as a single constituency anymore but with 8 electoral 
constituencies. In the view of the party leaders, this change made AB’s participation much 
more relevant and worthwhile. Disappointing results did not however permit the Green list 
to obtain more than one seat in the European Parliament, for Gerard Onesta352. Still, the 
2004 European elections triggered a new external orientation for AB, which soon after 
gained observer status within the federation Solidarity Region-People353.
In 2004, a change in the mode of scrutiny for regional elections (the threshold for 
representation went from 5 to 10 percent) made AB decide to compete only in the 
cantonal elections. AB’s limited resources did not enable the party to campaign in all 
European, regional and cantonal elections in a single year and this must have played a 
role in this decision. Publically though, AB was consistent with its electoral strategy 
dictating that the party would only participate in an election if it had a chance of gaining 
representation. However, AB started feeling the electoral impact of the scission and the 
competition of new rival Batasuna354. The Northern Basque Country was the only field of 
action left to Batasuna since it had been made illegal in Spain355 and the party deployed 
considerable resources to campaign in French elections. In the cantons constitutive of the 
Basque Country, AB obtained 7.42 percent -  it had gone abovelO percent in the last 
cantonal elections - Batasuna managed to obtain 3.57 percent, while EA was far behind 
with 0.3 percent and the PNB did not take part in the elections. It is in the context of this 
electoral decrease that a new challenge presented itself to AB: the referendum on the 
European Constitution. AB found itself profoundly divided over the issue between those 
rejecting the proposed Constitution on the grounds of the party’s leftist ideology356 and 
those supporting the document as an imperfect but overall positive development357. 
Interestingly, the split mirrored the positions of EMA and EB respectively on the Maastricht
349 Interview Michel Berhocoirigoin, 3 September 2009; Interview Jean-Noel “Textx” Etcheverry, 11th 
September 2009
350 Interview Peio Etcheverry-Ainchart, 4 December 2007; Interview Jakes Borthayrou, 4 
December 2007.
351 Interview Peio Etcheverry-Ainchart, 4 December 2007.
352 The Green list obtained 7.4% of the votes.
353 AB was given the status of observer at the R&PS General Assembly of 24 August 2005.
354 The loss to Batasuna of Jean-Pierre Iriart, a local personality with a strong electoral base in 
the canton of Tardets-Sorholus, was particularly significant for AB.
355 In March 2003, the Spanish Supreme Court ordered the dissolution of Batasuna, on the basis 
of the Constitutional Amendment of June 2002 against political organisations associated to 
terrorism (Organic Law on Political Parties, 2002, 12756).
356 AB, Konstituzioari Ez, 2004
357 AB, Konstituzioari Bai, 2004
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Treaty, suggesting that AB members had in fact never reached a consensus on the EU. 
These internal divergences could at least partly explain the lack of a European dimension 
in AB’s mobilisation. An internal referendum was organised on the European Constitution 
during which the “no” votes won by a short majority358. Party leaders decided that these 
results were not clear cut enough for AB to take a position on the European Constitution 
and therefore did not give voting instructions to its members. With the scission fresh in the 
minds of AB members, no risk was taken to create further divisions within the party359. 
Still, the fact that the European Constitution was deemed important enough to organise an 
internal debate indicated that European integration had gained prominence within the 
activity of AB.
In the meantime, AB had been associated with the re-launch of the peace process 
in the Southern Basque Country. The Basque President, PNV Juan Jose Ibarretxe, had 
proposed a radical change in the relationship between Spain and the Autonomous 
Community of the Basque Country (CAPV) under a new formula of “free association”360. 
From the start, AB was not supportive of what it saw as the PNV trying to take credit for 
the process started with the Lizarra-Garazi declaration361. Like most Basque nationalists, 
AB perceived the Ibarrexte plan as an attempt to increase the competences of the Basque 
government - and therefore the power of the PNV in charge of it - rather than a basis for 
the resolution of the Basque conflict362. Criticism also came from the fact that the Ibarrexte 
plan was focused essentially on the CAPV, and not on the historic Basque Country. 
Iparralde was only briefly mentioned in Article 7 in the context of cross-border cooperation, 
without any provision for its institutionalisation363. On 1st February 2005, the proposal was
358 Interview with Peio Etcheverry-Ainchart, 4 December 2007
359 Interview with Peio Etcheverry-Ainchart, 4 December 2007
360 The new Political statute of the Community of the Basque Country, also called Ibarretxe Plan, 
would extend the powers of the Basque government and give it more autonomy in relation to EU 
matters (Basque Parliament, Political Statute of the Community of the Basque Country, 30 
December 2004). The proposed constitutional reform was approved by the Basque Parliament on 
30 December 2004, in the view to be sent to the Spanish Parliament.
(http://www.nuevoestatutodeeuskadi.net/docs/dictamencomision20122004 eng.pdf accessed on 
12 August 2008)
361 Interview Gorka Torre, April 2005 (http://www.onesta.net/theme1-texte33.html accessed on 13 
August 2008)
362 AB, Reel espoir ou simple illusion, 12 October 2007 (http://www.abertzaleen- 
batasuna.com/article-7177617.html accessed on 13 August 2008)
3w “Article 7 - Relations with the Basque Territories of Iparralde: 1. Basque institutions shall give 
priority to the relations with the Basque territories of Iparralde, and for this purpose, within the 
framework of the European Union, measures shall be taken to bring about the signature of any 
agreements and treaties that may be necessary so that the Basque Territories and Communities 
located on both sides of the Pyrenees may make use, in the widest and most extensive manner 
possible, of the potential offered by current or future regulations on cross-border co-operation in 
order to strengthen the special historical, social and cultural ties between the Community of the 
Basque Country and the Basque Territories & Communities located within the French State, 
including the capacity to establish instruments of co-operation at a municipal and territorial level, 
based on a respect for the wishes of their respective citizens; 2. Within the framework of the 
provisions of this article, the Community of the Basque Country shall foster the operations of a 
collaborating body with other Basque territories located within the French State, as well as with
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rejected by a large majority in the Spanish Parliament364, putting an end to the initiative of 
the PNV. Soon after, Basque nationalist parties responded to what they considered an 
attempt by the PNV to highjack the Basque peace process. Batasuna, EA and AB, as well 
as fifty other organisations, signed a Basic Democratic Agreement (BDA) for Conflict 
Resolution in the Basque Country, according to which "All citizens in the whole of the 
Basque Country must be consulted on the future of the Basque Country through 
whichever procedure the parties agree"365. The BDA was a reiteration of the fact that the 
solution to the Basque conflict could only be found with the involvement of all Basque 
political parties on both sides of the French-Spanish border, and the participation of AB in 
this initiative confirmed its role as the main actor of the national construction in 
Iparralde366.
In May 2005, Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero made an unprecedented offer of 
peace talks with ETA, conditional upon a complete end of violence. ETA took 10 months 
to respond to Zapatero’s offer and eventually declared a “permanent ceasefire” in March 
2006367, thereby launching the negotiations368. Despite ETA's demand that talks took place 
with both Spain and France, only the Spanish government accepted to sit at the 
negotiation table. AB was de facto excluded from the negotiations, but the party was able 
to use the contacts it had established at the European level - in the form of MEP and Vice- 
President of the European Parliament, Gerard Onesta -  to support the Basque peace 
process. AB had negotiated a number of points with Onesta in the context of the 2004 
European elections, including the promotion of the Basque peace process. Accordingly, 
MEP Onesta sponsored a public hearing in the European Parliament on 30 November 
2005, where the BDA was presented. Following this public hearing, 12 MEPs supportive of 
the Basque peace process formed a Friendship Association to examine ways in which the 
European Parliament could assist the resolution of the conflict in the Basque Country369. 
This led to the adoption by the European Parliament of a Resolution supporting the peace
the Autonomous Community of Navarre, which shall attend to the common requirements of all the 
Basque people”, Basque Parliament, Political Statute of the Community of the Basque Country,
30 December 2004.
364 313 votes against (PSOE, PP, United Left (Spain), Canary Coalition and CHA), 29 votes in 
favour (PNV, ERC, CiU, EA, Na-Bai and BNG) and 2 abstentions (IC-V)
365 Oinarrizko Hitzarmen Demokratikoa, 5th March 2005.
366 Abertzaleen Batasuna, 1995-2005-2015 : dix ans de gagn6s, dix ans ci gagner, 2005.
367 Declaration of ETA, Euskal Herria, 22 March 2006
(http://news.bbc.co.Uk/1/hi/world/euroDe/4833490.stm accessed on 12 August 2008)
The peace talks were planned as a two track process: in the first track, ETA and the Spanish 
government would discuss the organisation’s disarmament and prisoners’ situation; in the second 
track, all the Basque nationalist parties would be invited to discuss the future of the Basque 
Country.
369 The Friendship Association members are Gerard Onesta (vice president of the parliament), 
Bernat Joan i Mari (Catalan), Alyn Smith (Scottish), Bart Staes (Belgium), Ian Hudghton 
(Scottish), Jill Evans (Wales), Tatjana Zdanoka (Latvian), Jonas Sjostedt (Swedish), Erik Meijer 
(Dutch), Helmuth Markov (German) and the Sinn F6in MEP Bairbre de Brun.
121
process in the Basque Country370. The negotiation process collapsed just a few months 
later, when ETA attacked Madrid airport on 30 December 2006. Still, the Abertzale had 
been in a position to measure the strategic resources that could be derived from its 
alliance with Green MEP Onesta. Not only had it enabled AB to play a role in the Basque 
peace process, but it had also involved France in this process, if only symbolically and 
indirectly -  this was a real achievement for Northern Basque nationalism.
5.3. Summary of European responses
What emerges from this survey of AB’s activity since the 1980s is that Europe has 
remained an issue of secondary importance for Northern Basque nationalists. Unlike what 
had been hypothesised in chapter one based on the Basque trans-border identity, the 
Abertzale have not changed their demands and long-term political project in relation to the 
European level. This is in stark contrast to the European response of Southern Basque 
nationalism, which has evolved towards the idea of an independent and reunified Basque 
Country as a result of the entry of Spain to the EU. The arrival of EA and the PNV on the 
Northern Basque political scene has however prompted the Abertzale to take a closer look 
at the possibilities emerging from European integration. More than a real sense of 
opportunity, it seems that the Abertzale’s interest in Europe has grown out of the 
European themes used by EA and the PNV in their campaigns for French local elections. 
Yet, Europe has never gained prominence in the core discourse and activity of AB, whose 
support for European integration has mainly revolved around its potential to undermine 
French sovereignty.
What can explain this limited interest in European developments? First, the lack of 
organisation of the Northern Basque nationalist movement has to be taken into account. 
This chapter has illustrated the process of maturation undergone by Northern Basque 
nationalism in the last three decades, during which the Abertzale have distanced 
themselves from the shadow of IK’s violence to emerge as democratic and legitimate 
actors in local politics. They still remain so far from their aim of self-determination that their 
demands and positions have appeared unclear at times. For now, AB’s mobilisation is 
better conceived as an ongoing evaluation of the best strategy to achieve the first step of 
institutional recognition in the French context. Through its evolution, AB has not only 
moderated and adjusted its nationalist propositions, but also progressively come to realise 
the resources to be derived from other levels of government, such as the EU, for its 
mobilisation.
370 EP, Resolution on the Peace Process in Spain, B6 0527/2006, adopted on 25 October 2006.
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Second, if the formulation of a European position has seemed more problematic 
than in the Corsican and Breton cases, it is also due to internal divisions on the subject. 
Abertzaleen Batasuna has brought together a number of heterogeneous ideological 
tendencies within a single partisan framework. Ideological differences between more 
“nationalist” or more “socialist” interpretations of European integration can be identified. 
These have prevented the formulation of a common position in the referenda on the 
Maastricht Treaty and the European Constitution. Disagreements on the question of 
political violence have also hindered the development of AB’s European dimension by 
limiting its prospect for party cooperation. The historical links existing between the 
Northern Basque nationalist movement and Herri Batasuna have delayed a strict 
condemnation of ETA. While the Abertzale had long reached a consensus against IK, their 
reluctance to condemn ETA’s struggle has resulted in their isolation within minority 
nationalist parties in France and in Europe. AB has recently clarified its position -  by 
calling for a truce from ETA -  and this has coincided with increased party cooperation in 
the R&PS federation.
Lastly, the lack of institutionalisation has arguably reduced the significance of 
European opportunities-especially cross-border cooperation - for AB’s mobilisation. More 
than France and Spain’s fear of secessionism, cross-border cooperation has primarily 
been constrained by the huge institutional gap between Basque territories on both sides of 
the border. Building a Euro-region representative of the historic Basque Country simply 
cannot be done without the creation of a Basque department. The lack of institutional 
recognition has also meant that European integration was not a concrete reality in 
Northern Basque politics. Basque political actors have not been involved in the EU 
Regional Policy and structural funds have been exclusively managed at the level of the 
Aquitaine region. European integration has therefore rarely entered the sphere where the 
Abertzale mobilise, beyond key moments such as the Maastricht Treaty, the Euro or the 
European Constitution.
AB’s 2004 alliance with the Green Party, renewed in the 2009 European elections, 
could be seen as the sign of a new direction for the party. Admittedly, the strategies of civil 
disobedience and mass mobilisation have done little to put forward the demand for a 
Basque department to the French government. In its constant assessment of the 
resources available for its mobilisation, AB has started considering the strategic resources 
emerging from European integration. Without the creation of a Basque institution -  
necessary pathway to higher levels of government, including the EU - it is however 
unlikely that Northern Basque nationalists will derive as much benefit from Europe as the 
Corsican UPC or the Breton UDB, as we will see in the next chapter.
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Chapter 6 -  The Union Democratique Bretonne
This chapter analyses the significance of European integration for Breton 
nationalist parties by looking at the Union Democratique Bretonne (UDB). It starts with a 
brief overview of the Breton nationalist movement, establishing the UDB as the main 
nationalist actor in Brittany, and then goes on to survey party activity since the 1980s. 
Arguably more articulate than the two other political parties included in this study, the UDB 
has devised a European policy addressing the political, economic and social implications 
of European integration for Brittany. Over the years, the UDB has strengthened the 
European dimension of its political agenda and the defence of Breton interests in the EU 
has become central to its mobilisation. Breton nationalists not only aligned their demands 
with the European level but also gained a certain European expertise among the regional 
elites, which subsequently helped them to infuse their autonomist ideas into the regional 
political debate. After the UPC’s pragmatism with regards to the EU, and AB’s lack of 
interest for European matters, the UDB provides an example of the successful use of 
Europe as a strategy for local mobilisation.
6.1. The Breton nationalist movement
The Breton nationalist movement emerged at the beginning of the 20th century, but 
it was only in 1931 that it found its first political expression in the Parti National Breton 
(PNB). The party however remained on the political fringe and was largely discredited 
after some of its members collaborated with German occupation forces and the Vichy 
government during WW2, hoping for the creation of an independent Breton state (Lynch, 
1996:88; Rogers, 1990:68). In 1951, while Breton nationalism seemed to have arrived at a 
dead end, a group of mayors created the Comite d’Etudes et de Liaison des Interets 
Bretons (CELIB), an apolitical organisation promoting regional economic development in 
Brittany. This initiative turned out to be a great success and the CELIB became a 
pioneering organisation in the field of regional development in France (Martray, 1983). 
Some of its members decided to pursue the CELIB’s economic claims on political 
grounds. This led to the creation of the Mouvement pour (’Organisation de la Bretagne 
(MOB) in 1957 and the Union Democratique Bretonne (UDB) in 1964. While the MOB did 
not survive the disappearance of the CELIB, made redundant by the first decentralisation 
measures in France, the UDB grew to become the main political party of the Breton 
nationalist movement. On the basis of the “national vocation” of the Breton people, the 
UDB saw Brittany’s autonomy as a necessity to rise above its current cultural and 
economic under-development (Pasquier, 2006:90). Building on the idea that Brittany was
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essentially a colony, the UDB made internal colonialism a cornerstone of its 
mobilisation371. Placing the experience of the Breton people in the context of colonial 
domination facilitated the convergence between the idea of national liberation and the 
concept of social class (Rogers, 1990:70-71). This was important because it enabled the 
UDB to establish Breton nationalism as a political phenomenon of the Left.
A more radical tendency also appeared within the Breton nationalist movement in 
the 1960s. Initially, two clandestine organisations fighting for Brittany’s independence 
emerged, namely the Front de Liberation de la Bretagne (FLB) and the Armee 
Republicaine Bretonne (ARB). These two military structures merged in 1968 to form the 
FLB-ARB, but their action has ceased at the beginning of the 1980s372. In 1983, a support 
group for political prisoners from the FLB founded Emgann-MGI, a political party 
demanding the creation of an independent “socialist Breton state” and linked to another 
clandestine organisation, the Armee Revolutionnaire Bretonne373. Emgann-MGI has 
however had limited electoral results, mainly due to its constant refusal to form political 
alliances with non-nationalist parties374, and the party has not participated in local 
elections since 2000 (Dominici, 2005:102). While the two parties have collaborated at 
times, Emgann-MGI has conflicting relations with the UDB (Crettiez & Sommier, 2002:64). 
Disagreements have come essentially from the UDB’s vocal condemnation of the actions 
led by the FLB and the FLB-ARB, which it has always regarded as irresponsible and 
counter-productive (Rogers, 1990:72).
Over the years, several nationalist parties have come to challenge the UDB’s 
leadership on the Breton nationalist movement, without success. In 1982, the Parti pour 
I’Organisation d’une Bretagne Libre (POBL) was created as a “more clearly nationalist" 
alternative to the UDB. “Neither right-wing, nor left-wing, but Breton”375, the POBL 
advocates the right to self-determination of the Breton nation and demands the 
independence of Brittany in a federal Europe376. While the party has existed for more than 
twenty years, with only 100 members, its electoral presence remains marginal. In addition, 
the POBL has evolved towards the right end of the political spectrum, which has left the 
party isolated in a predominantly leftist Breton nationalist movement. A scission appeared
371 UDB, Bretagne = Colonie, Quimper: Imprimerie Cornouaillaise, 1972.
372 The FLB-ARB claimed more than 120 terrorist attacks between 1971 and 1980, and 1 failed 
attack in 1999.
373 Created in 1971, the Armee Revolutionnaire Bretonne claimed a series of terrorist attacks 
between 1998 and 2000. Emgann’s former spokesperson, Gael Roblin, was arrested following a 
terrorist attack in the Mac Donald of Quevert on 9th April 2000, which led to the death of one of 
the restaurant’s employee, but was eventually released. The Armee Revolutionnaire Bretonne is 
also suspected to have participated in the theft of 8.5 tonnes of dynamite by ETA in Plevin 
(Brittany) on 19th September 1999.
74 With the exception of the 1986 regional elections, when Emgann joined forces with the UDB 
and other leftist parties.
375 L’avenir de la Bretagne 21, December 1982.
376 The POBL bases its claims on the 1532 Union Treaty which granted a right to autonomy to the 
Breton nation.
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in 2000 when a few members left the party to create an extreme right organisation, Adsao. 
The POBL has since then transformed itself into a social movement named “POBL evit 
Breizh Dizalc’h", or “POBL for a Free Brittany”. In addition, the UDB’s difficult relationship 
with the Socialists in the 1980s led to the departure of some of the party’s members and 
the formation of another Breton nationalist party in 1986, Frankiz-Breizh (FB, Freedom 
Brittany)377. FB only ever had a few municipally elected officials, mainly in municipalities 
around Brest, and always remained close to the UDB, both in its goals and strategies. The 
parties have formed several electoral alliances, even conducting joint electoral campaigns,
r
until FB recently decided to merge back into the UDB. Finally, the latest addition to the 
Breton nationalist movement is the Parti Breton, which was created by members of the 
Breton diaspora in 2000. Advocating the self-determination of the Breton nation in Europe 
and modelling itself on the SNP and Plaid Cymru, the Parti Breton has so far had a limited 
audience and has only recently started participating in elections378.
The UDB is currently the only Breton political party with political representation at 
the municipal, departmental and regional levels of government. Perhaps the most 
important part of the UDB’s programme is the rejection of the administrative boundaries 
established by the French government. The party demands the reunification of Brittany, 
that is the return of the department Loire Atlantique, currently part of the region Pays de la 
Loire, to the historical Breton region. The second article of the party’s charter declares that 
“the UDB acts in the whole of Brittany and fights for its administrative reunification”379. 
Interestingly, this statement is reflected in the electoral activity of the UDB, in that the party 
has not limited itself to the Breton administrative region but contested seats in the five 
departments constitutive of historic Brittany380. The UDB has always placed more 
importance in its territorial presence than its electoral success (Miodownik & Cartrite, 
2006). Basing its influence on its support at the grassroots level and representation in 
most municipal councils, it is only in the 2004 elections that Breton nationalists succeeded 
in gaining access to the Breton council.
377 Frankizh-Breizh (FB), meaning Liberte Bretagne, only had a few municipal elected officials, 
mainly in municipalities around Brest. FB always remained close to the UDB, both in its goals and 
strategies, and formed electoral alliances with the party until recently, when FB decided to merge 
back into the UDB.
378 The Parti Breton presented 2 candidates in the 2004-2005 cantonal elections, 4 candidates in 
the 2007 legislative elections and 20 candidates in the 2008 municipal elections.
379 UDB, Charte d’adh6sion adoptee le 29 avril 2000 a Ploemeur / Planvour, p.1
380 In the 1993 legislative elections, the UDB has put forward candidates in three of the ten seats 
in the department of Loire Atlantique, officially part of the Pays de la Loire region, while not 
contesting any of the seats in the department of Cotes d’Armor, part of the Bretagne region.
Since then, the UDB has progressively increased its footprints both in the four departments in the 
Bretagne region as well as in Loire-Atlantique, contesting all 36 seats in the 2007 elections.
126
6.2. The Union Democratique Bretonne
6.2.1. Up to 1986: “Brittany = Colony"
A concern for Europe has always been present in the Breton nationalist movement. 
Already, in 1929, Maurice Duhamel, member of the PNB, published “The Breton Question 
in a European Context”, revealing a surprisingly modern outlook on the future of Europe 
as a “federation of nations and not of states” (Nicolas, 2006:297). Hence, unlike the 
Corsican and Basque cases, the UDB developed a clear set of positions with regards to 
European integration ever since its creation in 1964. Europe was directly included in the 
core discourse of the party, whose founding statement contained a commitment to the 
federal integration of European peoples381. Breton nationalists subsequently developed 
their European discourse through their collaboration with the Socialist and Communist 
parties. The UDB had cultivated a close bond with the French Left since it considered that 
only socialism could change the colonial situation of Brittany. The UDB participated in 
elections as part of the Union of the Left -  formed with the Socialist and Communist 
parties - and managed as a result to gain representation in the municipal councils of 
Rennes, Brest and Nantes. The party’s association with left-wing parties was reinforced 
after their adoption of a Joint Programme of Government in 1972382, which included a 
commitment to regionalisation and decentralisation. At that time, the concern of the 
French Left for regions had been attributed to the influence of the UDB on the Socialist 
leadership (Pasquier, 2006:96). Throughout the 1970s, Europe was a theme the UDB 
debated with the Socialist and Communist parties in Brittany, primarily as a way to elevate 
the party’s profile by taking part in national debates (Lynch, 1996:98). This predominance 
of leftist ideas in the early years of the UDB goes some way into explaining its criticism of 
European institutions and their policies.
Indeed, while being supportive of European integration as a process, Breton 
nationalists expressed reservations towards the European Community. They perceived 
the EU as a capitalist institution, dominated by business and government interests, whose 
free-market policies were damaging to the Breton economy383. Primarily, the creation of a 
free market in agriculture was seen as having a negative impact on the Breton farming 
industry384. The UDB essentially saw a colonial relationship between the EC and Brittany 
in a number of policy areas, with European policies increasing regional disparities by 
advantaging strong regions at the expense of economically weaker regions (Lynch, 
1996:97-98). These claims were linked to the party’s attempt to mobilise support on socio­
economic issues ’linked to the lack of regional autonomy for Brittany. Echoing the
381 Le Peuple Breton, January 1964, p.1
382 The Joint Programme of Government was signed on 27 June 1972 by the Socialist Party, the
Communist Party and the Movement of Left Radicals.
383 Le Peuple Breton, 15 September 1967, p.2
384 Le Peuple Breton, 15 July 1967, p.3
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colonialism of France, Europe was pictured as acting in a colonial manner through its 
centralised economic policies. The UDB campaigned in favour of a “no” in the 1972 
referendum on the enlargement of the European Community385, arguing that it could only 
reinforce its internal colonialism386. Yet, this position was primarily motivated by 
instrumental reasons, the UDB seeking to capitalise on any political development to gain 
exposure and advance its case for an autonomous Brittany387. Despite its criticism, 
however, the UDB was never opposed to European integration, which it conceived as an 
overall positive development provided that it followed the correct socialist lines: “the UDB 
declares itself in favour of the construction of a Europe enabling peoples ignored by 
current States to exist and flourish [...] the Union of the Peoples of Europe can only be 
done through socialism”388.
The disappointing results of the 1978 legislative elections, after which the Right 
maintained its control over the National Assembly, marked the end of the Union of the 
Left. In fact, the demise of the Union of the Left provided an opportunity for the UDB to 
reassess its alliance strategy. There had been growing dissatisfaction within the party over 
the fact that the Left had used the UDB to gain public support in Brittany, without 
promoting the party’s nationalist demands389. Not only was it felt that the Socialists had 
eroded the UDB’s ideological specificity by exploiting themes such as the defence of 
Breton identity and culture, but it also became clear that the alliance with the Left had 
restricted the party’s freedom of action as an independent political party (Rogers, 1990:73- 
74). The UDB had effectively tied its own fortunes to the electoral success of the Left at 
the national level, a vulnerable position considering the results of the Socialists in the last 
elections390. Consequently, the 1978 annual meeting sought to reassert the nationalist 
dimension of the UDB’s political project, i.e. Brittany’s autonomy, by advocating the right of 
the Breton people to self-determination and self-government. The party endorsed a motion 
signalling a departure from its identification with the Left, stating that “regionalisation and 
decentralisation are traps, [only] autonomy will allow the Breton people to assume its full 
role in the international struggle against capitalist oppression”391. The motion implied the 
development of “a programme that cannot be taken over by the French Left and the 
Socialists in particular”, but it also stressed that “the affirmation of our specificity must not 
lead our party to cut itself off from the tactical gains previously attained, such as our
385 French voters were asked to endorse the decision to admit Denmark, Ireland, Norway and the
United Kingdom, and therefore to revoke De Gaulle's veto on British membership in the EC.
Overall, the “yes” vote obtained 67.07 percent, and Brittany supported enlargement by 74.8
percent.
Le Peuple Breton (103), April 1972
387 Interview Herri Gourmelen, 27 October 2008
388 UDB, Programme Democratique Breton, Adopte par le Comite Directeur de I’UDB, le 13
Novembre 1977, Quimper: Imprimerie Cornouaillaise, 1978, p.66.
389 Interview Mona Bras, 5 November 2008
390 Interview Herri Gourmelen, 27 October 2008
391 Le Peuple Breton (182), November 1978
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presence in municipal councils”392. While the UDB would stop cultivating the ideological 
connections between its nationalist political project and the programme of the French Left, 
the party did not either turn down the possibility of strategic alliances in the future.
In the context of this re-direction towards minority nationalism rather than 
socialism, the UDB explored potential links with other regional minorities in France. The 
party formed the Union of Peoples for Autonomy and Socialism with Occitan and Basque 
parties in 1980, in the view of representing minority nationalists in the coming presidential 
elections. The Union however failed to produce a candidate for the 1981 elections393. The 
consequences of the UDB’s desire for independence from the Socialists however meant 
that Brittany did not feature on the “110 Proposals” of candidate Mitterrand394, unlike 
Corsica and the Basque Country395. In the end, even though it was felt that the UDB could 
be compromised by its relationship with the Left, the Socialists remained the party’s only 
chance to participate in national elections396. Furthermore, with Mitterrand becoming the 
new French President in 1981, the great victory of the Left had finally become a reality and 
the UDB intended to claim at least some credit for the success of the Socialists. The party 
therefore presented 15 candidates on the Socialist list for the 1981 legislative elections, 
even though the terms of the electoral alliance were disadvantaging to the Bretons which 
did not gain representation as a result.
In reality, the election of a Socialist government placed the UDB in an uneasy 
situation, in that the party’s long-term ally had become the representative of the Jacobin 
French state. While the alliance with the Socialists had been necessary for the UDB to 
participate in the French political process, this strategy presented Breton nationalists with 
the risk of failure through being integrated into a logic essentially aiming at the 
reinforcement of French national unity (Nicolas, 1982:354). Furthermore, due to its 
proximity with the Socialists in power, the UDB had to defend itself from accusations of 
being regionalist: “Our ambition is far from the provincialism or mild regionalism within 
which one would like to confine the Bretons”397. The discrepancy between the electoral 
promises and the first proposals of the new government confirmed the drift between the 
Socialists and Breton nationalists. The 1982 decentralisation reforms398 did not go nearly 
as far in regional empowerment as the UDB had intended and, most importantly, did not
392 Le Peuple Breton (182), November 1978
393 The Union of Peoples for Autonomy and Socialism failed to gather the number of elected 
officials’ signatures necessary to present a candidate in the presidential elections.
394 Francois Mitterrand, "110 Propositions pour la France”, Elections presidentielles, April-May 
1981.
395 "Proposal 54, [...] Corsica will receive a special status. A Basque department will be created" 
in Francois Mitterrand, 110 Propositions pour la France, Elections presidentielles, April-May 
1981.
396 Especially since it is only in 1986 that the first sub-national elections at the region and 
department levels took place in France.
397 Le Peuple Breton (235), July 1983
398 For details on the 1982 decentralisation reforms, please refer to chapter three.
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introduce a redrawing of regional boundaries in accordance with historic regions. This 
meant that the department of Loire-Atlantique, which contained the historical capital of 
Brittany, Nantes, was not to be included in the Breton administrative region and would 
remain in the region Pays de la Loire. In addition, Brittany retained its status as an 
ordinary region whereas Corsica was accorded a special status with its own regional 
institutions and extended competences. Under these terms, the Socialists reforms 
received the UDB’s strong condemnation, thereby putting a considerable distance 
between Breton nationalists and the government399. This positioning however led to the 
departure of several party members. Among them was one of the UDB’s leaders, Ronan 
Leprohon400, who joined the Socialist Party instead, triggering the dissolution of the Brest 
federation of the UDB401. At its 1982 annual meeting, the UDB nevertheless decided 
against a systematic criticism of the Socialist government, mainly on the grounds that “this 
attitude would be very likely to isolate us’’402. Accordingly, and despite obvious tensions, 
the UDB maintained its collaboration with the Socialists in the 1983 municipal elections, 
gaining about 80 seats of municipal councillors and two mayor seats. Yet, the situation 
had not been uniform across Brittany: in some municipalities, the PS-UDB alliance had 
held very well, while in others, the UDB had abandoned the strategy of alliance and 
presented its own lists, with marginal electoral results (3 percent of the votes on average).
The changing nature of the UDB’s relationship with the Left had not greatly 
impacted on the party’s position with regard to European integration. Just like before, 
Breton nationalists were in favour of Europe, but they wished for a different Europe403. 
Mainly, the EU had to become more than an economic zone of free market and to merge 
into the Europe of the Regions and the Peoples. Breton nationalists started making 
demands for more regional representation through the creation of a Senate whose powers 
and competences would be equivalent to the ones of the European Parliament404. On the 
other hand, the party’s difficulties with the Socialists meant that Breton nationalists did not 
take part in the 1984 European elections. In order to demonstrate its new combative 
stance, the UDB had campaigned for abstention in the elections, arguing that the electoral 
system adopted by the Socialist government was undemocratic inasmuch as France was 
treated as one single constituency with no special regional representation405. This loss of 
support in the European elections had been presented by UDB leaders as a “warning” to 
the Left, to illustrate their “disapprobation with the policies of the Socialist government [and
399 Interview Herri Gourmelen, 27 October 2008
400 Ronan Leprohon returned to the UDB in 2000.
401 Le Peuple Breton (223), July 1982
402 Le Peuple Breton (217), January 1982, p.28
403 Interview Christian Guyonvarc’h, 3rd September 2009
404 Le Peuple Breton (246), June 1984
405 Le Peuple Breton (244/245), May 1984
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its] lack of respect for electoral promises”406. The UDB was however clear in saying that 
Breton interests needed to be defended at the European level, essentially concerned with 
the peripheralisation of Brittany in the EU. In particular, the party expressed its 
disagreement with a further enlargement of the EU, on the basis that it would exacerbate 
regional inequalities within Europe and be detrimental to Breton agriculture and 
fisheries407. Despite campaigning for abstention, there was a sense that the UDB had 
missed an opportunity to present arguments in favour of Brittany’s regional autonomy408. 
Soon after, the party approached the European Free Alliance (EFA) in the view of 
becoming a member.
The UDB’s love-hate relationship with the Socialists had had a disastrous effect on 
the party membership, which had gone from over 2000 to 500 in just a couple of years 
(Nicolas, 2001:88). The UDB was continually faced with the impossible choice of 
remaining supportive of the government despite the disappointment of its policies -  on 
which the party had a negligible influence anyway - or dissociating itself from the Socialists 
and falling into isolation (Rogers, 1990:77). This was reflected in the 1984 annual meeting, 
which saw two motions being presented: one in favour of maintaining a “critical” support to 
the Socialist government and another pushing for a more independent line, refusing the 
logic of electoral alliance with candidates of the Left unless negotiations took place on a 
range of issues409. The supporters of the second motion stressed that the UDB’s doctrine 
was not socialist regionalism but minority nationalism, and that an alliance with a non­
nationalist political formation could only be strategic410. Fearing dissolution, the party 
leadership opted for a middle ground position: they rejected a radical break with the 
French Left but also abandoned the practice of unconditional support to the Left 
candidates in the second round of elections. In any case, these internal debates over the 
alliance with the Socialists had become redundant, as the latter showed less and less 
interest in Breton nationalists. The UDB was no longer the ideological laboratory it once 
was for the Socialists, who paid little attention to the party’s propositions, as illustrated in 
the government’s refusal to receive a UDB delegation to discuss the party’s development 
plan for Brittany in 1985.
Le Peuple Breton (244/245), May 1984
407 Le Peuple Breton (246), June 1984
408 Interview Herri Gourmelen, 27 October 2008
409 Le Peuple Breton (251), December 1984
410 Le Peuple Breton (251), December 1984
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6.2.2. Reorientation towards Europe
All in all, the context was clearly unfavourable to the UDB when the first regional 
elections finally took place in Brittany in 1986411. As well as being let down by the 
Socialists and seeing its membership drop dramatically, the party’s credibility was being 
attacked from within. The UDB’s leadership within the Breton nationalist movement had 
been challenged since the beginning of the 1980s, with the emergence of new Breton 
parties such as the Parti pour I’Organisation d’une Bretagne Libre (POBL) and Emgann- 
MGI. These new parties had been created partly on the ground that the UDB had turned to 
regionalism under the influence of the Socialists and that Breton nationalism needed a 
new voice to be defended (Nicolas, 2001:96-107). To make matters worse for the UDB, 
the proponents of a clear break with the Left at the 1984 assembly - refusing to submit to 
the decision of the party leadership - were finally expelled and went on to create Frankiz 
Breizh in January 1986. Despite these obstacles, the election of a Breton regional council 
was an unprecedented opportunity for the UDB, in terms of providing the first substantial 
forum for Breton interests. The party therefore designed an electoral strategy based on the 
unification of all political, economic, social and cultural Breton actors with “comparable 
aspirations” for the future of Brittany412. The resulting “Kemper Breizh” alliance did not 
include other Breton nationalist parties -  apart from Emgann-MGI -  but was instead 
oriented towards extreme-left and environmental organisations413. The alliance was based 
on three common propositions: the existence of the Breton people, a leftist ideology, and 
an opposition to the Socialist party in office414. Despite an effort to present candidates in 
all the historic Breton departments415, the scores achieved by the “Kemper Breizh” lists416 
were not enough to reach the 5 percent electoral threshold and gain representation at the 
regional level. Having the first Breton political assembly form itself without UDB 
representatives was a major drawback for the party, which was forced to face the reality of 
having lost the greatest part of its electorate to the Socialists.
The electoral fiasco of the 1986 regional elections triggered a deep questioning of 
the UDB’s ideology and strategy417. The party’s political project, Brittany’s autonomy, on 
which a number of nationalist goals depended -  teaching of Breton language, return of 
Loire-Atlantique to Brittany, development of Breton agriculture -  remained untouched.
411 Although the Defferre decentralisation reforms were adopted in 1982 and provided 
administrative regions with directly elected political assemblies, it is only in 1986 that the first 
regional elections took place.
41 Le Peuple Breton (256), April 1985
413 Formed on 8-9 November 1985, Kemper Breizh included the Unified Socialist Party, the 
Federation for the Alternative Left, several ecologist and pacifist organisations, Skol an Emsav, 
Emgann-MGI and the UDB.
414 Le Peuble Breton (265), Janvier 1986
415 That is Cotes-dArmor, Morbihan, Ille-et-Vilaine, Finistere (forming the administrative region 
Brittany) and Loire-Atlantique (which is in the region Pays de la Loire).
416 See Appendix 1: Election Tables.
417 Interview Christian Guyonvarc’h, 3rd September 2009
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However, the ideological justification surrounding the UDB’s demand for self-government 
changed dramatically. The UDB abandoned the thematic of internal colonialism in favour 
of a federalist philosophy and began to stress a more European agenda in its campaign 
for Breton autonomy. Indeed, the 1986 UDB meeting operated a rewriting of the party’s 
ideology, building on the idea of a Brittany fully integrated in Europe418. From that point 
onwards, Europe gained prominence in the activity and discourse of the UDB, and after 
several years of informal participation, the party became a formal member of the EFA in 
1987. The UDB sought to increase the credibility of its mobilisation through its participation 
within a larger movement of minority nations in Europe, organised around the EFA: 
"everywhere in Europe, we have allies, leading the same struggle”419. “Europeanising” the 
Breton mobilisation appeared as a valid strategy to the UDB to circumvent the 
confidentiality of local mobilisations and gain visibility in the French domestic context420. 
The party’s involvement in the EFA also brought new opportunities for electoral 
cooperation and, in the 1989 European elections, the UDB formed an alliance with the 
Greens and other minority nationalist parties in France421. While the UDB had high 
expectations for this alliance, it was the Corsican Max Simeoni, leader of the UPC, who 
received the one seat granted by the Greens to minority nationalists. Still, it was the first 
time that the party got involved in European elections, and the fact that the Green list 
gained higher than average support in Brittany and Corsica enabled the UDB and the UPC 
to claim the venture as a success422. In addition, UDB member Christian Guyonvarc’h 
became Simeoni’s parliamentary assistant, providing the party with direct access to the 
European Parliament and first-hand information on European affairs423.
This reorientation towards Europe did not however stop the UDB from being critical 
of most EU policies424. The Single European Act, for instance, was seen as damaging to 
the Breton economy as well as increasing economic isolation and depopulation425. 
Concerns emerged that Brittany, like many other peripherical regions, would be excluded 
from the economic benefits of European integration due to the lack of an efficient 
European regional policy426. Consequently, the UDB campaigned for direct regional 
representation in the EU, on a par with states representation427. For similar reasons, the 
party was suspicious of the Maastricht Treaty’s proposals for economic and monetary 
union, viewing them as centralist measures that would exacerbate the inequalities of the
418 Le Peuple Breton (274), October 1986
419 Le Peuple Breton (297), September 1988; Le Peuple Breton (301), January 1989
420 Le Peuple Breton (324), December 1990
421 The Green Party made an alliance with the UPC, UDB, Partit Occitan and Bloc Catala.
422 In France, the list had achieved 10.6 percent, while it went up to 12.2 percent in Brittany and
15.5 percent in Corsica.
423 Interview Christian Guyonvarc’h, 3rd September 2009
424 Interview Christian Guyonvarc’h, 3rd September 2009
425 Le Peuple Breton (285), September 1987
426 Le Peuple Breton (297), September 1988
427 Le Peuple Breton (330), June 1991
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single market428. Breton nationalists were also unsure about *the EU gaining new 
competences in the field of education and culture, fearing that this would only reinforce the 
linguistic and cultural prejudices of member states429. Yet, in 1992, the UDB did not 
campaign against France’s ratification of the Maastricht treaty, mainly because it feared 
losing support among a Breton population rather supportive of the EU430. Breton 
nationalists worried that they would appear as isolationist and anti-European if they 
opposed the treaty431. The party therefore gave a reluctant “yes” to Maastricht, but largely 
abstained from the referendum campaign.
The UDB however reframed its political project in relation to European integration, 
inasmuch as regional autonomy was not only a right of the Breton people but had also 
become an institutional necessity to survive in the EU. Accordingly, the party started 
making demands for a direct representation of Brittany in Brussels432. This growing 
interest in European representation came with the realisation that decisions made by the 
EU had direct consequences for Brittany433. In particular, agriculture and fisheries were 
two sectors on which the Breton economy relied heavily, where the EU had competences 
and for which the UDB had developed clear positions434. While the Common Agricultural 
Policy was mentioned as a concrete resource for the Breton economy, the party 
denounced the policies of price control and quotas used by the EU since the 1960s as a 
source of imbalance in the agricultural market435. Similarly, in the party’s view, the 
Common Fisheries Policy had to be more comprehensive in the management of resources 
and include the consultation of all stakeholders, in order to resolve the problem of 
overfishing affecting the Breton coastline436. Through this criticism, the UDB decried the 
negative impact on peripheral economies of an integration process designed and driven 
by state interests. Brittany being classified under Objective 2 of the EU Regional Policy, 
the region was not eligible for priority European funding. The party feared that this lack of 
EU engagement towards Brittany would only reinforce the social and economic 
inequalities created by the policies of the French government437. The UDB’s main concern 
was that Brittany did not become a periphery of the EU, just like the Breton economy 
suffered from being at the French periphery.
428 Le Peuple Breton (343/344), July/August 1992
429 Interview Herri Gourmelen, 27 October 2008
430 The 1992 referendum illustrated the strong support for Europe in Brittany, with 59.9 percent of 
Breton voters favouring the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. In comparison, at the national 
level, the "yes” votes achieved 51 percent.
431 Le Peuple Breton (343/344), July/August 1992
432 Le Peuple Breton, Editorial, Septembre 1988 (297)
433 Le Peuple Breton, Europeennes : abstention, pourquoi ?, Juin 1984 (246); Interview Christian
Guyonvarc’h, 3rd September 2009
434 Le Peuple Breton (323), November 1990; Le Peuple Breton (326), February 1991
435 Le Peuple Breton (335), November 1991
436 Le Peuple Breton (352), April 1993
437 Le Peuple Breton, Minorites en Congres, Juin 1988 (294)
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Hence, the international dimension of the UDB was (1) a means to gain visibility in 
the French context and (2) also a necessity to defend Breton interests in the EU. Yet, the 
party’s focus on European integration also followed another logic: one of (3) a strategic 
comparative advantage in local politics438. Through the EFA and Guyonvarc’h’s role as 
parliamentary assistant, the UDB was the only Breton political force with connections at 
the European level439. The party could derive credibility and raise its profile in Breton 
politics through these European connections, despite being in a difficult situation both 
electorally and politically since the mid-1980s. Indeed, Breton nationalists had not 
succeeded in gaining representation in the Breton council since getting the cold shoulder 
from the Socialists. After the failure of the “alternative Left” alliance strategy in the last 
elections, the UDB sought to unite the whole Breton nationalist movement for the 1992 
regional elections. Despite sharp differences in terms of ideology and on the question of 
political violence440, the UDB joined forces with the POBL, Emgann-MGI and Frankiz 
Breizh in a list named “The Breton People, People of Europe”. However, the coalition only 
received 2.23 percent of the votes -  almost half of the UDB electoral score in 1986441. It 
was argued that the last-minute alliance with other Breton nationalist parties had had a 
detrimental effect on the UDB’s political credibility442. Once again, Breton nationalists 
would not sit in the Breton assembly, making it hard to have a say in the local debates. In 
contrast, the EU was a political space where the UDB had a form of representation 
through the EFA and this encouraged Breton nationalists to specialise in European issues 
with a direct relevance for Brittany, such as the Common Agricultural Policy and the 
Common Fisheries Policy. Cut off from national and local politics, the UDB would focus 
instead on the defence of Breton interests in the EU.
6.2.3. Difficult years for the UDB
The context leading to the representation of French minority nationalists in the 
European Parliament turned out to be a one-off. For the 1994 European elections, the 
UDB gave its support to the minority nationalist list “Solidarity People-Region” led by the 
Corsican Max Simeoni after the demise of its alliance with the Greens. The initiative did 
not enable Simeoni to keep its European seat, but it did create the Federation Solidarity 
People-Region (R&PS), composed of 9 minority nationalist parties in France443. The UDB
438 Interview Herri Gourmelen, 28 October 2008
439 Interview Christian Guyonvarc’h, 3rd September 2009
440 The POBL is clearly right wing, while Emgann refuses to condemn political violence. Interview 
Mona Bras, 5 November 2008
441 As well as Brittany, the UDB also presented candidates in the region Pays de la Loire, where 
the party obtained 0.33 percent of the votes.
442 Interview Naig Le Gars, 5 November 2008
443 R&PS is composed of the Union Democratique Bretonne, the Partit Occitan, the Parti National 
Basque, Eusko Alkartasuna, Bloc Catal&, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, Mouvement
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was instrumental in this attempt at joining local forces in order to gain visibility in the 
French context and make an impact on Paris444. From then on, the party’s discourse 
featured European themes familiar to other members of the R&PS. Hence, France was 
pictured as an exception in Europe and the French politico-administrative system, the “last 
of dinosaurs", was presented as archaic445. The French government’s response to cultural 
and regional diversity appeared inadequate in comparison to other EU member states: 
“the Gallic rooster is now surrounded in Europe”446. The party campaigned for the 
ratification of the European Charter on Minority and Regional Languages, an important 
document providing credibility to demands for the recognition and protection of the Breton 
language447. Interestingly, party cooperation within the R&PS also triggered a process of 
self-definition within the UDB. Unhappy with both the regionalist (not reflective of the 
existence of the Breton people) and nationalist (too inflammatory and exclusive) labels, 
the Bretons preferred defining themselves as autonomists448. More precisely, the UDB was 
“the party of regional autonomy”, which was both a right of the Breton people and the best 
possible type of governance for Brittany in the context of European integration449. In 1997, 
the UDB launched a new campaign for regional autonomy in response to the devolution 
granted to Scotland and Wales450. In light of the example of other European regions, the 
party’s demand for Brittany’s autonomy appeared not only as legitimate, but also as a 
necessity for Brittany to remain competitive in the EU. Increasingly, the party raised 
concerns over the weaknesses of Brittany in comparison to larger, wealthier and 
autonomous regions in Europe451.
The UDB maintained a strong focus on Europe despite having lost its (indirect) 
representation in the European Parliament. This was illustrated in the party’s programme 
for the 1998 regional elections, i.e. a crucial electoral event for Breton nationalists. After 
the disappointing results of coalitions with small parties in the last two elections, the UDB 
decided to face the public vote on its own and to stress its European dimension in the 
electoral campaign452. The UDB programme listed the six most important challenges 
facing Brittany, four of which were directly related to the EU: the Euro (likely to create 
more inequalities due to the lack of Brittany’s export), reforms of the CAP and the 
Common Fisheries Policy (decrease of European funding in Brittany), enlargement of the
Region Savoie, Union du Peuple Alsacien and Parti de la Nation Corse. Abertzaleen Batasuna 
recently gained observer status.
444 Interview Christian Guyonvarc’h, 3rd September 2009
445 Le Peuple Breton, Le dernier des dinosaures, Juin 1996 (390)
446 Le Peuple Breton (390), Juin 1996
447 Le Peuple Breton (400), April 1997
448 Interview Herri Gourmelen, 28 October 2008
449 Interview Mona Bras, 5 November 2008
450 Le Peuple Breton (405). September 1997
451 Le Peuple Breton, La Bretagne, trap petite pour I’Europe, Fevrier 1999 (422)
452 Interview Naig Le Gars, 5 November 2008 ; Interview Christian Guyonvarc’h, 3rd September 
2009
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EU to Central and Eastern Europe (more peripheralisation of Brittany), decentralisation 
and devolution measures in other EU member states (making Brittany less able to 
compete in the European market)453. In the parly’s view, regional autonomy was a 
necessity to face all these challenges and ensure the future of Brittany. Above all, it was 
clear to the UDB that autonomy should cover European matters, as the party asked for the 
Regional Council to have representation in Brussels, to be able to sign cooperation 
agreements with other European regions and to manage European funds (which were 
entirely dealt with in Paris)454. The reunification of Brittany, i.e. the inclusion of the 
department Loire-Atlantique into the administrative region Brittany, was also required to 
remain competitive against the largest European regions455. Similarly, in order to best 
defend Breton interests in the context of European integration, the UDB proposed the 
creation of a Western Euro-region composed of the reunified Brittany, the reunified Poitou 
(with Vendee), the region Val de Loire (made of Anjou and Touraine) and the reunified 
Normandy456. However, with 3.31 percent of the votes457, the UDB’s electoral results were 
once again insufficient to gain political representation.
A few months later, the UDB released an institutional project of special 
autonomous status for a reunified Brittany458. Article 1 of the project stated that “the Breton 
people, to defend its identity and to gain access to self-government, must constitute an 
autonomous political community inside the French Republic, named Autonomous Region 
of Brittany”459. It has been argued that this proposed institutional status was similar to the 
one of the Spanish Autonomous Communities (Pasquier, 2006:91). Hence, the Breton 
assembly would be given legislative powers in all the domains that are not state functions 
in federal states, i.e. education, language, environment, agriculture, tourism, etc. As well 
as giving substance to the party’s autonomist doctrine, this was also an attempt to 
maximise on institutional developments taking place in Corsica. The Matignon process 
had started around that time, and was meant to redefine Corsica’s institutional status. 
Breton nationalists did not see why the Corsican model would not be applied to other 
regions in France460. In their view, autonomy was a right on the basis of the existence of 
the Breton people, as well as the need to protect and promote the Breton culture461. But 
perhaps even more importantly for the UDB, Brittany’s regional autonomy emerged as a
453 Le Peuple Breton (408), December 1997; Le Peuple Breton (409), January 1998
454 Le Peuple Breton (409), January 1998
455 Le Peuple Breton (422), February 1999
456 Interview Nicole Logeais, 28 October 2008
457 As well as Brittany, the UDB also presented candidates in the region Pays de la Loire, where 
the party obtained 0.49 percent of the votes.
458 Le Peuple Breton (417), September 1998. This institutional status was adopted as the UDB’s 
political project on 29 May 1999.
459 UDB, Un Statut Politique pour la Bretagne, Cahiers du Peuple Breton, Nb. 8, Lannion: 
Presses Populaires de Bretagne, 1999:14
460 Le Peuple Breton (441), September 2000
461 Le Peuple Breton (450), June 2001
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need for the Breton people to defend their interests and to compete against other 
European regions in the Common Market. Through the making of French centralisation 
and Jacobinism, Brittany had been reduced to being a “minor political player in Europe” 
462. Yet, the French state was now unable to deal with the economic and social problems 
facing Brittany, whose future was being played out at the European and local levels463. In 
the new context created by European integration, regional autonomy was for the UDB the 
best possible form of governance for Brittany. However, the party’s lack of political 
representation at the regional level meant that the UDB’s institutional project had little 
exposure outside of Breton nationalist circles. Furthermore, the UDB was out of its depth 
financially and failed to form an alliance for the 1999 European elections. Breton 
nationalists chose not to participate in the elections, arguing that these were still organised 
with France as one single constituency, giving no chance of representation to local 
political parties464.
6.2.4. The rise to the Breton Regional Council
On 29 April 2000, the UDB adopted a new charter, stating that the party’s raison 
d ’etre was the defence of Breton interests in France and in the EU and that its priority was 
to develop Brittany’s profile at the European level465. In many ways, this new charter was 
the final point of a long ideological transformation for the UDB and its complete 
reorientation towards Europe. The party’s campaign for regional autonomy was now 
centred around a pragmatic rationale: “How can Brittany defend its interest in Europe 
without being at the same institutional level of regions such as Galicia, Catalonia, 
Scotland, Wales, Flanders, Sardinia, which all have regional autonomy, legislative power 
and a budget on average 10 times higher than the Breton one?”466. There was a sense of 
urgency in the party’s discourse as the Breton people could no longer afford to rely on 
Parisian technocrats to represent its interests in Brussels, especially in the fields of 
maritime transport and fisheries467. Europe also remained a source of credibility and 
legitimacy for the demands of Breton nationalists: “our ambition for Brittany is nothing 
exceptional if considered outside of the French context and placed in the right 
environment, i.e. Europe, as many Europeans already experience regional autonomy on a
462 Le Peuple Breton (429), September 1999
463 Le Peuple Breton (429), September 1999
464 Le Peuple Breton (415/416), July/August 1998
465 UDB, Charte de I’UDB, adoptee le 29 avril 2000 a Ploemeur/Planvour, Le Peuple Breton 
(438), June 2000
Le Peuple Breton (439/440), July/August 2000
467 Examples quoted by the party were: the lack of response from French authorities to the oil 
slick caused by the Erika (Le Peuple Breton (439/440), July/August 2000), the overlooking of 
Breton harbours in the trans-European transport networks, apart from Nantes (Le Peuple Breton 
(451/416), July/August 2001) and the shortcomings of the EU Fisheries Policy (Le Peuple Breton 
(456), January 2002).
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daily basis”468. The party reiterated that regional autonomy was no longer “the ideological 
red flag it used to be, but the way forward for the survival of Brittany”469. Accordingly, 
France was presented as “the victim of its constitutional exception” and as bound to 
change its Jacobin conceptions since “the gap increases between France - fixed on a 
static Constitution - and the international community, which evolves towards pragmatism 
and openness”470.
Meanwhile, the demands of the UDB were starting to find an echo in local political 
assemblies. Already, a 1999 poll had revealed that 68 percent of the Breton population 
was in favour of the administrative reunification of Brittany471. On 22 June 2001, the 
General Council of Loire-Atlantique voted in favour of the institutional recognition of its 
Breton identity, through its inclusion in the region of Brittany472. This decision carried little 
political weight since the General Council has no institutional competences, but it was the 
sign that proposals for reunification (and potentially autonomy) had found support outside 
of Breton nationalist circles473. From then on, the UDB campaigned for a public 
consultation on the reunification of Brittany. In 2002, the UDB released a joint program 
with Frankiz Breizh, asking for a regional democracy in Brittany through three 
propositions: (1) a referendum on the reunification of Brittany in 2004 (2) the 
disappearance of the departmental level in favour of an organisation based around 20 
“pays” and (3) a mixed electoral system for the regional council, which should be granted 
legislative and fiscal powers474. The Breton nationalists had the 2004 regional elections in 
sight and were determined to gain political representation at the regional level this time, 
through any means necessary475. As noted above, despite experimenting with different 
electoral strategies476, the UDB had yet to go beyond 5 percent of the votes in the regional 
elections. To make matters worse, the electoral threshold giving access to the second 
round was raised from 5 to 10 percent for the 2004 elections477. This change in the
468 Le Peuple Breton (450), June 2001
469 Le Peuple Breton, L'autonomie Regionale, (462/463), July/August 2002
470 Le Peuple Breton (449), May 2001
471 TMO-OUEST poll on February-March 1999, Le Peuple Breton (441), September 2000
472 It should be noted that in 1972 (i.e. prior to the creation of administrative regions in the French 
politico-administrative system), the General Council of Loire-Atlantique had already asked to be 
included in the region Brittany about to be created. However, the demand for reunification, 
referring to a shared history of the Duchy of Brittany and the County of Nantes from the 12th 
century to 1789, had first emerged at the beginning of the 20th century.
473 Interview Naig Le Gars, 5 November 2008
474 Le Peuple Breton, L’UDB (et Frankiz Breizh) proposent pour une democratie regionale en 
Bretagne, (467), December 2002
475 Interview Mona Bras, 5 November 2008
476 As a recap, the UDB made an alliance with alternative left-wing political parties in 1986 (4 
percent of the votes), united the entire Breton nationalist movement in 1992 (2.23 percent of the 
votes) and faced the public vote alone in 1998 (3.31 percent of the votes).
477 The new electoral rules, introduced by Raffarin’s government, established a two-round system 
with the region as the electoral constituency. The system combines majority and proportional 
rules, as access to the second round is conditional on obtaining a minimum of 10 percent of the 
votes in the first round, but the law also enables the combining of lists between the two rounds.
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electoral rules meant that the UDB had no other choice than to renew the experience of 
alliance with a larger political formation478.
In a bid to sign an electoral alliance, the UDB clarified its electoral program around 
three main demands: the autonomy of Brittany, its administrative reunification and an 
official status for the Breton language479. Soon after, the party approached the Greens, 
with whom Breton nationalists had previously been in contact through R&PS and the EFA. 
There was a degree of programmatic compatibility between the Greens’ commitment to 
regionalisation and subsidiarity, and the UDB’s autonomous political project. Equally, 
through its interest in the agriculture and fisheries sector, the UDB conceived the 
protection of the environment as one of its main themes of action480. In December 2003, 
the UDB signed an electoral agreement with the Greens for the 2004 regional elections. It 
played in the UDB’s favour that the Greens were looking for partners to present 
candidates independently from the Socialists, in order to represent “another Left”481. Also, 
in return to the electoral alliance, the Federation Solidarity Region-People offered its 
support to the Green party in the 2007 presidential elections482. While many demands of 
the Breton nationalists - such as the reunification of Brittany - were included in their joint 
electoral programme, the UDB had to “sacrifice” its demand for autonomy for the sake of 
the alliance483. The Greens-UDB list however obtained 9.70 percent of the votes, a score 
enabling the coalition to bargain its way into the list of Socialist Jean-Yves Le Drian. While 
the Greens and the UDB had in common to disagree with the policies of the Socialists, the 
objective was never to divide the Left to the benefit of Josselin de Rohan, President of the 
then Right-majority Breton Council484. In the end, the large success of the Socialist list in 
the second round meant that, for the first time since its creation, the UDB gained three 
seats in the Breton assembly485.
Shortly after, UDB member Christian Guyonvarc’h was named Vice-President of 
the Breton Council in charge of European Relations. This nomination, as opposed to the 
more obvious Vice-Presidency on Cultural Affairs, was noteworthy as a recognition of the
The list with an absolute majority in the first round or relative majority in the second round is 
granted a bonus of 25 percent of the seats.
Interview Naig Le Gars, 5 November 2008
479 Le Peuple Breton, Gagner la Bretagne a gauche en 2004, (478), November 2003
480 The protection of the environment was used by the UDB as an argument to change means of 
production in the Breton agricultural sector, as intensive agriculture caused serious problems of 
pollution and had a backlash effect on tourism in Brittany (Pasquier, 2006:92)
481 Interview Mona Bras, 5 November 2008
482 Le Peuple Breton, Regionales 2004: Un accord Verts-UDB historique pour la Bretagne, (479), 
December 2003
483 Le Peuple Breton, Regionales 2004: Un accord Verts-UDB historique pour la Bretagne, (479), 
December 2003
484 Le Peuple Breton, Regionales 2004: Un accord Verts-UDB historique pour la Bretagne, (479), 
December 2003; Interview Mona Bras, 5 November 2008
485 The Socialist list led by Jean-Yves Le Drian obtained 58.79 percent of the votes, and 58 seats, 
in the second round of the elections.
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UDB’s expertise in European matters486. Now part of the Breton regional institution, the 
party could use its new political status to advance its nationalist demands. It was also 
helpful that the new President of the Breton Council, Jean-Yves Le Drian, was not 
opposed to many of the UDB’s demands for a stronger and autonomous Brittany. Even 
more, with the decentralisation reforms started by Prime Minister Raffarin in 2003, the 
ideas of the UDB had gained in popularity. On 8 October 2004, the Breton Council voted 
unanimously in favour of the reunification of Brittany, following a resolution proposed by 
the UDB representatives487. The vote was sharply criticised by the President of the Region 
Pays de la Loire (where the department Loire-Atlantique is located), referring to an attempt 
of “annexation”488. Following the provisions for Local Initiative Referendum adopted in 
2003489, the resolution called for a public consultation on the issue in accordance with 
popular will490. Several surveys had indicated that the majority of the population of Loire- 
Atlantique and Brittany was in favour of the reunification491. On 17 December 2004, the 
Breton Council also voted unanimously for the adoption of a “Linguistic Policy for Brittany" 
whose provisions contained the official recognition of the Breton and the Gallo as official 
languages of Brittany”492. In addition, following a proposal by Guyonvarc’h, the Council 
transformed its representation in Brussels. Since 1988, Brittany had had a joint 
representation office with the regions Pays-de-la-Loire and Poitou-Charentes, but in July 
2005, an Embassy of Brittany was opened in Brussels in order to represent Breton 
interests in European institutions.
Despite an intense activity in Breton politics, the UDB continued reacting on 
European matters. For a start, the party was not enthusiastic about the Eastern 
enlargement of the EU, which it analysed as resulting in a move of the European decision­
making centres towards the East - thereby accentuating the peripherical location of
486 Interview Nicole Logeais, 28 October 2008
487 For the text of the Resolution, see http://www.reqion-
bretaane.fr/CRB/Public/services en liqne/toutes les decisions/archives 2004/debat sur lavenir 
d 10972390816192 (accessed on 20 November 2008)
488 Le Peuple Breton, Reunification de la Bretagne: un message clair du Conseil Regional, (490), 
November 2004
489 Law 2003.705 of 1st August 2003 relative to the local referendum
490 Although this would be a mere implementation of the Law 2003.705 (which requires that only 
10 percent of the local population ask for a referendum), the French government has yet to give 
its approval on the referendum.
491 According to a 2000 CSA poll, 71 percent of the Loire-Atlantique population was in favour of 
the reunification (63 percent for Brittany), an 2001 Ifop survey indicated 75 percent (63 percent in 
Brittany) although the same institute came up with 56 percent in 2002 and 67 percent in 2006. 
However, according to a 2002 poll by TNS Sofres, only 29 percent of the population of Loire- 
Atlantique favoured the reunification as opposed to other forms of territorial organisation, such as 
maintaining the current territorial division (32 percent) and the creation of another territorial entity 
including Brittany and Pays de la Loire (36 percent).
492 Conseil Regional de Bretagne, Direction de la Culture, Une Politique Linguistique pour la 
Bretagne, December 2004. For the text of the Resolution, see http://www.reqion- 
bretaane.fr/CRB/Public/divers/cache-actualite/un plan de sauveqard 11036480895536
(accessed on 20 November 2008)
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Brittany -  and in less European funds for the region493. Breton nationalists also 
complained that the EU was solely driven by economic considerations494, reaffirming their 
“support for a federal, democratic and social Europe” and pointing out that European 
integration should include “a European pact of social stability ensuring full employment, 
the well-being of all, as well as social equity”495. For the 2004 European elections, a 
change in the mode of scrutiny -  France was divided into 8 electoral constituencies -  
meant that the party felt it had a real opportunity to influence the trajectory of European 
integration496. An electoral alliance had been decided between R&PS and the Greens, so 
that UDB was able to present two candidates on the Green list497. In the referendum for 
the European Constitutional Treaty, the UDB campaigned in favour of a ‘yes’. The party 
membership was divided on the issue and a debate was organised to discuss the 
European Constitution498. In the end, although the EU did not reflect the federal and social 
Europe wished for by the UDB, the party felt that the document provided significant 
improvements for the respect of cultural and linguistic diversity and regional representation 
at the European level499. Based on his European expertise, Guyonvarc’h has performed 
an agenda-setting role in the Breton Council, stressing the need for Brittany to join the 
“club of European regions with legislative powers”500. For instance, he has repeatedly 
highlighted the weakness of Brittany’s budget in comparison to the one of Wales, a region 
comparable in size and population (the Breton budget is 25 times less than the Welch 
one)501. The UDB leader has also alerted the Breton Council of the under-use of European 
funding, notably in the field of fisheries502. The Breton Council has since made demands 
for a direct and autonomous management of European funds destined to Brittany503.
6.3. Summary of European responses
493 Le Peuple Breton, L’autonomie regionale: une imperieuse necessite pour que la Bretagne ne 
soit pas la victime impuissante d’un marche unique a 25, (462/463), July/August 2002
494 Le Peuple Breton, Europe des actionnaires, Europe des precaires, (490), November 2004
495 Le Peuple Breton, St Malo: le 27e Congres de I’UDB, (491), December 2004
496 Le Peuple Breton, Le 13 Juin, faisons avancer I’Europe federate et sociale des peuples et des 
regions, Juin 2004 (485)
49 Jedjiga Ouggad-Douillard and Herri Gourmelen also featured on the Greens list which 
obtained 7.66 percent and one MEP seat (Marie-Helene Aubert).
498 70 percent of party members were in favour of the Constitution. Interview Nicole Logeais, 28 
October 2008
499 Le Peuple Breton, Traite constitutionnel europeen : seul le ‘oui’ permettra des avancees, 
Janvier 2005 (492)
500 Le Peuple Breton, Regions d’Europe a pouvoir legislative: la Bretagne peut se preparer a 
integrer le club, (203), December 2005
501 Le Peuple Breton, Budget: les moyens financiers que donnerait I’autonomie, (506), March 
2006 ; Interview Christian Guyonvarc’h, 3rd September 2009
502 Le Peuple Breton, L’argent europeen inutilise!, (506), March 2006
503 Interview Nicole Logeais, 28 October 2008
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The UDB has showed a great deal of interest for Europe ever since its creation in 
1963. From very early on - long before the EFA was even created for instance - Breton 
nationalists have expressed their views on the trajectory that the EU should follow. 
Although it was never opposed to European integration, the party has expressed criticism 
towards the liberalism of European policies and decried the neglect of Brittany by the EU 
and by the French government. Breton nationalists have asked for more political 
integration enabling the EU to compensate for the regional and social inequalities created 
by the European single market. The European dimension of the party’s political agenda 
became stronger throughout the years to the point of emerging as central in the UDB’s 
demand for “Brittany’s autonomy within Europe”. The party’s campaign for regional 
autonomy is now based on it being an institutional and political necessity to defend Breton 
interests in the EU. Of the three cases, Breton nationalists have gone the furthest in 
embracing the Europe of the Regions rhetoric.
This chapter has also illustrated how Europe played a large role in the strategic 
considerations of the UDB. Specialising in European issues affecting Brittany has helped 
the party to go through a dry spell that lasted from 1986 to 2004, when it repeatedly failed 
to achieve regional representation. More than its defence of Breton culture and languages, 
it is through its expertise in European matters and its European connections with the 
Greens that the party gained entry to the Breton Council. Since 2004, the UDB has 
achieved recognition from the regional elites and has been in a position to influence the 
regional debate. There has been an acceleration in the last few years, with the Socialist 
President of the Breton Council taking position in favour of several UDB demands, such as 
the reunification of Brittany and the recognition of Breton languages. Discursive and 
political resources emerging from European integration have provided the UDB with 
means to access regional politics and subsequently to disseminate its ideas into the 
Breton political debate.
Of the three cases, Breton nationalists have perceived the most opportunities in 
Europe and used European resources to the full in order to serve their local mobilisation. 
The organisation and articulation of the UDB has played a part in the success of its 
strategic reorientation towards Europe. Unlike Basque and Corsican nationalists, the party 
has not been averse to forming tactical alliances with non-nationalist organisations. As 
well as improving its level of political representation, long-term collaboration with the 
Socialist Party has forced the UDB to take position on a wide range of socio-economic 
issues affecting the Breton people. Its political programme has not been limited to 
nationalist claims, thereby allowing for multiple links to be made between the EU and the 
political, economic and social situation of Brittany. In addition, the UDB has not been 
challenged in the political linkages it has made between European integration and its 
mobilisation. The fact that the party was the only Breton political force with connections at
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the European level -  even symbolic - has significantly strengthened its claim to be the 
defender of Breton interests in the EU.
Chapter 7 -  A comparative study of the impact of European integration on 
minority nationalist parties in France
The last three chapters have provided a contextualised account of the way in 
which the Unione di U Populu Corsu (UPC), Abertzaleen Batasuna (AB) and the Union 
Democratique Bretonne (UDB) have responded to European integration. This chapter will 
now take a step back from these individual case studies in order to draw conclusions with 
regards to the impact of Europe on minority nationalist parties in France. The European 
responses of AB, the UDB and the UPC have been shaped by a combination of their 
positions on European integration and the significance of Europe in their strategic 
considerations. The complex picture emerging from this comparative analysis is not a 
perfect fit with the often assumed Europeanism of minority nationalist parties. It is 
undeniable that minority nationalists in France have found an interest in the principles of 
European integration. Yet, their engagement with the European question has remained 
considerably influenced by the context of centre-periphery relations in France. Prevented 
by domestic constraints to mobilise in the EU, these parties have not searched beyond the 
framework of the French state for the realisation of their goal of self-government. This can 
come as a surprise considering the near deadlock situation in which minority nationalists 
find themselves in France. It shows that the European responses of minority nationalist 
actors are not just dependent on the potential of European integration to resolve their 
long-term demands, as often assumed in the literature. These responses are also based 
on the strategic assessment of multiple aspects of European integration for the 
mobilisation of minority nationalist parties in a given member state.
The aim of this thesis was to answer the two questions posed in chapter one, 
namely 1) what resources, if any, have minority nationalist parties in France perceived in 
European integration 2) what are the factors affecting these parties in their use of 
European resources? The evidence gathered in the empirical chapters attests that, 
despite being confined to the local level and not being able to mobilise in the European 
political space along other minority nationalists, AB, the UDB and the UPC have derived 
discursive, political and strategic resources from Europe. European integration has not 
only provided a new discourse to give credibility to minority nationalists’ aim of self- 
government, but has also been a strong impetus for party cooperation both at the 
European level and the French national level. The European dimension thereby cultivated 
by the parties has resulted in raising their local political status and moving them from the 
fringes to the mainstream of local politics. In response to the second research question, 
the comparative analysis has indeed revealed that there were two factors affecting the 
value of European resources for minority nationalist parties: regional institutionalisation 
and the dynamics of party competition. Unlike what had been hypothesised based on their
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trans-border identity, Northern Basque nationalists have perceived the least opportunity in 
Europe, partly due to the lack of institutionalisation of the Northern Basque Country. The 
regional status of Brittany and Corsica has involved both regions in the European policy­
making process, thereby enhancing European resources for the UDB and the UPC. In the 
end, though, the comparison of the Breton and Corsican cases shows that the value of 
Europe as a strategy for minority nationalist parties in France is also contingent on the 
dynamics of party competition within minority nationalist movement themselves.
7.1. Party positions on European integration
The empirical research has revealed, in the three cases, a clear line of support for 
the general ideas of integration underlying the EU. At no point during the 25 year time 
period of the study has either one of the three minority nationalist parties deeply contested 
the validity of European integration. AB, the UDB and the UPC have essentially conceived 
European integration as a process of reorganisation of existing political power. 
Accordingly, the parties’ positive response to Europe has come from its potential to bring 
changes to the centralised French state and transform centre-periphery relations in 
France. In the words of Corsican leader Max Simeoni, “the Europe that is being 
constructed will apply pressure on the Jacobin state [and] bring to the fore its internal 
contradictions"504. Northern Basque nationalists have been more fundamental, arguing 
that “Europe [will] weaken the dogma of absolute sovereignty of [their] two jailer states”505, 
while Breton nationalists have stressed that European integration rendered the French 
state increasingly unequipped to deal with the economic and social problems facing 
Brittany506. Hence, the three parties have come to recognise the potential of Europe to 
resolve the minority nationalist predicament in some way or another. Their pro-European 
stance is striking as small or excluded parties have an incentive to take extreme positions 
in an effort to gain political visibility in a given party system (Taggart, 1998). Judging the 
marginalisation of minority nationalist parties in France, a strong opposition to the EU 
could have been an appealing strategy for these parties. As such, the European response 
of the UPC, AB and the UDB came to reinforce the argument that European integration 
has a singular effect on the minority nationalist party family -  by striking at the heart of the 
centre-periphery cleavage (De Winter & Gomez-Reino, 2002). Minority nationalists have a 
vested interest in a process which not only changes the function of the state, but also 
challenges the correlation between nation and state, thereby removing a historical 
obstacle to the realisation of their self-determination.
504 Arritti, Editorial de Max Simeoni, 24th May 1991
505 Enbata, Une Chance ?, 2 Janvier 1986 (903)
506 Le Peuple Breton (429), September 1999
146
However, the example of AB, the UDB and the UPC also shows that the 
Europeanism of minority nationalist parties must be qualified. Minority nationalists have 
been portrayed in the literature as being overwhelmingly supportive of Europe (Jolly, 
2007). Some authors have even argued that pro-Europeanism was a defining feature of 
this otherwise rather heterogeneous party family (De Winter & Gomez-Reino, 2002). Yet, 
without ever contesting European integration, the three political parties have all tended 
towards a negative evaluation of the EU as an institution. This finding is in line with 
arguments made in the party politics literature, which suggest that one should differentiate 
between party support for the idea of Europe, i.e. the general principles at the core of 
European integration, and support for the concrete reality of Europe, i.e. the practices of 
the EU and European policies (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002; Elias, 2008). The three parties 
have challenged the current form of the EU, dominated by state interests. They have 
made demands for changes in the EU’s set-up in order to make it closer to satisfying their 
normative vision of a European polity, primarily through an increase of regional 
representation in European institutions. This discontent is fairly typical of minority 
nationalists in Europe, which have been vocal supporters of a Europe of the Regions 
where political power would be shared between the European and regional level. But what 
is striking in the case of minority nationalists in France is their consistent criticism of the 
European policies affecting the economic and social status of their territories. The UDB 
has been vocal in underlining the detrimental effects of the Common Agricultural Policy 
and the European Fisheries Policy for Brittany. The UPC has also appeared in rejection of 
the concrete policy implications of the EU, depending on how the latter have served 
Corsican economic interests. And while rarely featuring in the discourse of AB, European 
policies have generally been perceived by Northern Basque nationalists as a medium to 
serve the interest of member states. In sum, although they agree with the idea of 
European integration, these parties have been in clear disagreement with the practices of 
the EU.
One could argue that the positions of AB, the UDB and the UPC vis-a-vis 
European integration have been influenced by right/left ideology. Ample discussion in the 
party politics literature has established that party attitudes towards the EU are closely 
related to their ideological profile (Hix and Lord, 1997; Marks and Wilson, 2000; Hooghe et 
al., 2002; Marks, Wilson & Ray, 2002). Minority nationalists in France have leaned 
towards the left end of the political spectrum and the socialist orientation of these parties 
has at times clashed with the liberal ideals driving European integration. In the 1970s, 
Breton nationalists have participated in elections as part of the Union of the Left -  formed 
with the Socialist and Communist parties -  and the predominance of leftist ideas in the 
early years of the UDB goes some way into explaining its reservations towards the 
European single market. Similarly, AB has brought together different ideological
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tendencies into a single political platform and some of its members come from EMA, an 
extreme left organisation mobilising for the national liberation of the Basque Country. 
These AB members have never departed from a socialist interpretation of European 
integration as a process exclusively driven by logics of the capital market. Yet, the right/left 
divide is not predominant for minority nationalist parties, which are more concerned with 
the organisation of political authority than the ideas shaping the exercise of political 
authority. If one looks more closely at the content of these critiques, it becomes apparent 
that leftist ideology cannot fully account for the position of AB, the UDB and the UPC on 
European integration. More than an ideological disagreement, their negative appraisal of 
European practices has revolved essentially around the EU not taking into consideration 
the interests of their minority/region. When AB did mention the EU, it would almost 
inevitably include a reference to its indifference to the plight of the Basque people. More 
specifically, European policies have been perceived by the UDB as increasing regional 
disparities at the expense of economically weaker regions, such as Brittany. Similarly, a 
main concern of Corsican nationalists has been that European harmonisation would wipe 
out the fiscal exemptions granted to Corsica to counter the problems linked to its insularity. 
This perceived indifference from Brussels has to do with the fact that minority nationalists 
in France have absolutely no say in European policy-making.
As explained in chapter three, in the French system, all decisions related to 
European policies (even in the case of the Regional Policy) are taken at the national level. 
Lack of parliamentary representation and institutional recognition for minority groups has 
however meant that minority nationalists are completely cut-off from French national 
politics. Unlike what is found in many other member states, there is no form of power- 
sharing agreement through which minority representatives could directly participate in 
national debates (Argelaguet, 2003). Minority nationalist parties can only rely on channels 
available to any local interest group in France for the incorporation of their demands into 
the EU policy-making process. Furthermore, domestic constraints are present to 
undermine both regional and national channels of representation. As elected 
representatives, minority nationalists should be able to relay their demands through the 
competences granted to sub-national authorities. The French politico-administrative 
system however provides little political autonomy to regional elected assemblies, or to any 
other sub-national assembly, whose role has been limited to policy implementation. The 
regional channel is unlikely to lead to the inclusion of minority demands into national 
preferences. Alternatively, minority nationalists could gain representation at the national 
level, in the French Parliament, to defend their interests and values, but the two-round 
majoritarian rule adopted for legislative elections is unforgiving to regional and small 
parties. Despite increasing party cooperation and electoral alliances with the Green Party, 
not one minority nationalist has ever managed to sit in the French Parliament. In sum, for
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the representation of their interests in European policies, minority nationalists have to rely 
on political elites hostile to their predicament and over which they have no form of 
influence. It is therefore not surprising that Basque, Breton and Corsican nationalists have 
at times perceived the EU as a remote and unsympathetic institution. This also means that 
these parties’ criticism of EU policies is primarily an expression of their disagreement with 
the positions of the French government on European issues.
The positions of these parties towards Europe have been filtered primarily through 
their struggle against the French state. Interpretations of French centre-periphery relations 
vary between the three cases and these have mediated the way in which each of the 
parties has responded to European integration. The UPC has projected onto the EU the 
paradox of its demands for more autonomy and more public subsidies to the French 
government. In the same vein, the UDB’s concern for the peripheralisation of Brittany jn 
Europe -  and subsequent reticence about the enlargement of the EU - mirrors its 
experience within France. These parties’ analysis of European integration cannot be 
disentangled from the national and historical context in which they have emerged. Another 
observation - pointing even more strikingly at the need to refine the Europeanism of 
minority nationalists - is that none of the parties examined in this study have perceived the 
EU as an alternative to their relations with the French state. Despite embedding its political 
project in the European context, the UDB has never conceived Brittany’s self-government 
outside of France. Similarly, although the Corsican nationalist movement has been 
constructed entirely around its opposition to the French state, the UPC’s support for 
European integration has never involved the disappearance of Corsica’s link to France. 
And while the concept of Euro-region could open up new perspectives for Northern 
Basques, AB’s long-term objective has remained set on obtaining autonomy from French 
authorities. It may seem surprising considering the persistence of the French state in its 
rejection of minority rights and the sterility of centre-periphery relations in France. Despite 
their lack of prospect within the French domestic context, minority nationalists have not 
gone as far as reformulating their long-term constitutional aims in accordance with the new 
European reality. It does not mean that it will never be the case, but for now, their political 
project is understood within the framework of France, although European integration is 
perceived as facilitating its realisation by forcing the French state to reform itself.
This position has to be seen in relation to the limited contacts that AB, the UPC 
and the UDB have actually had with the EU beyond a few one-off opportunities. AB did 
campaign in the European Parliament with other Basque nationalist parties and this led to 
the adoption of a resolution supporting the peace process in the Basque Country507. The 
UPC was once received by the European Commission in 2005, in order to negotiate 
compensation after Corsica was moved from Objective 1 to Objective 2 of the Regional
507 EP, Resolution on the Peace Process in Spain, B6 0527/2006, adopted on 25 October 2006.
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Policy. In general, however, minority nationalist parties in France have struggled to access 
the European political space. As mentioned above, the domestic channels available to 
French sub-national actors to participate in the European policy-making process are 
extremely restricted. But minority nationalists have not possessed the financial and 
material resources necessary to approach and lobby European institutions directly. The 
parties examined here rely almost entirely on party membership fees to cover all their 
maintenance and administrative costs. As actors without resources, minority nationalists in 
France only have their numbers, potential disruptiveness and electoral clout to make 
authorities listen to their demands (Tarrow, 1995). These limited tools are mostly 
ineffective in a European polity where a vast array of actors compete with each other for 
their demands to be heard. European elections have been their only chance to participate 
in European politics but electoral rules in France have made it difficult for regional parties 
to pass the threshold for representation in the European Parliament. During the. 25 years 
time period of this study, there has only ever been one French MEP representing a 
minority nationalist party, the Corsican Max Simeoni from 1989 to 1994508. This shows 
how gaining representation at the European level is very much dependent on decisions 
made by member states, i.e. the rules governing the electoral process, as well as the 
definition and number of electoral constituencies.
Minority nationalists in France have lacked the means and resources to mobilise at 
the European level. With limited access to the European political space, these parties do 
not have enough experience of operating in the European polity to jump into the post­
sovereigntist arguments of other minority nationalists in Europe. Unlike Plaid Cymru or 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya -  both parties have abandoned their goal of 
independence in favour of autonomy within the EU (Keating, 2004) - AB, the UPC and the 
UDB have continued to consider France as the only framework for the political realisation 
of their claims to self-government, despite the undeniable lack of opportunity structures in 
the French domestic context. A post-sovereigntist stance would demand a certain amount 
of optimistic projection into a hypothetical Europe of the Regions which proved to be a 
stretch too far for minority nationalists in France, well aware of the entrenchment of states 
interest in the EU.
7.2. Resources emerging from Europe
The closure of the French state to the institutional and political representation of 
minority nationalists means that the day-to-day activities of minority nationalism have
508 In the 2009 European elections, Francois Alfonsi earned an MEP seat after an alliance with 
the Green Party in the South East district.
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remained entirely focused on the local political sphere. Unable to mobilise at the European 
level and to participate in French national politics, minority nationalists in France can only 
operate as political actors locally. The case studies have revealed that European 
integration had nevertheless entered the strategic considerations of these parties, albeit to 
different degrees. The next section will go though the different European resources used 
by AB, the UDB and the UPC in the context of their local mobilisation.
First, AB, the UDB and the UPC have derived discursive resources from European 
integration - primarily geared towards exposing France as an exception among EU 
member states -  in order to strengthen their minority demands. The parties have 
developed a European discourse confronting the French stance on minority rights, 
whereby the French nation-state, based on indivisibility and uniformity, is ill-adapted to the 
emerging European polity where cultural and linguistic diversity are celebrated. This is a 
clear point of similarity between the three cases, which have all developed imageries 
around the theme of the French exception in Europe, referring to a “Gallic rooster” about 
to surrender or the “last of dinosaurs”. The idea that France is bound to change in 
accordance with the new European reality gives a progressive tone to the political project 
of minority nationalists. The ideological and political positions of the French government 
with regards to regional diversity can be exposed as backward in contrast with the 
standards of other member states. The autonomous status granted to the Spanish 
Communities, political devolution in Scotland and Wales or the institutional arrangements 
adopted in Italian regions: all these developments underline the archaism of the French 
politico-administrative system. This has enabled minority nationalists to argue that, far 
from the stigma associated with minority nationalism in the French context, demands for 
self-government are not only commonly accepted elsewhere in the EU, but also the way 
forward in terms of political organisation. Similarly, the adoption of European documents of 
minority protection, such as the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, 
has also confirmed the appropriateness of minority nationalist demands for linguistic rights 
as well as reiterated the inadequacy of the position of the French government. Placing 
their political project in a favourable European perspective, if only discursively, has been a 
way of legitimising minority nationalist mobilisation in French regions.
European integration has also been an impetus for party cooperation among 
minority nationalists in France. After the demise of his alliance with the Green Party, 
Corsican nationalist Max Simeoni convinced most minority nationalist parties in French 
regions to present a joint list for the 1994 European elections. The list did not allow 
minority nationalist movements in France to retain their representation in the European 
Parliament, but had the effect of uniting these parties through the creation of Solidarity 
Region & People (R&PS). As a party federation, R&PS has enabled minority nationalists 
to present themselves as one united and coherent actor within French national politics.
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Above all, R&PS has proved useful in forming electoral agreements with the Green Party 
-  arguably minority nationalists' most reliable political ally in the French context. As 
illustrated in the empirical chapters, electoral alliances are a necessity for these parties to 
reach the electoral threshold for regional representation, which went up to 10% in the 
2004 regional elections. When negotiating an electoral alliance with the Green Party, 
minority nationalist parties have been able to offer the support of the whole R&PS 
federation, as well as their own support, in national elections. The extra political weight 
provided by the R&PS helped the UDB to bargain its way into the Breton Regional Council 
in 2004. In addition, ever since cooperation with the Greens yielded a European seat to 
the UPC, minority nationalists in France have started featuring on the Green lists for 
European elections. In general, AB, the UDB and the UPC have sought to spare their 
limited resources for local elections in which they actually stand a chance of gaining 
representation. Alliance with the Greens has provided an easy way for minority 
nationalists to participate in European elections at a low cost and bring exposure to the 
minority nationalist predicament in the process.
Some minority nationalists in France have also established connections with like- 
minded actors within the EU, since the UDB and the UPC have joined the European Free 
Alliance (EFA). These parties’ membership of EFA has brought a number of practical 
benefits, such as logistics, administrative support and development of party programmes. 
The EFA has for instance provided financial and campaigning resources for European 
election campaigns, and the Green/EFA alliance within the European Parliament has also 
facilitated the collaboration of the French Green Party with the R&PS in local elections. 
More generally, since direct representation in the European Parliament is unlikely, the 
EFA has served as the spokesperson of minority nationalist interests within the European 
arena. The EFA is organised in such a way that party members without an MEP can bring 
up domestic issues and sometimes propose resolutions in sessions of the European 
Parliament. The UPC presented a resolution in the EP to denounce the French decision to 
install an electric cable linking Corsica to Italy and Sardinia instead of developing 
Corsica’s own hydro-electric resources. Similarly, the UDB obtained the adoption of an 
emergency resolution by the EP relating to maritime safety and security after a series of 
shipping disasters on the Breton coastline. Furthermore, EFA membership has exposed 
the parties to a socialisation effect which has brought substance to otherwise abstract 
symbolic European ideas (Lynch, 1996:136-166; Elias, 2009:162-163). It has facilitated 
the exchange of information and ideas about a whole range of European issues which had 
previously been ignored by minority nationalists in France. The arguments of the EFA 
have provided images and a rhetoric that can be taken up by individual parties as an 
expression of their own aspirations for their minority/region within Europe. The discourse 
of the UDB and the UPC started featuring the principle of subsidiarity, perceived as a
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recognition and sharing of sovereignty, and a pincer strategy whereby the state is stripped 
of its power from above and from below. Only AB is not a member of the EFA and it is not 
coincidental that, of the three parties included in this thesis, AB’s European discourse has 
displayed the least detail and substance.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the case studies have revealed the 
domestic added value of the European dimension of minority nationalist parties. Minority 
nationalist mobilisation in French regions has gained credibility as a result of its insertion 
within a larger movement present in all EU member states. AB, the UDB and the UPC 
have devoted a considerable amount of their limited material resources to bring to the fore 
the international dimension of their mobilisation, through the organisation of local events 
and talks by more established minority nationalists, from Catalonia or Scotland for 
instance. In a very concrete way, Europe has been a source of legitimacy for minority 
nationalist demands within local political spheres. In addition, there are a lot of political 
credentials to be gained in the eyes of the electorate at home from representation in the 
EU, even through the EFA. The rhetoric of being able to go directly to Brussels (or 
Strasbourg in this case) to defend the interests of their minority/region has brought 
precious political capital to minority nationalists eager to portray themselves as key 
political actors, such as the Corsican UPC. The EFA has also provided information on 
European affairs and in some cases access to the Parliament’s deliberative and policy­
making forums. This has allowed minority nationalist parties to claim a sense of expertise 
on European issues affecting their territory, giving them a say in local debates like in the 
case of the Breton UDB. All in all, linking their mobilisation to developments at the 
European level has helped raise the profile of minority nationalists among local elites.
These resources emerging from European integration have proved particularly 
valuable in the French context where minority nationalists are marginalised and dismissed 
as extremists. Jacobinism is so deeply rooted in French politics that political actors 
demanding self-government, even through democratic means, receive a considerable 
amount of suspicion. As a result, minority nationalists not only lack legitimacy and 
credibility, they also struggle to find political allies outside of minority nationalist circles. In 
contrast, in Italy and Spain, minority nationalists have often been key actors in securing 
governing majorities at the state level (Calvet Crespo, 2003; Guerrero Salom, 2003; 
Giordano, 2003). The resources mentioned above have helped the UDB and the UPC to 
overcome the political isolation affecting minority nationalists in France. The European 
dimension of the UDB has contributed to establishing the party as the democratic option 
within the Corsican nationalist movement not only in the eyes of the population, but also of 
the French government. Re-orientating its mobilisation towards the EU has proved an 
effective strategy for the UDB to surmount its marginalisation within Breton politics since
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the demise of its alliance with the Socialist Party. The same cannot be said of AB, which 
has showed relatively little interest in European matters and has not made full use of the 
resources emerging from European integration. The next section will explain differences 
between the cases, by going through the three factors initially proposed to condition 
minority nationalist responses to Europe, i.e. trans-border identity, regional 
institutionalisation and dynamics of party competition.
7.3. Factors influencing party responses to Europe
7.3.1. Trans-border identity
In chapter one, the Basque trans-border identity had been suggested as a factor 
increasing the significance of European integration for the realisation of minority nationalist 
projects. It had been hypothesised that, with the new perspectives opening up through the 
changing nature of the French-Spanish border, Northern Basque nationalists would have 
reformulated their demands for self-government in line with the changing European reality. 
Minority nationalists’ principled support for European integration was expected to be 
enhanced in the case of Northern Basque nationalism. Yet, in comparison to the UPC and 
the UDB, Abertzaleen Batasuna has proved the least interested in European politics, 
suggesting that the party did not perceive Europe as opening up new possibilities for the 
realisation of its political project, which has remained centred on achieving autonomy in 
the French context. European integration has not gained prominence in the discourse of 
AB and the party has not sought to join the EFA like the other two cases. Arguably, AB’s 
reluctance to denounce ETA’s struggle has limited its prospect for party cooperation 
through the EFA, which formally requires from its members to condemn political violence. 
But the UPC became part of the EFA long before taking an official position against 
Corsican political violence. Although it has always claimed to be a democratic 
organisation, the UPC only publicly condemned the actions of the FLNC after it left the 
Corsica Nazione coalition in the mid-1990s. And Northern Basque nationalists have never 
even approached the EFA about a possible membership. The fact of the matter is, until 
recently, AB had made no effort to socialise outside of the Basque nationalist movement 
and was reluctant to perform electoral alliances with non-nationalist political parties. AB’s 
partnership with the Green Party for the 2004 European elections has been contested not 
only by the leadership of Batasuna, but also by AB own members. The exclusive nature of 
Northern Basque nationalism and a certain level of mistrust towards non-nationalist 
organisations have to be taken into account to understand AB’s lack of engagement with 
other minority nationalist parties in the EU.
It would be misguided to conclude from the experience of AB that European 
integration is not conducive to opportunities for the accommodation of minorities with a
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trans-border identity. The 1999 creation of the first Basque trans-national institution, the 
Udalbiltza, reuniting the entire Basque nationalist movement on both sides of the border 
would suggest otherwise. The emergence of this new political community was not framed 
as European cross-border cooperation by Northern Basque nationalists who instead 
preferred the term “national construction of the Basque Country”. It is however unlikely 
that this development would have taken place without the erosion of the French-Spanish 
border triggered by the EU. It is also true that the sort of cross-border cooperation sought 
for by Basque nationalists has been hindered by compelling political and institutional 
factors. Cross-border cooperation is less likely to flourish in politically charged situations, 
such as those involving divided minorities (Perkmann, 2003:166), and these initiatives in 
the Basque Country have been constrained by France and Spain’s fear of secessionism. 
Even more directly, cross-border cooperation has been inhibited by institutional 
discrepancies on both sides of the border. For the Comunidad Autonoma del Pais Vasco 
(CAPV) - one of the most powerful regions in the EU - there is arguably little to be gained 
from forming a political association with French sub-national authorities, in all account 
minor political players. In any case, the lack of institutionalisation of the Northern Basque 
Country has prevented any attempt at creating a Basque Euro-region, which could only be 
done through the grouping of existing sub-national institutions. Consequently, cross- 
border cooperation in the Basque Country has been found at the municipal level, such as 
Eurocity Bayonne-San Sebastian, and at the regional level, such as the Euroregion 
Euskadi-Navarre-Aquitaine. The Northern Basque Country is however located at a meso 
level, i.e. it is large enough to encompass several municipalities but too small to be a 
regional unit, and none of these initiatives have satisfied Northern Basque nationalists as 
an reflection of the links existing within the historical Basque Country.
The Northern Basque case is most compelling with regards to the powerful 
constraints imposed on minority nationalist mobilisation in the French domestic context. 
The political and electoral weakness of the Northern Basque nationalist movement is 
striking when compared to its Southern counterpart. It is noteworthy that AB has not been 
able to derive much benefit from the existence of another Basque nationalist movement 
actively mobilising in the EU, especially when evidence suggests a certain amount of 
sympathy for the Basque political issue on the part of European institutions. In 2005, with 
the help of French MEP Onesta, Basque nationalist parties have lobbied the European 
Parliament and obtained the adoption of a European resolution in support of the Basque 
peace process. On this occasion, AB was propelled into the European political space, 
eluding the strong gate-keeping of the French state on sub-national mobilisation in the EU. 
This one instance attests the political resources that Northern Basque nationalists could 
have exploited, had they been able to mobilise in the European political space. As it is,
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however, AB has remained constrained to operate exclusively within the French domestic 
context, just like the UDB and the UPC.
Regardless of the political, institutional or even symbolic possibilities opened up by 
European integration for the Basque predicament, the limitations imposed by the French 
state are such that AB is not more able to access the EU than any other minority 
nationalist party. Still, like any other minority nationalist party in France, maybe even more 
so, AB has suffered from political marginalisation in its local political sphere. Chapter five 
has illustrated the efforts deployed by Northern Basque nationalists, in the context of the 
mobilisation for the creation of a Basque department, to establish themselves as legitimate 
political actors. Yet, unlike Breton and Corsican nationalists, at no point did they use 
Europe to gain credibility among the Basque political elites. If the UDB and UPC did 
perceive advantages for their local mobilisation in the EU, one can wonder why AB has 
not followed the same rationale. The answer lies in the lack of institutional recognition of 
the Northern Basque Country.
7.3.2. Regional institutionalisation
The comparative analysis indicates that a minimum level of regional 
institutionalisation is necessary for minority nationalists to draw strategic resources from 
European integration for their local mobilisation. Northern Basque nationalists essentially 
defend a territory which has no existence in the French politico-administrative system, not 
even as a sub-regional entity like a canton. In opposition, the UPC and the UDB have 
mobilised in institutionalised regions: Brittany is an administrative region while Corsica has 
a unique institutional status. This difference in terms of institutional recognition has 
affected the concrete reality of European integration in the three territories. Compared to 
many other regions in Europe, French regions are weakly consolidated as institutions and 
their influence within the French politico-administrative system is limited. Yet, simply as a 
result of their regional status, Brittany and Corsica are much closer to EU policy-making 
than the Northern Basque Country. With the growing importance of EU policies in Breton 
and Corsican politics, the need has increased for regional representation in European 
institutions. This is precisely why the European dimension of the Breton and Corsican 
nationalists has constituted an asset and a tool to participate in the local political debates. 
Regions, i.e. the administrative units identified as region within each member state, have 
become the local level of government where European policies take place (Jeffery, 1997). 
As French regional interests seek to be incorporated into the EU policy-making process, 
regional actors with some form of influence within European institutions have seen their 
status improve.
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Cultivating a European dimension has constituted an effective strategy to raise the 
profile of the UDB and the UPC among the regional elites. The UPC has used Simeoni’s 
European mandate and its EFA membership to maintain its influence over Corsican 
politics at a time when the party did not sit in the Corsican Assembly. Similarly, stressing 
its involvement in the EFA and reorienting its mobilisation towards the EU has helped the 
UDB to gain representation in the Breton regional council. Both parties have positioned 
themselves as defenders of Corsican and Breton interests in the EU and this has 
ultimately given them political visibility and credibility. In contrast, Europe does not come 
into play in the local politics within which Northern Basque nationalists are engaged, at 
least not in a direct way. European funds and European projects of cross-border 
cooperation are being dealt with at the level of the Aquitaine region. Beyond the fact that 
gaining representation in the regional council is out of reach for Northern Basque 
nationalists, it means that European politics have less relevance in the eyes of the 
Northern Basque population. For instance, the control of structural funds is not a stake like 
it can be in Breton or Corsican politics. Evocations of Europe would not have provided AB 
with added political weight and this explains why the EU has been marginal in the strategic 
considerations of Northern Basque nationalists.
7.3.3. Dynamics o f party competition
Representation and party co-operation at the European level have been the main 
substantive elements of the European dimension of the UDB and the UPC. Such 
experiences have raised the parties’ awareness and knowledge of the European polity, 
and this has proved to be their entry point into the mainstream of Breton and Corsican 
politics. The UPC and the UDB have exploited the European issue to score political points 
against their rivals, may it be other minority nationalists or mainstream political parties. 
From a strategic viewpoint, positioning themselves as defenders of their minority/region in 
Europe is convenient for minority nationalists: they can blame the French government -  
and therefore the political parties in office -  for the disadvantages of European integration 
and take some form of credit for its advantages among local political actors. The two 
parties were not equally “equipped” on the European issue, inasmuch as the UPC had an 
MEP from 1989 to 1994, but have both successfully used it to raise their local political 
profile. In the end, the impact of direct representation within the European Parliament on 
the party’s status has not been as stark as one would imagine. Corsican politics are 
characterised by a strong antagonism between the island’s clans - in control of the local 
branches of national political parties, such as the Socialist Party or Sarkozy’s Union for a 
Popular Movement - and the nationalist movement. Arguably, the task of overcoming 
marginalisation in this particular historical context has been more arduous, even with
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Simeoni’s prestigious European mandate. Yet, the UDB has also significantly benefited 
from its European dimension overtime, despite never having formal representation in the 
EU. Membership of a European network like the EFA has proved sufficient for Breton 
nationalists to portray themselves as European (as well as Breton) political actors 
defending Breton interests in European institutions. It is argued that the effectiveness of 
Europe as a strategy for the UPC has been hindered by the power struggle taking place 
within the Corsican nationalist movement.
In chapter one, it was posed that dynamics of party competition within minority 
nationalist movements would affect parties’ ability to draw strategic benefits from Europe. 
The comparison of the Breton and Corsican cases has reinforced the argument that the 
utility of Europe has been dependent on the political space that the parties have to play 
the European card in local politics (Elias, 2008:565). The UPC and the UDB have not 
been alone in adapting their discourse to the new European reality, other minority 
nationalist parties have also adopted European themes which were previously their 
exclusive terrain. Evidence demonstrates that the local benefits derived from Europe are 
greatest when a minority nationalist party detains some kind of exclusivity on European 
matters within its political movement. In the mid-1990s, Corsica Nazione (CN) started 
taking an interest in European politics, primarily because of the growing importance of 
structural funds for the Corsican economy. The prestige derived from Europe by the UPC 
was undoubtedly tempered when CN leader Jean-Guy Talamoni became responsible for 
European affairs within the Corsican Assembly. In contrast, the Breton nationalist 
movement is united around the UDB, whose leadership has rarely been contested. The 
UDB has been able to take the full advantage of its European dimension precisely 
because it could present itself as being the only Breton political force with contacts at the 
European level.
7.4. Conclusion
What has been the impact of European integration on minority nationalist 
mobilisation in France? Arguably, European integration has made little difference to the 
relations between minority nationalists and the French government. The French insistence 
on granting the same rights to all citizens has remained constant throughout the time 
period of this study. Impervious to the territorial re-organisation of most EU member states 
in favour of regional minorities, France has continuously refused to recognise and 
accommodate its internal diversity. Minority nationalists in France have faced strong 
institutional constraints to operate at the national and European levels of government. The 
three parties included in this thesis have rarely been able to mobilise in the European
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political space along minority nationalists from other regions in the EU. Yet, European 
integration has changed the local politics of minority nationalism in France. It has provided 
discursive, political and strategic resources helping minority nationalist parties to 
overcome their marginalisation in local politics. By strengthening their mobilisation for self- 
government at the local level, European integration could help minority nationalists to 
work their way up and force concessions from Paris through the democratic channel.
While noteworthy considering the “hard case” that France represents in this 
context, these conclusions are at odds with the literature on minority nationalist 
mobilisation in the EU. By looking at a universe of cases neglected in the literature -  
minority nationalist parties in France - 1 his research has revealed that European 
integration does not have the same significance for all minority nationalist parties in 
Europe. Rather, it has demonstrated that the extent to which minority nationalists are able 
to benefit from European integration is dependent upon their national circumstances. 
Where national structures recognise and accommodate minority nationalism, as for 
instance in those cases most widely cited in the existing literature (Scotland, Wales, 
Northern Italy, South Tyrol etc.), European integration is indeed an advantageous new 
political space for minority nationalist mobilisation. But where national structures, as in 
France, provide little or no recognition or accommodation of minority nationalism, 
European integration is, at best, an ideological reference point.
Furthermore, by analytically dissociating minority nationalists’ response to Europe 
from the national opportunity structures where they mobilise -  this was done by 
comparing three parties within the same member state -  this research has been able to 
identify local factors affecting the impact of European integration. Regional 
institutionalisation has appeared as a necessary condition for minority nationalists to 
derive political resources from the EU, while dynamics of party competition -  in particular 
the fragmentation of minority nationalist movements - has emerged as a factor 
undermining the strategic advantages of Europe. This research was never meant to 
provide an exhaustive account of local factors interfering in the value of European 
integration for minority nationalist mobilisation. Rather, the point was to establish that, 
contrary to assumptions made in the literature, the impact of European integration is 
context specific. European integration does provide opportunities for minority nationalist 
mobilisation, but minority nationalists’ access and use of these opportunities emerging 
from the EU will depend on (1) whether the national opportunity structures within which 
they operate is conducive to sub-national mobilisation in the EU and (2) on local factors 
specific to their immediate environment.
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7.5. Contribution to the literature
This thesis has explored the impact of European integration on minority nationalist 
mobilisation through the experience of the Unione di U Populu Corsu (UPC), Abertzaleen 
Batasuna (AB) and the Union Democratique Bretonne (UDB). This last section will go 
through the implications of the findings of this study for the literatures on minority 
nationalism, on minority nationalist response to European integration and on sub-state 
mobilisation in the EU.
First, this research has provided an insight into the way in which minority 
nationalist parties form and operate in the democratic arena. The literature on minority 
nationalist parties has so far concentrated on the variety of their constitutional projects for 
self-government (Seiler, 1994; De Winter & Tursan, 1998; Catt & Murphy, 2002), 
considerably less attention has been given to the process through which these parties 
have not only mobilised support for, but also come to formulate, these demands. Scholars 
have mainly been interested in the most advanced minority nationalist parties in Europe, 
the Scottish Nationalist Party, Plaid Cymru, the Partido Nacionalista Vasco, Volksunie, etc. 
Apart from the content of their programmes, there is little differentiating these widely 
established parties from other regional, or even national, political parties in the way they 
organise and mobilise. By contrast, this research has focused on the early stages of 
minority nationalist mobilisation and this has made the specific features of minority 
nationalists as political actors more apparent. Minority nationalists are the entrepreneurs 
of a minority nationalist mobilisation, in the most fundamental sense. Their role is to 
produce a minority nation and to create a momentum for the realisation of its self- 
determination. The Unione di U Populu Corsu, Abertzaleen Batasuna and the Union 
Democratique Bretonne have used the democratic arena primarily to generate group 
awareness along the lines of their minority nation and to disseminate their minority 
nationalist demands in local political debates, for them to be supported by the local elites. 
In doing so, they have sometimes diverged from the votes-maximising behaviour of 
traditional political parties, by favouring lower levels of representation or refusing alliances 
with powerful political partners.
This research has also demonstrated the degree to which these parties have 
adapted their nation-building strategy to opportunities arising for the realisation of their 
political agenda, often reformulating their demands and changing their tactics. Minority 
nationalists are context-sensitive actors who will reflect upon and respond to changes in 
the institutional, political, social and economic environment where they mobilise. This 
reactivity and flexibility might be less obvious in the case of parties such as the Scottish 
National Party or the Partido Nacionalista Vasco, which operate within the favourable 
institutional and political settings they have contributed to create. Yet, it is a central feature
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of minority nationalist parties that will define the way they react to new developments, 
such as European integration. Indeed, such conceptualisation of minority nationalist 
parties is in line with the latest contribution to this literature which has argued for a 
dynamic relationship between European integration and minority nationalists, where party 
attitudes to the EU reflect the evolution and direction of the integration process at any 
given time (Elias, 2009).
Secondly, this research has also provided evidence on how minority nationalist 
parties formulate their European response, through a combination of party positions on 
the EU and strategic considerations for their mobilisation. The party politics literature has 
been quick to categorise these parties as pro-EU, purely based on the potential of 
European integration to resolve the minority nationalist predicament in the long-term (Hix 
& Lord, 1997; Marks & Wilson, 2000; Jolly, 2007). While Corsican, Basque and Breton 
nationalists have all demonstrated support for the principles underlying European 
integration, this research has revealed the limitations of this argument inasmuch as they 
have not conceived their long-term future in the EU. Their assessment of the benefits of 
European integration has also taken into account the immediate and concrete implications 
of Europe. Since minority nationalists in France have had no say in European policy­
making, EU policies have often failed to incorporate their interests. Strategic 
considerations have come into play as well, depending on the value of European 
resources for their local mobilisation. This research has established that the European 
responses of minority nationalist parties are not solely based on principled support for 
European integration, but also on the specificities of each mobilisation context. This 
finding could help explain a question left unanswered in the literature, i.e. why minority 
nationalist parties have responded to different degrees to European integration?
This research has been built on the few academic accounts that have identified 
opportunities emerging from European integration for minority nationalist parties (De 
Winter & Gomez-Reino, 2002; Lynch, 1996; McGarry & Keating, 2001; McGarry & 
Keating, 2006). As pointed out from the outset, this literature has however not addressed 
how minority nationalist actors use these opportunities domestically and translate them 
into resources for their local mobilisation. As contested and marginalised actors, minority 
nationalists in France have primarily been in need of legitimacy for their demands, 
credibility as political actors and visibility for their mobilisation. They have exploited 
European opportunities to respond to these needs. Following the argument made by 
Lynch (1996), the parties have linked themselves to developments within the framework of 
the EU, such as the referendum on the European Constitution. The contextualised 
account provided in this thesis has illustrated that these political linkages have primarily 
been a way of bringing exposure to their mobilisation. As suggested by McGarry & Keating 
(2001 ;2006), the parties have sought to maximise on the EU’s commitment to the principle
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of subsidiarity and minority rights, as well as the examples of other autonomous regions in 
Europe. These have been the basis of a new discourse exposing the deficiencies of the 
French position on internal diversity. Minority nationalist demands for self-government 
have appeared not only as legitimate but also as progressivist in this European 
perspective. The Corsican UPC and Breton UDB have both joined the European Free 
Alliance (De Winter & Gomez-Reino, 2002) and subsequently used party cooperation at 
the European level to raise their political profile within local elites. The information on and 
knowledge of European affairs acquired through EFA membership has helped them to 
overcome their marginalisation in French politics. In many ways, European integration has 
changed and re-shaped minority nationalist mobilisation in France. However, saying that 
Corsican, Breton and Basque nationalists have entirely reoriented their goals and 
strategies towards the European level -  as implied by this literature -  would be an 
overstatement. Aside a few notable exceptions, they have found themselves unable to 
mobilise at the European level. Indeed, as demonstrated in this study, access to the 
European political arena, and to the full spectrum of opportunities deriving from it, is 
dependent on the level of recognition achieved by minority nationalists in member states.
More generally, this research makes a contribution to the literature on sub-state 
mobilisation in the EU. This was arguably a “hard case” for this literature, inasmuch as the 
French government has been keen to monitor the involvement of sub-national actors in 
European policy-making and has also been reluctant to see minority matters escape the 
realm of domestic affairs. It has clearly illustrated that links between sub-state actors and 
European institutions continue to go through the national level. When domestic channels 
are limited -  as it is the case for minority nationalists in France - it is extremely difficult to 
articulate sub-state interests at the European level. Representation in the European 
Parliament (EP) is equally contingent on decisions made by member states regarding 
electoral rules for European elections. On a couple of occasions, minority nationalists in 
France have succeeded in bypassing the strong gate-keeping of French authorities: AB 
has campaigned in the EP along with other Basque nationalist parties during the latest 
Basque peace process and the UPC has recently won an MEP seat through an alliance 
with the Green Party. This suggests that there are political dynamics triggered by 
European integration that member states cannot control. Overall, though, this research 
reinforces the argument that interactions between the EU and sub-state actors remain to a 
large extent state-centric. Looking at minority nationalist mobilisation in France has 
exposed the limitations of Europe, inasmuch as national structures continue to be a 
precondition for practical engagement with European institutions.
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Appendix 1: Election Tables
These results have been compiled by the author from various sources, including 
databases from the Ministere de Nnterieur and the Centre de Donnees Socio-Politiques, 
newspaper articles, party magazines and documents provided by the parties themselves.
1. Legislative elections
UPC/PNC in legislative elections
1986 1988 1993 1997 2002 2007509
CORSE
Corse du 
Sud
District 1 8.87
(UPC-
MCA)
3.77 3.71 10.51
(Unione
Naziunale)
District 2 6.31
(UPC-
MCA)
2.65 4.81 14.53
(Unione
Naziunale)
Haute-
Corse
District 1 6.30
(UPC-
MCA)
4.62 2.46 6.29
(Unione
Naziunale)
District 2 6.39
(UPC-
MCA)
6.64 6.88 13.50
(Unione
Naziunale)
UDB in legislative elections
1986 1988 1993 1997510 2002 2007
BRETAGNE
Cotes d’Armor
District 1 - - 2.10 2.20
(SRE list)
1.53 -
District 2 - - - - 0.93 -
District 3 - - - - 1.01 -
District 4 - - - 2.21
(SRE list)
2.23 4.93
District 5 - - - 3.12 (SRE 
list)
2.23 2.20
Finistere
District 1 - - - - 1.31 -
District 2 - - - 1.89 (SRE 
list)
1.32 1.25
509 The UPC/PNC participated in the 2007 legislative elections as part of the nationalist coalition 
Unione Naziunale.
510 For the 1997 legislative elections, the UDB formed electoral lists under the name "Solidaires 
Regions Ecologie” (SRE) with two parties - Convergences Ecologie Solidarite and Parti 
Ecologiste -  which would join the Green Party a few years later.
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District 3 1.48 (SRE 
list)
1.17
(Frankiz
Breizh)
District 4 - - - 2 (SRE list) 1.11 3.85 (with 
Greens)
District 5 1.55
(Frankiz
Breizh)
District 6 3.20
(SRE list)
11.28
(with
Leftists)
12.41
(with
Leftists)
District 7 - - - - 1.30 -
District 8 - - - 2.22 (SRE 
list)
1.48 2.98 (with 
Greens)
Ille-et-Vilaine
District 1 - - - - 0.60 -
District 2 - - - - 0.87 -
District 3 - - 2.40 1.50 0.78 -
District 4 - - 1.40 2.33 2.17 -
District 5 - - - - 0.90 3.57
District 6 - - - - 1.47 -
District 7 - - 3.20 2.22 1.44 2.97
Morbihan
District 1 - - - 2.18 1.69 1.51
District 2 - - - 2.37 1.38 -
District 3 - - 7.44 (with 
Greens)
2.36 1.23 4.25 (with 
Leftists)
District 4 - - - 1.91 1.19 -
District 5 - - - 2.52 1.35 1.45
District 6 - - - 2.32 1.82 -
PAYS DE LA 
LOIRE
Loire
Atlantique
-
District 1 - - 1.09 6.06 (SRE 
list)
0.74 1.08
District 2 - - - 1.26 0.76 0.79
District 3 - - - 1.30 0.95 -
District 4 - - - - 0.68 -
District 5 - - - 1.35 1.16 -
District 6 - - 1.32 1.64 0.99 0.82
District 7 - - - 1.10 1.62 0.81
District 8 - - - 1.20 1.29 0.89
District 9 - - - - 0.67 -
District 10 - - - - 0.89 0.72
AB results in legislative elections
1986 1988 1993 1997 2002 2007
AQUITAINE
Pyrenees-
Atlantiques
511 For the 2007 legislative elections, AB formed an electoral coalition with EA-lparralde and 
Batasuna and presented candidates under the name "Euskal Herria Bai” (EHB).
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District 1 - - - - - -
District 2 - - - - - -
District 3 - - - - - -
District 4 3.35 4.75 10.59 12.97 10.74 13.11 
(EHB List)
District 5 2.14 3.45 2.96 2.65 3.34 4.5 (EHB 
List)
District 6 3.47 5.61 5.03 6.6 5.64 9.09 (EHB 
List)
2. Regional elections
UPC/PNC in regional elections
1986 1992 1998 2004
% Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats
CORSE
512
9.07 6 13.7
(Corsica
Nazione
)
9
(16.8)
3.85 12.14
(Unione
Naziunale)
8
(17.34
in
round
2)
UDB in regional elections
1986 1992 1998 2004513
% Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats
BRETAGNE
Cotes-
d’Armor
2.26
(Kemper
Breizh)
2.23 4.08 9.70
(coalition
with
Greens)
3
Finistere 1.91
(Kemper
Breizh)
2.03 2.77
llle-et-
Vilaine
1.79
(Kemper
Breizh)
1.73 2.53
Morbihan 1.93
(Kemper
Breizh)
2.69 3.88
PAYS DE 
LA LOIRE
Loire-
Atlantique
1.37
(Kemper
Breizh)
1.69 2.47
Maine-et-
Loire
- - - - - -
Mayenne - - - - - -
Sarthe - - - - - -
Vendee - - - - - -
512 Unlike other regions in France, and in accordance with its Special Status, regional elections in 
Corsica are not organised with departments as electoral districts, but within one single 
constituency.
513 Following a change in electoral rules, since 2004, regional elections are organised with the 
entire region as one single constituency.
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AB in regional elections
1986 1992 1998 2004
% Seats .% Seats % Seats % Seats
AQUITAINE
Dordogne - - - - - -
Gironde - - - - - -
Landes - - - - - -
Lot-et-
Garonne
- - - - - -
Pyrenees-
Atlantiques
3.27 
(EB + 
EMA)
3.14 3.78
3. Cantonal elections
UPC/PNC in cantonal elections
1992514 19945'5 1998 2001 2004 2008
CORSE
Corse du 
Sud
Celavo-
Mezzana
13.65 (CN 
coalition)
- -
Tallano-
Scopamana
18.25 (CN 
coalition)
- -
Les Deux 
Sorru
7 (CN 
coalition)
- -
Ajaccio 2 6.11 (CN 
coalition)
- 5.21
Figari 22.01 (CN 
coalition)
- -
Petreto-
Bicchisano
22.48&16 (with 
A Chjama 
Naziunale)
Ajaccio 6 9.94 (CN 
coalition)
- -
Ajaccio 7 14.57 (CN 
coalition)
- -
Ajaccio 1 9.10 (CN 
coalition)
- -
Ajaccio 3 11.79 (CN 
coalition)
- -
Ajaccio 4 12.11 (CN - -
514 For the 1992 regional and cantonal elections, the UPC as well as most Corsican nationalist 
parties (with the exception of MPA) joined the Corsica Nazione (CN) coalition led by Edmond 
Simeoni.
515 The UPC was still part of Corsica Nazione in 1994, although it would leave the coalition just a 
few months after the cantonal elections.
516 Joint UPC/ACN candidate Paul-Joseph Caitucoli was elected in the second round with 45.33 
percent of the votes. He is the first Corsican nationalist to become a departmental councillor in 
Corsica.
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coalition)
Ajaccio 5 18.82 (CN 
coalition)
- -
Bastelica 4.60 (CN 
Coalition)
- 12.69
Les Deux 
Sevi
10.61 (CN 
coalition)
16.64 -
Levie 9.98 (CN 
coalition)
- -
Zicavo 11.89 (CN 
coalition)
- -
Olmeto 7.94 (CN 
coalition)
- -
Porto-
Vecchio
- - 26.89
Haute Corse
Ghisoni 16.06 (CN 
coalition)
- -
Bustanico 6.59 (CN 
coalition)
- 16.68
Vescovato 9.89 (CN 
coalition)
- -
Bastia 5 6.05 (CN 
coalition)
- -
Bastia 1 16.75 (CN 
coalition)
- -
Bastia 3 10.33 (CN 
coalition)
- -
Campoloro 
di Moriani
14.44(CN
coalition)
- -
Canpobianco 23.32 (CN 
coalition)
- -
Corte 10.69 (CN 
coalition)
- -
La Conca 
d’Oro
9.34 (CN 
coalition)
5.31 -
L’lle Rousse 11.66 (CN 
coalition)
- -
Niolu-
Omessa
5.85 (CN 
coalition)
- -
Prunelli 11.66 (CN 
coalition)
- -
Sagro di 
Santa Giulia
14.44 (CN 
coalition)
- -
Venaco 4.70 (CN 
coalition)
11.28 10.11
UDB in cantonal elections
1988 1992 1994 1998 2001 2004 2008
BRETAGNE
Cotes
d’Armor
Plerin 8 - 10.90
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Perros-Guirrec - 7.39 8.07
Plouha 5.53 7.05 7.42
Mael-Carhaix - 6.68 6.20
Paimpol 4.40 5.43 5.84
Chatelaudren - - 4.84
Dinan-Ouest 3.90 - -
La Roche 
Derrien
4.50 6.08 -
Pontrieux - 1.68 -
Begard 5.76 6.60 - 6.65
Guingamp - - 9.06 4.41
Lannion 6.93 - 7.34 5.38
Plouaret 6.74 8.90 5.13 -
St Brieuc Nord - - 3.82 6.74
Treguier 6 5.60 7:38 7.81
Lezardrieux - 3.80 - -
St Brieuc Sud - 2.80 - -
Finistere
Carhaix 10.50 7.85 31.14
(with
Leftists)
Le Guilvinec - 8.52
Rosporden 5.60 5.36 8.14
Brest
Lambezellec
- 7.37
Bannalec - 7.18
Arzano 1.80 7.10
St Pol de Leon - 7.07
Plouzevede - 4.65
Brest Kerichen - 5.52 -
Brest St Pierre - 3.01 -
Pont L’Abbe - 3.30 -
Brest Bellevue - - 2.26 -
Brest Centre - - 2.73 -
Chateaulin - - 6.85 -
Chateauneuf 
du Faou
- - 5.19 10.28
Quimper 1 - - 2.62 -
Quimper 2 - - 2.26 -
Quimper 3 - - 5.96 5.08
St Renan - - 5.06 9.06
Qimperle - - 3.35 -
Douarnenez - - 4.15 -
Landerneau - - 7.36 -
Ploudiry - - 3.96 -
Pont-Aven - - 4.33 -
Taule - 1.90 2.91 -
Ille-et-Vilaine
Rennes Sud 
Est
2 3.50 9.26
Rennes 
Centre Ouest
- 3.74 7.02
Cancale - - 5.53
Cesson-
Sevigne
- - 4.82
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St Malo Sud 3.55 5.25 -
Bruz - 3.39 -
Rennes 
Centre Sud
- - 2.56 2.34
Rennes Nord 
Est
- - 2.01 2.44
Rennes Nord 
Ouest
3.10 2.54
St Aubin du 
Cormier
- 8.54 "
Redon - 6.60 9.78 -
St Malo Nord - - 2.27
Morbihan
Sarzeau 6.45 8.80 9.90
Pluvigner 4.70 4.77 9.18
Locmine - - 7.50
Ploemeur - 3.67 6.54
Quiberon - 4.43
Muzillac - 4.33 5.83
Questembert - - 3.90
Lanester 3.98 4.83 -
Lorient Nord 4.40 4.01 -
Pontivy 2.62 2.79 -
Vannes
Centre
- 6.24 -
Vannes Ouest - 3.81 -
Gourin - 3.07 -
Port-Louis - 4.65 -
St Jean 
Prevelay
- 2.77 -
Ploermel - 5.09 -
Hennebont - 6.80 2.88 4.48
Palais - - - 6.77
Elven - 5.80 3.93 -
Lorient Sud 7.62 10.50 - 4.15
Pont Scorff - - 3.50 -
Malestroit 5.61 - - 4.64
Grand-Champ 5.50 3.12
Plouay - 6.40 5.28 18.49
Vannes Est - - 3.66 5.40
Lorient Centre - - 3.12
Baud - 3.50 - -
Josselin - 5.20 - -
PAYS DE LA 
LOIRE
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Loire-
Atlantique
St Herblain 
Est
13.29
(with
Leftists)
Herbignac - - 4.23
St Nazaire 
Ouest
4.96 2.90 2.93
Ancenis - - 2.92
St Nazaire Est “ 2.52
Nantes 5 3.67 5.55 2.47
Nantes 3 2.50 - 2.20
Nantes 1 - - 1.99
Orvault 2.74 4.02 1.88
Nantes 9 2.38 2.85 1.78
Savenay - - 1.75
Blain " 1.75
St Etienne de 
Montluc
• 1.68
La Baule- 
Escoublac
1.53
Carquefou - - 1.40
Vertou - - 1.37
Bouaye - - 1.81
Croisic - - 2.13 4.62
Guerande - - 3.76 -
Nantes 2 - 3.46 -
Nantes 4 - - 2.54 -
Nantes 6 2.26 3.40 4.53 -
Nantes 7 - - 3.58 -
Nantes 8 - - 3.29 -
Nantes 10 1.80 - 2.02 -
Nozay - - 4.22 -
Pontchateau - - 6.06 -
St Gildas des 
Bois
•* 4.11
St Herblain 1.87 - 5.81 -
St Nazaire - 2.20 4.56 -
St Nicolas de 
Redon
2.33
Ligne - - - 2.29
Montoir de 
Bretagne
3.33
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La Chapelle 
sur Erdre
1.96 7.30 3.81 -
Reze 2.88 - 6.66 2.38
Le Pellerin - - 3.58 -
AB in cantonal elections
1988 1992 1994 1998 2001 2004 2008s17
AQUITAINE
Pyrenees-
Atlantiques
Anglet-Nord 3.62 4.63 4.25
Bayonne-
Est
5.05 6.17 5.82
Bayonne-
Nord
3.1 3.48 3.25
Bayonne-
Ouest
3.15 5.92 5.64
Biarritz-
Ouest
8 5.37 4.68
Hasparren 27.6 19.63 5.5
Iholdy 17.42 13.92 14.73
Bastide-
Clairence
10.2 13.47 12.62
Et Jean 
Pied de Port
26.94 22.04 17.73
Tardets
Sorholus
5 8.07 -
Biarritz-Est 7.03 11.46 14.17 9.73 (EHB 
List)
Bidache 9.20 4.4 8.08 (EHB 
List)
Espelette 10.53 12.33 10.61 22.23 
(EHB List)
St Palais 7.95 - 5.75 8.86 (EHB 
List)
Mauleon-
Licharre
9 8.82 4.90 9.58 (EHB 
List)
St Etienne 
de Baigorri
10.97 11.83 29.13518 31.80519 
(EHB List)
St Jean de 
Luz
7.18 14.14 11.33 15.07 
(EHB List)
Hendaye 6.54 9.93 9.02 12.17 
(EHB List)
Anglet Sud 2.66 6.13 4.57 8.53 (EHB 
List)
517 For the 2008 cantonal elections, AB renewed the “Euskal Herria Bai" (EHB) alliance with EA- 
Iparralde and Batasuna.
AB candidate Jean-Michel Galant went to the second round and got elected as departmental 
councillor for the canton of St Etienne de Baigorri with 44.11 percent of votes.
519 EHB candidate Jean-Michel Galant went to the second round but was not re-elected with 
48.80 percent of votes against 51.20 percent for Jean-Baptiste Lambert (UMP).
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Ustaritz 8.93 11.32 19.58 
(EHB List)
St Pierre 
d’lrube
5.96 5.87 5.18 6.81 (EHB 
List)
Appendix 2: List of Interviews
Unione di U Populu Corsu
Francois Alfonsi, MEP & Leader of the UPC (18th September 2007)
Max Simeoni, Ex-Leader of the UPC (19th September 2007)
Edmond SimeOni, Founder of the UPC & Leader of Chjama Naziunale (23rd 
September 2009)
Abertzaleen Batasuna
Jakes Abeberry, Municipal Councillor of Biarritz & Founder of AB (3rd December 2007)
Jakes Borthayrou, AB Member (4th December 2007)
Peio Etcheverry-Ainchart, AB Spokesperson (4th December 2007)
Michel Berhocoirigoin, President of Laborantza Ganbara / Northern Basque Chamber 
of Agriculture & AB Member (3rd September 2009)
Jean-Noel “Textx” Etcheverry, Coordinator of the Foundation Manu 
Roblez Arangiz & AB Member (11th September 2009)
Union Democratique Bretonne
Herri Gourmelen, Leader of the UDB (27th October 2008)
Nicole Logeais, Secretary-General R&PS & UDB External Relations Coordinator (28th 
October 2008)
Mona Bras, UDB Spokesperson (5th November 2008)
Naig Le Gars, Regional Councillor of Brittany & Leader of the UDB (5th November 
2008)
Christian Guyonvarc’h, Vice-President of the Breton Regional Council & Leader of the 
UDB (3rd September 2009)
